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Chapter   1  Introduction  
1.1  Learning and innovation in industries  
The topic of this study is processes of innovation among firms in an industry. When we study 
innovation processes in an industry it becomes clear that firms do not innovate in isolation 
(Jarillo 1988, Porter 1990, 1998, Lundvall 1992, 1993, Hakansson 1993, Grabher 1993, 
Duysters 1995, Uzzi 1997). To innovate successfully, firms need to search for new sources of 
knowledge and technology in order to be able to continuously develop new products and 
processes. As a consequence, the competitiveness of firms is becoming more dependent on 
complementary knowledge from other firms as well as from knowledge providers or carriers 
such as universities, research institutes, consultants etc. (Baden-Fuller e.a.1995, Chen 1997, 
Porter 1998, Nooteboom 1999a, Rindova e.a. 1999). This increasing dependency poses new 
challenges for firms as the environment in which firms operate becomes more and more 
important for strengthening their innovation performance and competitive advantage. The 
increased dependency on other firms is also reflected in a growing number of studies on 
alliances (Hamel and Prahalad 1990, Smith Ring and van de Ven 1994, Hagedoorn 1993, 
Hagedoorn & Schakenraad 1994, Spekman e.a. 1995, Uzzi 1997, Nooteboom 1999a, Rowley 
e.a. 2000). Still, most of these studies adopt a firm-level perspective and do not take the 
increasing interwovenness of firms and their industry-environment into account. Some studies 
take a more specific interest in the relation between (inter-)firm behaviour and industry-
characteristics by making the generic differentiation between high-tech, medium-tech and 
low-tech industries (e.g. Hagedoorn & Duysters 1999, Hagedoorn 2002), as also used in 
OECD studies (see e.g. OECD 1992, 1997).  
Overall, these studies neglect the specific circumstances and conditions in which technical 
change and innovation are operating. This is rather striking as these circumstances and 
conditions can differ considerably among industries as well as among nations and 
significantly affect the behaviour of firms (Lundvall 1992, Nelson 1993, Edquist 1997, 
Malerba & Breschi 1997, Mowery & Nelson 1999, Nooteboom 2000). As argued by these 
innovation scholars, firm behaviour is shaped by the conditions in which it is embedded and is 
path-dependent (Arthur 1989). This path-dependency manifests itself at the network-level and 
at the firm level. Firms’capabilities have been defined and refined by the types of problems 
tackled in the past, the nature of which has been shaped by the characteristics of the value 
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networks in which firms have historically competed and collaborated. As a consequence, firm 
capabilities are highly specialized and context-specific (Nelson & Winter 1982, Dosi e.a. 
1988, Christensen 1997, Mowery & Nelson 1999, McEvily and Zaheer 1999, Rowley e.a. 
2000). This embeddedness manifests itself in strategies, structures, policies and procedures 
that are based on the specific network structure. This may lead to the development of cohesive 
and integrated structures within networks and as such lead to the build-up of a competitive 
position. However, in this is a potential danger as such a ‘robust system’ is not very inclined 
to adapt when circumstances change (Arthur 1990, Whitley 1994, Rumelt 1998, Porter 1998, 
Nooteboom 2000). A (sudden) need for change may run counter to behavioural and 
professional norms in networks (Coleman 1988). Proven approaches have institutionalised 
into habits and routines (Nelson & Winter 1982) and powerful forces may work against 
modifying strategies. Firms can lose competitive advantage because of emerging weaknesses 
in their environment (Porter 1990). When a network in which a firm operates is not able to 
respond to new (technological) developments, the consequences for the networks as well as 
for (some of) its firms can be severe (Nahapiet and Ghoshal 1998).
Such dynamic aspects of learning and innovation within networks still remain relatively 
unexplored in the literature (McEvily and Zaheer & 1999, Pavitt 2002). Therefore, in this 
research we make an effort to identify how the evolution of knowledge, learning and 
innovation takes place within networks of firms. We will make use of Grandori’s definition of 
networks as ‘a set of firms, generally characterized by different preferences and resources, 
coordinated through a mix of mechanisms not limited to price, exit and background 
regulation’ (Grandori 1999 : 2). 
1.2   Ontology and research aim  
In this paragraph we describe and explain the object of study. In doing so, we start by 
discussing some ontological issues (paragraph 1.2.1). Based on that we discuss the relevance 
of the (National) Systems of Innovation approach for our study (paragraph 1.2.2). Next we 
formulate our research aim (paragraph 1.2.3). 
1.2.1   Some ontological issues 
Ontology entails the set of basic assumptions on the nature of actors and how we see the 
relationship between actors and their environment.
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Our research starts from the assumption that knowledge is the most important resource for 
innovation and learning its key-process (Lundvall 1992) and we adopt an endogenous view on 
them. In addition, we assume that actors who engage in learning are boundedly rational. So, 
their information processing capabilities are limited and costly and hence information will be 
imperfect. Such bounded rationality is an important condition for learning. Learning can only 
take place in circumstances in which agents have an imperfect understanding of the world in 
which they operate (Dosi & Marengo 2000). Furthermore, we assume that to the extent that 
different people have developed in different social and physical surroundings and have not 
interacted with each other, they will see the world differently. Hence their cognition will 
differ resulting in a greater or lesser cognitive distance (Nooteboom 1999, 2000). Cognitive 
distance reflects diversity of knowledge that yields a potential for Schumpeterian novel 
combinations to emerge (Johnson 1992). So, novelty can thus be perceived as to originate 
from the (re-)combination of existing and diverse parts of knowledge.  
In line with this view is the assumption that interaction emerges because actors are 
heterogeneous, not because they are similar and that it is by means of interaction that actors 
are able to combine and integrate complementary knowledge and capabilities. From this 
interaction common meanings and frameworks are constructed, which connects with a social 
constructivist view (Berger & Luckmann 1966). According to this view, no objective 
knowledge of reality can be claimed and different views of this reality can exist (Nooteboom 
2000). From this social constructivist view follows a broad definition of knowledge as 
including perception, understanding and value judgements (Nooteboom 2000), which are 
contingent upon institutions. 
Institutions form a central notion in evolutionary theory1. Institutions can be seen as ‘devices’ 
which shape the way in which individuals perceive the world surrounding them (Johnson 
1992). As such, institutions influence social interaction and thus affect learning processes. 
According to Douglas (1987 : 2), ‘people recognise, classify, remember and forget in 
accordance with institutions’. So, institutions select the transfer and retention of knowledge 
and information. In this research we adopt a broad definition of institutions as the ‘sets of 
1 At the heart of evolutionary theory is the notion of a process of endogenous change, in contrast with the static 
perspective of neo-classical equilibrium theory. These patterns of change are directly linked to learning 
processes which underlie technological advancements and innovations. These change processes are described in 
terms of the three evolutionary metaphors of variety, selection and transmission&retention. Variety is the 
creation of novelty within a population. Selection occurs through competition among the alternative novel forms 
that exist. Transmission & Retention involves those forces that perpetuate and maintain those forms that were 
selected in the past (Nelson & Winter 1982). These evolutionary mechanisms should be seen as three continuous 
interacting  forces which  shape an evolutionary pattern of (technical) change. 
16
common habits, routines, established practices, informal and formal rules, laws and so on that 
regulate the relations and interactions between individuals and groups’(Dosi e.a. 1988,  Scott 
1995, Edquist & Johnson 1997). Taken together, we conceive of institutions as a selection 
environment in which interfirm learning and innovation processes are embedded.  
From this social constructivist view of knowledge and learning follows an embedded view on 
interfirm networks: different institutional environments stimulate different types and levels of  
interaction, leading to different networks and learning patterns. To specify this embedded 
view of networks, the (National) Systems of Innovation approach may further inform us.  
1.2.2   (National) Systems of Innovation  
The notion of different actors, connected by interactive learning processes shaped by 
institutions, forms the basis for the (National) Systems of Innovation approach (Lundvall 
1992, Nelson 1993, Edquist 1997). This approach studies the relationship between 
institutions, organisations and innovation. A (national) system of innovation consists of 
elements and relationships which interact in the production, diffusion and use of new, 
economically useful knowledge. Although there exist different approaches to (national) 
systems of innovation, all have innovation processes and learning at their center and consider 
technological and institutional change as evolutionary2.
The systems-element connects with the notion to incorporate all possibly relevant elements in 
a systemic way; to not only treat the elements constituting the system but also the way these 
elements interact. Such a system-based approach adds value in (moderately) complex systems 
in which system properties such as feedback become more important. In such a system of 
non-linear relationships among variables, it is less meaningful to differentiate between 
independent and dependent variables since changes in one variable are caused endogenously 
by others (Baum & Singh 1994, Edquist 1997). 
So, this NSI-approach is relevant for our study as it enables us to deal with an embedded view 
of networks. More specifically then, to deal with the notion of circumstances and conditions 
2 Although there exist different approaches to (National) Systems of Innovation (SoI’s), they share their 
intellectual roots in evolutionary economic theory (McKelvey 1997, Edquist 1997). The evolutionary 
characteristics of SoI’s are that they put innovations and learning at the center and that a historical perspective is 
natural. Furthermore they acknowledge the notion of non-optimality and consider institutions as a central 
explaining factor to learning and innovation (Nelson and Winter 1982, Johnson 1992).  
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that can differ among industries, we adopt the concept of a Sectoral System of Innovation
from Malerba (2002). He defines a Sectoral System of Innovation (SIS) as ‘composed of a set 
of heterogeneous actors carrying out market and non-market interaction for the generation, 
adoption and use of new and established knowledge and for the creation, production and use 
of new and established products’.3 Following this definition, we see the following arguments 
why our use of the concept of a SIS is relevant to study networks of firms. Firstly, according 
to this definition of a SIS, interaction among actors is crucial. This connects with our social-
constructivist, interactionist ontology with regard to learning, as discussed above. Secondly, 
relations and networks form the core of a SIS and form an integral element of the learning and 
innovation processes within it (Malerba 2002). This connects with our interest in the dynamic 
aspects of learning and innovation in networks of firms. Furthermore, the concept of a SIS 
points to the relevance of sectoral institutions such as among others the knowledge base, 
appropriability conditions, opportunity conditions and so on (Malerba and Breschi 1997). In 
this respect, it is the central claim that we make in this study that to develop a dynamic 
understanding of the role of knowledge, learning and innovation in networks of firms, the role 
of such sectoral institutions needs to be considered. In this respect, we will abstract from the 
role of national and/or regional institutions and will also pay less attention to the spatial 
boundaries of networks. 4
1.2.3   Research aim 
As argued, we see networks as being conditioned by the institutional environment of the SIS 
in which they are embedded. From our ontology it follows that different institutional 
environments stimulate different types and levels of social interaction, leading to differences 
in learning patterns. An interesting question now is which aspects of such learning patterns 
are present in different SIS’s and which aspects are more idiosyncratic for a specific SIS. One 
3 This does not imply that products pertain to a sector in a narrow sense. Innovation can generate new (classes 
of) products that cross sectoral boundaries giving rise to changes in existing sectoral boundaries. 
4 A concept that is closely related to a SIS is that of a Technological System (TS) as developed by Carlsson 
(1995, 1997, 2002, Carlsson and Eliasson 2003). He distinguishes three dimensions of a TS, namely (1) a 
cognitive dimension that defines the clustering of technologies resulting in a new set of technological 
possibilities, (2) an organizational and institutional dimension that captures the interactions in the network of 
actors engaged in the creation of these technologies and (3) an economic dimension that defines the set of actors 
who convert technological possibilities into business opportunities, also referred to as a ‘competence bloc’. The 
concept of a TS strongly emphasizes the role of (new) technology in explaining economic growth (Carlsson 
2002, Carlsson and Eliasson 2003). Due to this strong focus on technology, one abstracts to some extent from 
other sectoral characteristics such as opportunity conditions, appropriability conditions, demand conditions and 
so on. For the purpose of our study, we consider these sectoral institutional conditions as important to include 
into our analysis, as we will argue throughout this study (see in particular chapter 2, 3 and 4), and will therefore 
make use of the concept of a SIS.
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important element of a learning pattern that we expect to be present in different SIS’s is that 
outcomes of interfirm learning can also shape the institutional environment and may lead to 
path-creation, exerting considerable influence on the broader structure in which they are 
embedded (Mowery & Nelson 1999). So, given our interest in the dynamic aspects of learning 
in networks of firms, we are interested in a two-way relationship between networks and their 
institutional environment.  
Based on these considerations we propose formulating our research aim as follows : 
To determine 
- how the institutional environment of a SIS conditions interfirm learning, 
- how outcomes of interfirm learning may affect the institutional environment,
- and in how far this varies per type of SIS
We argue that SIS’s may greatly differ in terms of the properties of their knowledge base 
upon which learning and innovation are based (Malerba 2002). More specifically, we assume 
that heterogeneous actors searching around similar knowledge bases and embedded in the 
same institutional environment share some common behavioural and organizational traits and 
develop a similar range of learning patterns and behaviour. Moreover, we assume that 
decisions and actions of firms are enabled as well as constrained by actions and knowledge of 
other firms in their SIS (Lundvall 1992). So, there is a collective dimension to innovation in 
addition to an individual dimension (McKelvey 1997). As we study networks from the 
perspective of a SIS, we are especially interested in this collective dimension, seeing 
innovation in networks as a collective learning process.  
Rather than developing a detailed understanding of the structure of a SIS and the networks 
within it at a specific point in time, our interest entails the dynamics of aggregate learning and 
innovation patterns. This reflects our interactionistic ontology that to understand why a 
specific pattern of learning in networks develops, one needs to understand the dynamic 
processes that generated it. In line with this, we are interested in the changing nature of the 
relationships among firms, rather than in acts of individual firms. So, a network of firms 
forms our unit of analysis.  
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1.3   Research questions 
Following our ontology and research aim, in this paragraph we will formulate our research 
questions.
As mentioned, institutions play an important role in learning processes. Obviously, there are 
institutions in wider society which do not affect learning and innovation and they will not be 
our object of study. We are interested in those institutions that provide incentives to learn and 
innovate as well as institutions that shape or influence the direction of these learning and 
innovation activities. This leads to our first two research questions : 
- 1.  Which institutions are relevant for interfirm learning, 
           and
- 2.  How do these institutions condition interfirm learning ? 
In the literature on learning and innovation, institutions are often considered as exogenous.  It 
is assumed that institutions determine the learning and innovation patterns in an industry 
(Pavitt 1984, Nelson 1993, Malerba & Breschi 1997, Malerba & Orsenigo 1996, Carlsson 
1997, 2002, Mowery & Nelson 1999). In such an approach a rather deterministic stance is 
taken that resembles a  traditional ‘structure-conduct-performance view’ : an exogenous 
structure determines conduct which subsequently leads to a certain performance. This clearly 
ignores the notion that outcomes of such learning and innovation can also (substantially) 
affect the institutional environment. In terms of the evolutionary mechanisms,  these studies 
strongly focus on how selection processes take place but do not investigate how this relates to 
variety nor how variety affects selection again. We consider that to be too limited when 
developing a dynamic understanding of learning and innovation in networks. Following our 
social constructivist, interactionist view of knowledge we argue that outcomes that result from 
the behaviour of firms can also change the institutional environment which has first shaped 
this behaviour. So, we argue that firms are not only shaped by their institutional environment 
but are also shapers of this same environment.5 Outcomes of learning can cause changes in 
5 This goes back to Veblen who took an interactionistic stance in the sense that actor and structure interact and 
mutually condition each other to the degree that explanation based on either actor or structure alone are 
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the institutional environment and hence lead to changes in the selection process. So, there is a 
dynamic relation between the generation of novelty (variety) and selection among 
alternatives. Or rephrased in terms of our research, there is a dynamic interplay between the 
institutional environment and institutionalised interfirm learning.  
This connects with a discussion among sociologists on the relation between structure and 
agency or, rephrased, between the over- versus undersocialised conceptions of human action.  
The undersocialised view is committed to social atomism which claims that human behaviour 
can be identified independently of its social environment. Its methodological approach is 
individualism which is based on the  assumption that individuals form the ultimate 
constituents of society and that only data about individuals are relevant for understanding 
human behaviour (Wilber & Harrison 1978). Methodological individualism leads to ‘upward 
conflation’, i.e. making it difficult to recognize how economic action is enabled and 
constrained by the social structure in which actors are embedded (Archer 1995). The 
oversocialised view on the other hand assumes that people follow customs, habits or norms in 
an automatic and unconditional way. Its methodological approach is collectivism which 
portrays individuals as unilaterally determined by the social structure. Methodological 
collectivism leads to ‘downward conflation’, i.e. ‘considering individuals as indeterminate 
material unilaterally moulded by society, whose holistic properties have complete monopoly 
over causation, and which therefore operate in a unilateral and downward manner’ (Archer 
1995 : 3). As we consider the dynamic relation between selection and the generation of 
variety, we need to thread our way between upward and downward conflation by analysing 
how behaviour is embedded in its institutional environment as well as how behaviour gives 
rise to changes in the institutional environment. 
Our third research question is therefore : 
3.  What are the outcomes of interfirm learning and how do they affect the                  
 institutional environment? 
When studying learning and innovation according to these three research questions, which 
stress the dynamic aspects of interfirm learning, it seems to be appropriate to conceive of this 
unwarranted : ‘both the agent and his environment being at any point in time the outcome of the past process’ 
(Veblen 1898: 391) 
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dynamic relation between institutional environment and interfirm learning as a co-
evolutionary process. Underlying this co-evolutionary process are the three evolutionary 
mechanisms of selection, transmission&retention and variety generation. These mechanisms 
function as interacting forces which drive the co-evolutionary process into its path-dependent 
direction. One evolutionary mechanism may dominate a specific phase of the co-evolutionary 
process and as such affect interfirm learning. In the case of substantial selection forces, the 
generation of variety may be hampered or even become blocked. When variety abounds, the 
exploitation of what has been discovered may be blocked. Transmission mechanisms used in 
a network of firms may affect both selection and variety. So, the specific combination of  
evolutionary mechanisms affects interfirm learning and therefore also has implications for 
networks with regard to modes of  organisation and coordination mechanisms. We are 
interested in how far this co-evolutionary process is present in different types of SIS’s and in 
how far it differs between different SIS’s. More specifically, we are interested in which 
elements of this co-evolutionary process are more SIS-generic and which elements are more 
SIS-specific.  
As argued, the evolutionary approach as developed by Nelson & Winter (1982) provides the 
general framework for our study. This approach studies individual and collective cognitive 
processes and considers routinized behaviour as the central element in economic evolution. 
However, this approach tends to ignore the fact that from these processes conflicts and 
opportunistic behaviour may emerge. Therefore, in this research we aim to develop an 
understanding of on the one hand stimulating interactive learning processes as developed by 
evolutionary theory, NSI-approaches and competence-based approaches, and on the other 
hand, reconciling diverging interests among dependent firms as developed by transaction 
costs economics. Transaction cost economics is often criticised for being static (Lazonick 
1993, Groenewegen e. a. 1995) and neglecting learning (Lundvall 1993, Nooteboom 2000). 
So, there is an analytical gap between governance perspectives and competence perspectives 
and an evident need to connect them (Williamson 1999, Nooteboom 1999, 2000, Dosi and 
Marengo 2000). In our research we want to develop an effort to combine these two lines of 
thought by analysing incentives, coordination and cognition related problems of interfirm 
learning and knowledge creation. Therefore, our fourth research question reads as follows : 
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4.  What are the implications of the co-evolutionary process for networks of 
firms and their coordination, from both a competence and governance 
perspective?  
With regard to this last question we need to add that we not only aim to describe these 
implications but also intend to explain them. This explanation should follow from our first 
three research questions that should enable us to explain why a specific combination of 
network structure and forms of coordination emerges in a SIS at a specific point in time. In 
chapter 6 on methodology we will further elaborate on some of the issues that are relevant 
with regard to explanatory research. 
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1.4   Overview of  study 
Following our research questions, in this paragraph we discuss the structure of our study and 
the build-up of this book. 
Chapter 2 Selection by the institutional environment 
This chapter deals with research question 1:
 Which institutions are relevant for interfirm learning?
In this chapter we will unravel the institutional environment. To do so, we introduce a model 
of institutional levels that differentiates between the institutional environment on the one hand 
and a level of embedded, institutionalised behaviour on the other hand. With regard to the 
institutional environment the model takes a nested view and makes a distinction between 
different levels of institutions. Based on this distinction, we identify those institutions that are 
relevant for learning and innovation in a SIS, based on the contributions by scholars from 
different bodies of literature such as evolutionary theory, NSI-approaches, industrial 
dynamics and social network theory.  
Chapter 3 Learning regimes  
This chapter deals with research question 2: 
 How do these institutions condition interfirm learning?
Chapter 3 builds on the analysis as developed in chapter 2 by analysing the level of 
institutionalised interfirm behaviour. We differentiate between two types of institutionalised 
interfirm behaviour, namely interfirm learning behaviour and interfirm dependent behaviour. 
Interfirm learning behaviour takes a competence perspective, based on which we discuss how 
the identified institutions condition interfirm learning activities. From these activities 
originates interfirm dependency. Interfirm dependency then requires a governance 
perspective, based on which we discuss how the identified institutions condition this interfirm 
dependency. In order to be clear about these two different but related forms of interfirm 
behaviour, we analyse both types separately before integrating them. To reconcile both 
perspectives, we introduce the concept of a learning regime.  
The institutions of the institutional environment, as analysed in chapter 2, and the elements of 
a learning regime, as analysed in chapter 3, are not independent. On the contrary, there are 
many connections among these variables, creating systemic combinations of features. In this 
respect, these chapters 2 and 3 reflect a static view of the relation between the institutional 
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environment and learning regimes and relate to the first part of our research aim, namely how 
the institutional environment conditions interfirm learning.  
Chapter 4 Co-evolution of institutional environment and learning regimes 
This chapter deals with research question 3: 
What are the outcomes of interfirm learning and how do they affect the institutional 
environment? 
Chapter 4 builds on the analysis in chapter 2 and chapter 3 and discusses the dynamic relation 
between a learning regime and the institutional environment. To study this dynamic interplay 
we will make use of a co-evolutionary approach. Co-evolutionary inquiry attempts to 
understand and predict how variables in the system respond to changes in other system 
variables or in changes to the structure of the system itself. As a way to structure this co-
evolutionary process we use the concept of the Cycle of Knowledge as developed by 
Nooteboom (2000). From the dynamic viewpoint of the Cycle of Knowledge, the systemic 
combinations can be considered as a specific ‘point’ at this Cycle. In this chapter we now 
analyse the transition of these systemic combinations over time. Such a transition can be 
considered as a ‘movement’ of such a systemic combination along the Cycle. This reflects a 
dynamic view and relates to the second part of our research aim, namely to changes in the 
relation between institutional environment and learning regimes.  
Chapter 5  Implications of the co-evolutionary process for networks, social capital  
and governance 
This chapter deal with research question 4 and 5: 
What are the implications of the co-evolutionary process for networks of firms and 
their coordination, from both a competence and governance perspective?
Chapter 5 focuses on the implications for networks of firms that follow from the co-
evolutionary process. An important implication relates to the choice of the organisational 
mode that is best suited to deal with learning and innovation. So, we discuss which type of 
network is best suited to deal with which type of learning. Next we discuss the implications of 
the co-evolutionary process for the properties of the relations making up these networks and 
the way these relations are coordinated. This combination of network structure, relational 
properties and coordination mechanisms may affect the co-evolutionary process. It may speed 
up learning but can also have a negative effect.  
25
Chapter 6 Methodology 
Chapter 6 forms the basis for the empirical part of our research and focuses on the 
development of a sound methodology to arrive at scientifically accountable answers to our 
research questions. Our interest in the dynamic relation between institutional environment and 
learning regimes, and to analyse this in terms of a co-evolutionary process, calls for a 
methodology that enables us to capture both the process of selection and the generation of 
variety. The development of such a methodology forms an important focus of this chapter. 
Based on that, we then focus on issues of operationalisation by specifying how we measure 
our key-constructs and how we select our research method. Finally, we discuss methods of 
data collection.
Chapter 7 Multimedia 
This chapter deals with the co-evolution of institutional environment and learning regimes in 
the multimedia system of innovation in the Netherlands over the period from around 1990 
towards 2000. 
Chapter 8 Pharmaceutical biotechnology 
This chapter deals with the co-evolution of institutional environment and learning regimes in 
the pharmaceutical biotechnology system of innovation in the Netherlands over the period 
from the late 1980’s towards 2001. 
Chapter 9 Conclusions 
Chapter 9 is our final chapter in which the main conclusions are formulated, based on a 
confrontation between our theoretical framework and the empirical research. 
Summing up: 
Our research covers the following three objectives : 
1. To identify systemic combinations of institutional environment and institutionalised 
behaviour (learning regimes). These systemic combinations are static and reflect a 
specific point at the Cycle of Knowledge.
2. To identify the transition of those systemic combinations over time, as a movement 
along the Cycle of Knowledge
3. To identify and explain the implications of those transitions in terms of network 
structure, relational properties and coordination mechanisms.
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Schematically: 
























   Theoretical framework 
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1.5            Contribution to theory and to an understanding of the dynamics of  
                 interfirm learning in networks
As outlined, this study aims to develop an understanding of the dynamics of interfirm learning 
in networks of firms. By analysing learning processes in such networks, and the changes 
created within them, we aim to shed some more light on the mechanisms that generate variety. 
In this respect we go beyond the selection bias as present in most innovation studies by 
developing an attempt to acquire an endogenous understanding of the origins of novelty in 
networks of firms. As argued, this requires a synthesis between evolutionary economics and 
the NSI-approach on the one hand and concepts from social network theory on the other hand.  
In evolutionary economics and the NSI-approach in particular, a key-role is attached to 
relations and interaction among actors (Lundvall 1992, Edquist 1997). This agreement on the 
importance of relations and interaction notwithstanding, in this literature an in-depth 
understanding of the structure and functioning of networks is still underdeveloped. For this 
we need to turn to the social network literature. This literature has developed various concepts 
and tools to analyse social networks from different angles (Granovetter 1973, Coleman 1988, 
Burt 1992). Due to this strong focus on structural elements of networks though, the 
identification of relevant institutional conditions and how they influence the structure and 
functioning of networks has generally been ignored by social network theorists. As a 
consequence, there is a strong universalistic tone in this literature. By combining these two 
different strands of literature we aim to develop a more profound understanding of how the 
structure and role of networks varies with the institutional conditions in different SIS’s. In 
doing so, we also contribute to the social network literature by showing that there is no such 
thing as a universally optimal network structure and that this optimality is subject to the 
specificities of the institutional environment in which the network is embedded.6 So, 
combining these lines of thought enables us to address various puzzles such as in how far 
specific types of SIS’s favour specific network structures and also which type of network 
structure favours which type of learning. Other questions that we address are for example 
what the effects are on learning and innovation when networks show very dense relations or, 
alternatively, very loose relations between firms.   
6 Moreover, the notion of a universally optimal network structure would be difficult to reconcile with our 
evolutionary approach. According to evolutionary economic theory, “systems never achieve an equilibrium since 
the evolutionary processes in it are open-ended and path-dependent. We do not even know whether the potential 
best trajectory is exploited at all, since we do not know which one it is” (Edquist 1997: 20). As argued in 
paragraph 1.2, we see selection to take place in relation to the distinctive structure of the institutional 
environment, reflecting the assumption of local optimality (McKelvey 1997). Hence the optimality of the 
network structure is subject to the specificities of this institutional environment so that this optimality is local 
instead of universal.  
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Furthermore, this study is an attempt to reconcile two views on organisation, namely a 
competence-view and a governance-view. As argued, there is an analytical gap between both 
perspectives and an evident need to connect them (Williamson 1999, Nooteboom 1999, 2000, 
Dosi and Marengo 2000). So, in this study we also develop an effort to combine a competence 
view with a governance view.  
In sum, this study is at the crossroads of two theoretical perspectives, to which we add some 
notions on governance as advanced by Transaction Cost Economics (TCE). This is 
schematically portrayed in figure 1.1. 
Figure 1.1 : Combination of theoretical perspectives 
In contrast with theoretical monism that is based on the conviction that the goal of science is 
to find a universally true theory, this combined use of different theories clearly reflects a 
theoretical pluralistic stance. Theoretical pluralism approves of a plurality of theories for a 
given set of phenomena which is based on the ground that any single theory inevitably gives a 
partial account (Groenewegen and Vromen 1996). This is not for reasons of pragmatism but 
because theoretical pluralists are led by the idea that a deeper understanding of phenomena 
can be enhanced by using different theories instead of one. An important assumption here is 
though that theories do not contradict each other. To assess this, we need to go back to our 
ontology as articulated in paragraph 1.2.  











The central premise in our ontology is that of bounded rationality. As argued, bounded 
rationality is an important condition for learning as this can only take place when agents have 
an imperfect understanding of the world in which they operate (Dosi & Marengo 12000). In 
terms of Lakatos (1978), all three theoretical frameworks that we use in this study have as 
their ‘hard-core proposition’ this notion of bounded rationality and are in this respect 
compatible with our ontology. Furthermore, when considering social network theory, two 
important ontological premises that underlie social network analysis are that actors and their 
actions are viewed as interdependent, instead of independent, and that relational ties are 
channels for transformation of material and non-material resources (Wasserman & Faust 
1994). This connects with our ontology making our use of social network theory indeed 
legitimate for the purpose of our research. With regard to the issues of governance we can 
make the following observations. First of all, introducing such a governance perspective does 
not imply that we integrate TCE with our two main theoretical frameworks. That would be 
problematic. TCE explicitly takes an efficiency perspective by dealing with the question how 
differences in dimensions of transactions determine which governance structures most 
efficiently economize on transaction costs (Williamson 1975). Moreover, TCE does not 
include learning and innovation, seeks equilibrium outcomes and is based on methodological 
individualism, negating the relevance of social embeddedness (Williamson 1999). This is all 
incompatible with our ontology. As articulated in paragraph 1.2, we acknowledge the 
profound role of institutions and assume selection to take place in relation to the distinctive 
structure of this institutional environment, reflecting the assumption of local optimality 
(Nelson 1987, McKelvey 1997) instead of universal optimality as assumed by TCE. So while 
rejecting TCE on a deeper level, we argue that on a more practical, instrumental level there 
are some notions that can provide an important complement to our study. As we will further 
argue in chapter 3, engaging in interactive learning processes makes firms become dependent 
on one another. This dependency yields a risk of conflict and opportunism and we agree with 
Williamson in this respect that ‘opportunism is so familiar that we often fail to acknowledge it 
and its consequences when we see it’ (Williamson 1999 : 1098). The potential for 
opportunism and its consequences may severely affect interfirm learning and can therefore 
not be ignored. This is increasingly being acknowledged by scholars from both strands of 
literature, by Williamson himself (1999) as well as by Nooteboom (1999, 2000) and Dosi and 
Marengo (2000). 
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So, our study is based on two theoretical pillars, namely evolutionary economics and the  
NSI-approach on the one hand and social network theory on the other hand. This reflects a 
competence view of learning. As argued, to reconcile this with a governance view, we add 
some notions on governance derived from TCE. 
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Chapter 2  Selection by the Institutional Environment 
Research Question 1 :
Which institutions are relevant for interfirm learning? 
2.1 Introduction 
As argued in chapter 1, we conceive of an institutional selection environment as consisting of 
different types of institutions. Interfirm learning and innovation processes are embedded in 
this institutional selection environment. This idea of embeddedness in the environment 
reflects the profound influence of institutions on the learning processes that take place among 
firms in an industry. Embeddedness refers to the contingency of interfirm relationships on the 
(social) institutions in which these relationships are embedded (Granovetter 1985, Grabher 
1993,  Whitley 1994, Grandori & Soda 1995). 
In this research, we adopt a broad definition of institutions as the ‘sets of common habits, 
routines, established practices, informal and formal rules, laws that condition the relations and 
interactions between individuals and groups’ (Dosi e.a. 1988,  Scott 1995, Edquist & Johnson 
1997). Taken together, these institutions form the institutional selection environment.  
Structuring the notion of an institutional selection environment 
In order to make this institutional environment more explicit, we propose the following two 
steps. We structure our concept of institutions by means of an ordering principle. Our 
ordering principle follows from the assumption that networks in a SIS, for evolutionary 
survival, need to continuously adapt to changes in their institutional environment. Therefore, 
we propose as a ordering principle the adaptibility of the various institutions.  
As a second step, we follow the suggestions made both by Nelson and Sampat (1999) and 
Nooteboom (2000) to conceptualise the notion of an institution as a process of 
institutionalising. In doing so, we free ourselves from the need to identify types of institutions 
that may have relevance, to a greater or lesser extent, in any specific context. Not all 
institutions are relevant at the same time for all networks in a SIS. So, we can specify those 
institutions that are relevant at a certain moment in time and leave aside those which are not. 
A second implication by conceptualising it as a process is that we can portray the institutional 
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environment as a ‘hierarchy of institutions’ (Nooteboom 2000). Some institutions are 
embedded in ‘higher institutions’ but at the same time embedding ‘lower institutions’. 
Based on these two steps, adaptability as the ordering principle and a process of 
institutionalising, we propose conceptualising the institutional environment as a hierarchy of 
institutions structured by the ease with which institutions are able to adapt. See also figure 
2.1.
Figure 2.1 : Schematic representation of the relation between the institutional 
environment and institutionalised behaviour 
Unraveling the institutional selection environment
Based on the above defined steps and considerations, we develop an attempt in this chapter to 
depict the institutions that form the institutional environment. Based on the contributions 
made by different scholars we will identify those institutions that are relevant for innovation 
processes in a SIS. We consider these different types of institutions as systemic features: they 
are mutually related and as such form a system, i..e. change in one institution will have 
consequences for others as well. Embedded in this institutional selection environment are 
interfirm learning processes that are conditioned by it, hence we see these interfirm learning 
processes as institutionalised behaviour (Lundvall 1992).  
Following the logic of figure 2.1, this chapter is structured as follows. In paragraph 2.2 we 
briefly discuss the role of the institutions at the 1st level of the institutional environment. 
Paragraph 2.3 deals extensively with institutions at the 2nd level of the institutional 
1
st
 Level   Cultural and National Institutions 
2
nd
 Level  SIS-specific Institutions 
                 
3
rd
 Level   Network Structure, Relational Properties &  
                  Coordination Mechanisms 
Level of Institutionalised 
Behaviour 
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environment. Paragraph 2.4 deals with the 3rd level in more detail. Finally, in paragraph 2.5, 
we discuss some of the systemic relations that exist between these different institutional 
levels. The level of institutionalised behaviour, as portrayed by the oval in figure 2.1, will be 
the topic of chapter 3.
st
The 1st level describes the cultural and national environment in which a SIS is embedded. As 
such, this level is generic for any SIS within it. This level contains various elements such as 
culture, the role of the state, the financial system, labour market institutions and so on. We 
consider this level, in terms of adaptability, as the most outer layer, i.e. change in this layer is 
highly incremental. Through its generic and encompassing character, it basically creates the 
selection environment for lower institutional levels as it enables and constrains these lower 
institutions, and in doing so, affects the embedded learning and innovation processes.  
As argued in chapter 1, we are interested in the dynamic aspects of learning and innovation in 
networks, from the perspective of a SIS. So we have a special interest in the dynamic relation 
between sectoral and network institutions and therefore abstract from national institutions. We 
will therefore not further incorporate this level into our analysis but only mention it here for 




Our 2nd level of the institutional environment is formed by those institutions that differ per 
type of SIS and can be highly idiosyncratic. These institutions are more adaptable than the 
institutions on the first level, which does not mean that change takes place quickly and easily. 
Change takes place in an incremental way but when pressures for change become manifest 
enough, institutions at this level can change relatively easily and quickly, compared with the 
1st level. Given our research aim as formulated in chapter 1, we will focus here on those SIS-
specific institutions that are relevant for interfirm learning and innovation processes. To do so, 
we will first identify these various relevant types of institutions (paragraph 2.3.1) based on 
which we then discuss how these institutions are related (paragraph 2.3.2). 
2.3.1  Identifying 2
nd
 level institutions 
We see the following elements as the institutions that are specific to a SIS namely the 
knowledge base, appropriability conditions, opportunity conditions, demand conditions and  




As argued in chapter 1, we consider interfirm learning to be specific to a SIS. As a 
consequence, SIS’s may   greatly differ in terms of the properties of their knowledge base 
upon which learning and innovation are based.  We see the following properties as relevant : 
Tacit vs. codified  
Tacit knowledge is embodied in people and context-specific that makes it difficult to 
formalise and transfer to others. Codified knowledge is made explicit through documents, 
standard operating procedures, technical norms and so and can therefore be (relatively) easily 
transferred to others by a formal, systematic language (Polanyi 1966).  
Systemic vs. stand-alone 
Knowledge is systemic when it consists of an integration of different scientific and/or 
engineering disciplines required for innovation (Teece 1986), forming part of a larger system. 
Knowledge is stand-alone when it can be considered to be as (relatively) isolated from other 
knowledge (Malerba and Breschi 1997). 
Level of diffusion 
Knowledge, in either tacit and/or codified form, can pertain to an individual or a single firm  
indicating a low level of diffusion. Knowledge can also be widely diffused among firms in a 
SIS, indicating a high level of diffusion.  
Generic vs. Specific 
The knowledge may be of a generic nature or specific to certain application domains (Malerba 
& Breschi 1997). 
Cumulativeness 
Cumulativeness indicates the probability of innovating at time t+1 is conditional on 
innovations at time t or on previous periods and experiences. It indicates the level of 
continuity in innovative activities (Malerba & Breschi 1997). 
35
Rate of change
The development of knowledge can range from very slow in stationary environments and 
increase towards high speed in turbulent environments (Lundvall 1992). 7
Opportunity conditions 
Opportunity conditions indicate the presence of clear incentives to undertake innovative 
activities (Marsili 2001). 
Level 
A high level of opportunities indicates that potential innovators may come up with 
(technological) innovations in easier ways and thus provides powerful incentives for firms to 
undertake innovative activities. A low level indicates that the ease with which (technological)  
innovations can be achieved is limited and thus provides weak incentives to undertake 
innovative activities (Malerba and Breschi 1997, Marsili 2001). 
Variety 
A rich variety in opportunity conditions is associated with ample potential for diversity in 
(technological) solutions, approaches and activities. Low variety indicates that this potential 
for diversity is limited, for example after the emergence of a dominant design when the focus 
shifts to improve existing products and processes (Malerba & Breschi 1997). 
Source
The source of opportunity may differ per type of SIS and can vary from scientific 
breakthroughs in academia, technological progress in R&D, improvements in production or 
other functional disciplines within firms to external sources such as users and/or suppliers 
(Malerba and Breschi 1997). 
7 Rate of change should not not be confused with radicality. A high speed of change is typically associated with 
radical innovations and a low speed of change with incremental innovations. However, incremental change may 
also be fast, whereas radical change may be slow. Obviously ‘fast’ and ‘slow’ are subjective notions and should 
therefore be interpreted with care, also because their connotation differs per type of  SIS. A period of let’s say 
two years for the development of an innovation may be considered long in one SIS and may be (very) short in 
another SIS.  
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Demand  
As argued by various scholars, demand may provide powerful incentives to firms for 
undertaking innovative activities (van Hippel 1988, Porter 1990, Lundvall 1992).  We see the 
following properties of demand as relevant: 
Size & Growth  
Growth and size are interrelated and should be seen in relation to the investments firms make 
and the possibilities to secure a sound return on that investment. Size of demand yields 
contingencies for economies of scale and experience effects.   
Homogeneous vs. Differentiated 
A more homogeneous demand base in combination with a large size, may lead to standard-
setting by means of a dominant design. When demand has a high level of differentiability, 
customers require a more tailored solution that sets conditions for economies of scope. In that 
case, more than one standard may be adopted. 
Advanced vs. standard
This relates to the extent in which customers are critical and demanding in their requirements. 
Some demanding customers may act as lead-users (von Hippel 1988) and provide powerful 
incentives for firms to come up with innovative solutions. In this respect, the level of 
advancement also sets conditions for experience effects (Porter 1990). In addition, there is a 
relation with price-elasticity as more advanced demand may generally be prepared to pay a 
premium versus more standard demand.
Appropriability  
Appropriability relates to the possibilities of protecting an innovation from imitation and thus 
appropriating the rents from innovative activities.  
Level of appropriability 
A high level of appropriability suggests that effective ways exist to protect against imitation. 
Low appropriability denotes limited possibility to protect from imitation and coincides with 
widespread knowledge spillovers (Malerba & Breschi 1997).  
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Means of appropriability
Ways to protect innovations range from secrecy, patents, continuous innovations, standards, 
accumulated tacit knowledge and control of complementary assets (Teece 1986).  
Competition 
Competition relates to the competitive conditions in which learning and innovation take place. 
We see the following properties as relevant: 
Intensity 
Highly competitive conditions coincide with low entry barriers, high exit barriers and low 
concentration rates. Low competitive intensity indicates high entry barriers, low exit barriers 
and medium to high concentration rates.  
Dimensions
Competition can take place on costs and/or on non-cost elements such as quality, flexibility,  
innovation, or on all of them (Bolwijn & Kumpe 1989). In general, competition based on 
costs (low price) relates to more homogeneous and standard demand that lowers possibilities 
for firms to differentiate whereas more advanced demand relates to competition on quality, 
flexibility and/or innovation.   
Individual vs. Group-based
Competition can be among individual firms but can also take place between networks of 
firms. This latter case is also referred to as ‘group-based competition’ (Gomes-Casseres 1994) 
and puts pressure on firms within a such a group to cooperate and innovate.  
2.3.2   Systemic combinations of 2
nd
 level institutions 
As argued, the identified institutions are not separate or independent, on the contrary, there 
are various possible connections. To give some general examples with regard to 2nd level 
insitutions:
- when knowledge is mainly tacit and highly cumulative, appropriability takes place by 
means of accumulated tacit knowledge  
- when knowledge is mainly codified, appropriability (may) takes place by means of 
patents
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- codified knowledge generally coincides with a high(er) level of diffusion, whereas tacit 
knowledge generally coincides with a low(er) level of diffusion 
- a widely diffused knowledge base (may) coincides with high entry and strong 
competition on price  
- a low level of knowledge diffusion (may) coincide with low entry and limited 
competition 
- appropriability by standards (may) induce group-based competition  
- a high rate of change limits spill-overs of knowledge as by the time others could absorb 
this knowledge, it has become obsolete 
- in an exploration setting with a high rate of change of the knowledge base, opportunities 
are generally diffuse and competition is limited  
- in an exploitation setting with a low rate of change of the knowledge base, opportunities 
are generally well defined and competition is (relatively) intense  
According to our scheme in figure 1, the 2nd level is embedded in the 1st level, implying that 
the 1st level is of higher order than the 2nd level. Of course it will depend on the type of SIS 
whether this will always be the case. For SIS’s that are clearly located within national 
boundaries, national institutions may indeed provide the larger context for lower institutions. 
However for a SIS that crosses national boundaries or approaches a global scale, the selective 
effect of 2nd level institutions on learning and innovation may exceed the effect of 1st level 
institutions. We will not further elaborate on this but refer to some studies that have 
developed interesting attempts to shed more light on this as for example by Malerba & 
Breschi (1997), Mowery & Nelson (1999), Marsili (2001) and Nelson e.a (2002). 
Following the logic of our scheme in figure 1, the 2nd level functions as the selection 
environment in which the 3rd level is embedded, the subject of paragraph 2.4. 
2.4  3
rd
 level institutions 
We consider this 3rd level as the intermediate level between the outer institutional 
environment, formed by the 1st and 2nd level, and institutionalised behaviour formed by 
embedded, interfirm learning processes. By intermediate we mean that the institutions at the 
1st and 2nd level select 3rd level institutions that most clearly fit with them, in view of the 
embedded learning and innovation processes. More specifically, we conceive of the 3rd level 
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as consisting of 3 elements, namely the characteristics of the network structure, the properties 
of the relations making up this network and the mechanisms through which these relations are 
coordinated.8
This paragraph is built up as follows. In paragraph 2.4.1 we make some general comments on 
social network theory and argue why it is relevant for our research. Next we discuss network 
structure (paragraph 2.4.2) and the properties of the relations making up a network (paragraph 
2.4.3.). Finally we discuss various coordination mechanisms that may be employed in these 
network relations (paragraph 2.4.4).  
2.4.1  Social networks 
As argued by different scholars, outcomes of evolutionary processes are affected by networks 
and by the patterns of relations within them (Lundvall 1992, Baum and Singh 1994, 
McKelvey 1997, Carlsson 1997, 2002, Malerba & Breschi 1997). Networks have been 
analysed from a variety of angles as schools of thought vary with different disciplines. A first 
school takes an interpersonal perspective and emphasizes the non-economic bases of social 
exchange. They are primarily concerned with the relations that individual actors have with 
one another and is referred to as the ‘ego-centric perspective’ on networks (Sandefur and 
Laumann 19989, Lesser 2000). A second school takes a more structural approach and focuses 
on the configuration, number and quality of ties (Burt 1992, Nahapiet and Ghoshal 1998). 
This approach stresses a person’s relative position within a network rather than his direct 
relationships with others in the network. Still others focus on the institutional nature of 
networks and define them as a distinct organisational alternative to markets and corporate 
hierarchies (Williamson 1985, Powell 1990). Other seminal contributions have been made by 
Granovetter on the distinction between strong and weak ties (1985) and Coleman on social 
capital (1988).
Our goal now is to understand how a network is structured and what function it has in the 
context of interfirm learning and innovation. To do so, we will make use of some concepts 
and tools as developed by social network analysis. Two important ontological premises that 
8 This level can also be referred to as ‘institutional arrangements’ as is usually being done in TCE (Williamson 
1985) but also by some innovation scholars (e.g. Carlsson 1997).  
9 Sandefur and Laumann refer to this ego-centric perspective as in which “an individual’s social capital is 
characterized by his/her direct relationships with others and the other people and relationships that he/she can 
reach through to those to whom he/she is directly connected” (1998: 484)
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underlie social network analysis are that actors and their actions are viewed as interdependent, 
instead of independent, and that relational ties are channels for transformation of material and 
non-material resources (Wasserman & Faust 1994). This connects with our ontology as 
articulated in chapter 1, making our use of social network theory indeed legitimate for the 
purpose of our research. 
The starting point for social network analysis is that relations among actors, or nodes, are the 
building blocks of networks (Knoke & Kuklinski 1982). In an economic context, this web of 
interfirm relations enables and constrains the direction and various forms in which economic 
relationships can develop (Granovetter 1985), also referred to as structural embeddedness. 
This embeddedness then is assumed to have important behavioural consequences for the 
individual firms as for the network as a whole (Wasserman & Faust 1984). 
When studying social networks, an important issue is the level of analysis. Knoke and 
Kulinkski (1982) differentiate between 4 levels of analysis, ranging from ego-centric 
networks, dyads, triads and the complete network level. We will take the complete network as 
our level of analysis and will analyse it according to the following three dimensions: 
- structure of relations, i.e. network structure (paragraph 2.4.2) 
- content and form of relations (paragraph 2.4.3) 
- coordination mechanisms (paragraph 2.4.4.) 
2.4.2  Network structure 
Network structure refers to the general structure of relations making up a network. We 
consider the following structural features as relevant: 
Size
Network size, also referred to as network volume, relates to the total number of ties that is 
present in a network (Knoke 1999). 
Density 
Proportion of present ties to the total number of possible ties (Knoke 1999). 
Structural holes 
Disconnections, or absent ties, between actors (Burt 1992). 
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Centrality 
Centrality refers to the extent in which there are actors in the network with relatively many 
ties (Knoke 1999). 
These structural features of networks are not separate or independent as there are various, 
possible connections among them. To give a few, general examples:  
- A network that is large in size may generally not have a very high level of density and 
will probably show structural holes  
- Closure indicates a high level of density 
- A network with many structural holes indicates a low level of density  
- A network with many structural holes may have a high level of centrality. Actors that  
span these structural holes, so-called ‘middle actors’ (Burt 1992), may occupy a 
central position in the network.
To these structural elements, which originate from social network analysis, we add two other 
elements that originate from industrial dynamics (entry/exit) and from innovation theory 
(cognitive distance):  
Entry/exit 
This refers to the rate of entry and exit over a given period of time. We add this dimension as 
it gives an indication of the dynamics in the network that has over time consequences for the 
more ‘static’ structural elements mentioned above. A high entry/exit rate will 
increase/decrease the network size over time with subsequent consequences for density, 
structural holes, closure and centrality. 
Cognitive distance 
Cognitive distance refers to differences in categories of cognition (Nooteboom 2000). We add 
this concept to our analysis as it complements the structural view, as described by the above 
elements, with a cognitive view of a network. Given the central focus of our research on 
knowledge and learning, we consider this an important feature of a network.  
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2.4.3    Relations 
The building blocks of a network are formed by relations. In the context of our research,  
relations among firm or interfirm relations. These relations have two dimensions (Knoke & 
Kuklinski 1982): relational content and relational form. 
 Relational content 
Relations between firms can entail different elements, i.e. the relational content differs 
(Knoke & Kuklinski 1982, Wasserman & Faust 1994). Obviously, firms may have different 
relational content in relations with different firms. The engagement in frequent economic 
transactions does not need to imply that these transactions are knowledge intensive; 
transactions can entail mainly the exchange of standard products or services without any 
knowledge exchange whatsoever. Given our central focus on knowledge and learning we are 
primarily interested in those relations in which knowledge is exchanged,  either in tacit or 
codified form and in varying levels of intensity (see next section on ‘relational form’ for our 
definition of intensity). Knowledge that is exchanged may entail different elements and can 
range from knowledge on technology, production processes, organisational practices, 
customers, markets, competitors, suppliers etc.
 Relational form  
Relational form refers to the properties of the relations independently of the specific contents. 
Relations that are quite distinct in content may exhibit identical or highly similar forms. We 
differentiate among the following: 
Formality 
Formality refers to the level of formalisation due to formal contracts (Grandori and Soda 
1995).
Durability  
Durability refers to the length of a relationship in time (Granovetter 1973) 
Intensity  
Intensity refers to the frequency of contacts (Granovetter1973) 
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Intimacy  
Intimacy refers to the level of agreement and trust between social actors (Granovetter 1973). 
Symmetry
Symmetry refers to the extent in which relations are parity-based in terms of power 
(DiMaggio & Powell 1983, Grandori and Soda 1995).  
2.4.4 Coordination mechanisms 
Interfirm cooperation yields the problem of making sure that desired behaviour is indeed 
accomplished, requiring coordination mechanisms. Following our definition of networks as 
introduced in chapter 1, we take a broad view on coordination mechanisms as ‘not limited to 
price, exit and background regulation’ (Grandori 1999). In addition to Grandori’s definition, 
we also follow her framework (1995) for identifying different kinds of coordinating 
mechanisms.  
Communication, decision and negotiation mechanisms 
These are generally cheap and widely used mechanisms, present in all kinds of networks. 
Social coordination & control 
These mechanisms relate to the functioning of groups norms, reputation, trust and peer control 
in networks. 
Integration and linking pin roles and units 
Lateral roles and responsibilities can be key-mechanisms for coordinating across functional 
and/or organisational boundaries.  
Common staff 
In the case of a wide scope of interfirm cooperation and/or a high number of participating 
firms, coordination becomes important and may be based on dedicated staff. Examples are 
franchises and associations. 
Hierarchy and authority relations 
These mechanism may be used, although seldom exclusive, instead of lateral communication, 
negotiation and other more parity-based mechanisms (although often in a mixture of both) 
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Planning & Control mechanisms 
Planning & control systems aim to ‘deliver’ desired behaviour by monitoring input, 
throughput or output of the cooperation.  
Incentive systems  
Such mechanisms are common in cooperation activities that are informationally complex and 
in which contribution or performance is difficult to measure. Rearranging property rights 
often form an effective mechanism to realign objectives so that interests converge. 
Selection systems
These mechanisms relate to who gets access to the networks based on specific selection 
mechanisms that can be either informal or formalized.  
Information systems 
These mechanisms can be powerful integrators for managing interfirm cooperation due to 
their potential for fast exchange of information at low costs.  
In general, these coordination mechanisms are used in a mix and it depends on the 
institutional conditions which specific combination of coordination mechanisms is selected.




 level institutions 
As argued, the 3rd level of network institutions is embedded in the 2nd level of the institutional 
environment, making both levels interdependent. In other words, there are various linkages 
between them, creating systemic combinations of 2nd and 3rd level institutions. This connects 
with the relation that we can observe between innovation theory and the Systems of 
Innovation approach on the one hand and concepts of social network theory on the other hand. 
We will now further elaborate upon this and will develop a typology of networks that forms a 
synthesis between these two bodies of literature. Based on that we formulate a hypothesis.  
Relation between innovation theory and social network theory 
As argued in chapter 1, we follow the basic principles from evolutionary theory and the 
Systems of Innovation approach. An important notion herein, is the system-concept of 
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connectivity that refers to the intensity and type of connections among the various actors in 
the system (Carlsson 1997). The general idea is that no or only a weak connection among 
actors hampers system performance in terms of innovation as interaction and learning do not 
sufficiently take place. When there is substantial connectivity among actors, fruitful 
opportunities for learning and innovation would arise. On the other hand, too much 
connection may again constrain learning and innovation, especially if no outsiders are 
allowed, indicating low external connectivity. In other words, connectivity is proposed as a 
key-concept when understanding the functioning and performance of a system of innovation 
(Carlsson 1997).
The equivalent of connectivity between actors is specified by ‘density’, one of the central 
concepts in social network theory. As defined in paragraph 2.4.2, density refers to the 
proportion of present ties in relation to the total number of possible ties in a network.10 The 
distinction between strong and weak ties as argued by Granovetter (1985) differentiates 
between high density relations on the one hand and low density relations on the other hand. In 
his theory on ‘structural holes’,  Burt (1992) argues that (groups of) actors can show a low 
level of density in their relations, creating structural holes. Middle actors are those who close 
these holes by forming a connection among these disconnected actors.  Also Coleman’s work 
on social capital (1988) deals with density. Depending on the density of ties, he distinguishes 
two types of networks, open vs. closed. An open network structure implies that there are very 
few connections among actors, whereas in the case of a closed network all are connected 
(closure).  
Following this notion of ‘connectivity’ in innovation theory, or density in social network 
theory, we are able to consider some systemic combinations of 2nd and 3rd level institutions 
along a general taxonomy of network types. We distinguish among the following three types : 
- compartmentalised networks (low density) 
- loosely connected networks (medium density) 
- strongly connected networks (high density) 
10 Connectivity is also used in social network theory but with a different connotation than in innovation theory. It 
refers to the extent in which all actors in a network are connected, through direct ties and/or indirect ties.  A low 
level of connectivity then indicates that there are (groups of ) actors with no connections to others, whereas a 
high level indicates that all actors can be reached, either directly or through others.  
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 Compartmentalised networks
Networks can be compartmentalised in the sense that (groups of) actors are disconnected from 
each other. In general, this network structure does not accommodate learning and innovation 
between such ‘compartments’. Due to the compartmentalised structure firms do not interact, 
allowing for a large cognitive distance and hence difficulties in absorbing new information or 
knowledge. Although the network may contain large amounts of information or knowledge, 
its potential use may be limited because opportunities for its recombination are constrained. In 
this type of network there are limited ties among (groups of) actors and many structural holes. 
As defined, structural holes entail ‘disconnections between players in the arena’ (Burt 1992 : 
2) and provide opportunities for information access, timing, referrals and control. In this way, 
Burt explains competitive advantage as a ‘matter of access to holes’ (Burt 1992 : 2). His claim 
is that firms that are positioned between different networks by occupying a structural hole will 
be more profitable as they have better access and control over opportunities. 
A compartmentalised network can be considered as having a low level of density. As there are 
only limited relations among actors, the network is open to anyone who aspires to enter. As 
argued by Coleman, such a structure inhibits the build-up of social capital, made up by a 
consisting of a mix of trust11, reputation and sanctions ensuring trustworthiness (Coleman 
1988) 12. For social capital to develop, actors need to be connected so that they can interact in 
order to learn about the behaviour, intention and reputation of others in the network.
 Strongly connected networks 
The opposite of a compartmentalised network structure is formed by a strongly connected 
network structure in which there are many linkages and frequent among the involved actors. 
These are Granovetter’s strong ties that are characterized by durability, high frequency of 
interaction, reciprocity and possibly intimacy (Granovetter 1973). From this high density and 
strength in relations strong ‘social cohesiveness’ results, facilitating the build-up of social 
capital that resides in the presence of dense social ties (Coleman 1988, Baker & Obstfeld 
1999). An important form of social capital is the potential for information that inheres in 
social relations. Social relations, also when maintained for other purposes, are important 
means to acquire information (Coleman 1988). This connects with theories on innovation and 
learning: dense ties among firms accommodate a small cognitive distance that enhances 
11 Although not mentioning this explicitly, Coleman basically refers to trust-in-intention rather than trust-in-
competence (Nooteboom 2002).  
12 See for an overview of the literature on social capital Coleman 1988, Leenders & Gabbay 1999 and Lesser 
2000.
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mutual understanding and facilitates the transfer of tacit knowledge (Cohen & Levinthal 1990, 
Nooteboom 2000).
Another form of social capital are norms that can have an important regulating effect on firm 
behaviour (Coleman 1988). The effectiveness of norms will depend on the structure of the 
social relations. As argued by Coleman (1988), when network density is high or approaching 
closure, this enables the effective functioning of coordination mechanisms such as social 
norms, peer control and reputation. Whether this is beneficial depends on the institutional 
environment in which the network is embedded.  In terms of our model, it depends on the 2nd
level institutions13. When knowledge is mainly tacit, dense ties among firms accommodate a 
small cognitive distance enhancing easy transfer of this tacit knowledge. Also in the case of a 
systemic knowledge base, a dense structure offers advantages. The integration of different 
knowledge disciplines can only be done efficiently when firms share a common 
understanding, have sufficiently close relations and sufficient trust in one another. When 
appropriation takes place by means of complementary assets, firms also need relational and 
cognitive closeness in order to be able to coordinate the relationship. In such networks the 
dense, integrated nature may be further enhanced by coordination mechanisms such as 
planning and control systems, selection systems regulating access and information systems. 
All these benefits accrue to a dense network structure as long as change occurs incrementally. 
When change in 2nd level institutions becomes more radical, these benefits disappear and it 
may appear that there is a danger in dense structure as well. Such a network may retain the 
exclusivity of incumbents whereby existing norms and reputation regulate behaviour too 
strictly. To deviate from the established way of doing things may be highly discouraged by 
these prevailing norms stressing conformity. In such a situation, it may be difficult for 
outsiders to enter as reputation may act as a formidable barrier that further blocks renewal. 
This results into ‘lock-in’ (Arthur 1988) or ‘inertia’ (Nooteboom 2000), a situation in which 
established firms become blind in a way that they ignore exposure to other practices (e.g. 
other markets or new technologies) outside their immediate geographic, cognitive 
environment and/or cultural environment. Others have labelled this situation as 
‘overembeddedness’ (Uzzi 1997, Uzzi and Gillespie 1999) or ‘social liability’ (Gargiulo & 
Benassi 1999). 
13 At this point we leave 1st level institutions out of the analysis, although these can certainly condition the 
benefits of a densely connected network. For example, as argued by Fukuyama (1995), the absence of a reliable 
legal infrastructure in Italy has led firms to develop dense social relations within regional networks which has 
facilitated the emergence of the Mafia (Sicily) and Camorra (Naples). 
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 Loosely connected networks 
A more intermediate form is a network with a loosely connected structure. In such a network 
structure actors are connected to others but the intensity may vary. There may be stronger 
relations to more inside actors and weaker relations to more outside actors. Relations that are
based on the frequent and durable exchange of codified and/or tacit knowledge, can be 
labelled as a strong tie. Weak ties are formed by relations with a lower level of intensity and 
durability and may be coordinated by mechanisms such as lateral roles, linking pin units or 
incentive systems to realign objectives.  
Especially  these weak ties may give access to other networks and as such form an important 
source of diversity (Granovetter 1973). Diversity, or variety, is one of the central elements in 
evolutionary theory (Nelson & Winter 1982). Variety on the level of a network affects the 
opportunities for communication and interaction among different actors (McKelvey 1997, 
Nooteboom 2000). These different sources of knowledge outside a firm are critical for 
innovation, implying that firms should maximise weak ties in their network. But we should 
not take this argument too far, for managerial and for cognitive reasons. First, there will be a 
limit on the number of weak ties that firms, in addition to their strong ties, are able to manage. 
An argument from a cognitive point of view is that the chance of misunderstanding increases 
when cognitive diversity becomes too big. Based on these considerations, there seems to be 
general agreement among (innovation) scholars that loosely connected networks, built up of 
strong and weak ties, provide fertile soil to nurture learning and innovation (e.g. Grabher 
1993, Smith Ring and van de Ven 1994, Carlsson 1997, Nooteboom 2000, Malerba 2002).  
A hypothesis 
An interesting question now is whether there is something like an ‘ideal level’ of  strong and 
weak ties in a network that could be specified ex-ante. Following our social constructivist 
view of knowledge and learning, our answer is that it varies with the conditions set by the 
institutional environment which specific combination of strong and weak ties is selected,  
making it difficult to specify such a ‘desired mix’ of strong and weak ties. Following 
Granovetter’s argument though, on the ‘strength of weak ties’ as an important source of 
diversity (1973), we can be more precise on the role of weak ties in the context of innovation. 
We propose the following hypothesis: 
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Hypothesis 1: 
When change in 2nd level institutions becomes more radical, there is an increasing need for 
weak ties to deal with this variability in conditions.  
Whether such weak ties are easily ‘available’ again depends on whether knowledge is widely 
diffused. If so, there may be more potential partners to choose from, making selection a 
relatively easy task. When knowledge is not widely diffused, not only finding a 
knowledgeable partner becomes difficult but also relational risk may be generated due to 




Chapter 3  Learning Regimes  
3.1        Introduction 
In chapter 2 we addressed our first research question and have identified which institutions in 
the institutional environment are relevant for interfirm learning and innovation. In this chapter 
we will address our second research question, namely : 
How do these institutions condition interfirm learning? 
In figure 2.1 (chapter 2), we have schematically depicted the relationship between the 
institutional environment (formed by three institutional levels) and institutionalised behaviour 
(formed by interfirm learning processes). As argued in paragraph 2.1, the oval in this figure is 
not an institutional level but represents a level of ‘institutionalised learning behaviour’. This 
behaviour is institutionalised in the way that it is enabled and constrained by institutions at the 
1st and 2nd and 3rd level of the institutional selection environment. So, this level of 
institutionalised learning behaviour represents the embedded interfirm learning and 
innovation processes and forms the topic of this chapter. 
To deal with this level of institutionalised learning behaviour we introduce in this chapter the 
concept of a learning regime. A learning regime reflects the notion that interfirm learning is 
dependent on the specific set-up of the institutional environment in which it is embedded. To 
further analyse this, we start in paragraph 3.2 with a competence-perspective based on which 
we discuss how a learning regime is conditioned by relevant institutions in the institutional 
environment. Solely relying on such a competence-view would create an impression of 
interfirm learning as a process of firms merely giving and sharing knowledge as this would 
enhance mutual learning and understanding. Obviously, this is only one side of the coin. The 
other side is that engaging in such interactive learning processes makes firms become 
dependent on one another. This dependency yields a risk of conflict and opportunism and may 
possibly influence the way firms interact. This connects with a governance-perspective. 
Governance forms a central element in transaction costs economics which explicitly 
acknowledges opportunism. ‘Opportunism is so familiar that we often fail to acknowledge it 
and its consequences when we see it’ (Williamson 1999 : 1098). The potential for 
opportunism as well as its consequences may affect interfirm learning and innovation and 
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therefore needs to be integrated into our analysis.14 In paragraph 3.3 therefore, we analyse a 
learning regime  from a governance-perspective. Based on that we then integrate it in 
paragraph 3.4 with our competence-view of a learning regime.  
3.2  Learning regimes : a competence perspective 
In this paragraph we take a competence-perspective and introduce the concept of a learning 
regime (paragraph 3.2.1). Next we discuss the differences between a learning regime and a 
technological regime (paragraph 3.2.2.). 
3.2.1   The concept of a learning regime 
As argued in chapter 1 we assume that heterogeneous actors that search around a similar 
knowledge base and that are embedded in the same institutional environment share some 
common behavioural and organizational traits and develop a common range of learning 
patterns and behaviour. Based on this, we have proposed differentiating between a collective 
dimension to innovation and an individual dimension (McKelvey 1997). As we study 
networks from the perspective of a SIS, we are especially interested in the collective 
dimension. We see innovation as a collective learning process and are interested in aggregate 
learning and innovation patterns in SIS’s, both in the process of interfirm learning and in its 
outcomes.
Following our analysis in chapter 2, we argue that this collective pattern of interfirm learning 
is the result of the enabling and constraining effect of the institutional environment. In 
addition, following our social constructivist view of knowledge and learning, we argue that 
differences  in institutional environments stimulate different sorts and amounts of social 
interaction and thus lead to differences in types of learning. These differences in institutional 
environments may not only affect what is learned but also how is learned.  
In this context we introduce the concept of a learning regime. A learning regime reflects the 
notion that learning varies with the conditions in which it is embedded. So, we see a learning 
regime as dependent on the specific set-up of the institutional environment. In this respect, 
14 This relates to a discussion on the analytical gap between governance perspectives and competence 
perspectives and the need to connect them (Williamson 1999, Nooteboom 1999, 2000, Dosi and Marengo 2000).  
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our concept of a learning regime reflects the collective dimension of innovation. It helps us to 
understand this collective dimension of innovation in a more explicit way by decomposing it 
into various elements. From a competence-perspective we see the following elements as 
relevant: 
 Object of learning : what is being learned 
 Learning process : how this learning process is being carried out 
 Actors   : who is involved 
 Input   : what knowledge, resources and capabilities are needed  
 Output   : what is the result 
To get a further understanding of the combination of elements making up a learning regime, 
we  differentiate between two archetypes of a learning regime. The differentiation between 
these two archetypes of learning regimes follows the notion as developed by March (1991) 
that evolutionary survival depends on the trade-off between exploration and exploitation. 
Exploitation involves the efficient utilisation of existing resources and competencies. For 
interfirm learning this requires stability, standardisation and routinisation. Exploration implies 
a need for constant renewal of resources and competencies. For interfirm learning this 
requires breaking away from continuity, standards and routines. Exploitation is required for 
survival on the short term, exploration for survival on the long term. As a consequence, both 
are characterised by different learning regimes, as outlined in table 3.1.  
Learning regime in exploration 
In exploration, a learning regime has the ‘discovery’ of new knowledge as its object of 
learning. The learning process is by searching: activities that are explicitly aimed at the 
generation of new knowledge in order to increase the knowledge stock. Generally this builds 
on insights into the limits of the existing knowledge base and requires the development of 
new capabilities as inputs. The output of this learning regime is formed by new knowledge, 
new ideas and beliefs, different kinds of demo’s, experimental products as well as new 
(technical) standards, new procedures, new routines and so on. 
This connects with Argyris and Schon’s double-loop learning (1978, 1996). Double loop 
learning is concerned with changes to underlying mental frameworks such as theories in use, 
assumptions, organizational strategies and norms as well as the way in which competencies 
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and environments are construed. This requires a capability of remaining open to 
environmental changes and of dismissing existing, underlying values and assumptions. 
Learning regime in exploitation 
A learning regime in exploitation focuses on one or a few specific elements of the existing 
knowledge base and focuses on improving or correcting these elements, its object of learning. 
The way of learning is by repetition: activities focused on constantly improving the existing 
knowledge base in a routine manner. This learning requires the development of refined 
problem solving capabilities to systemically monitor deviations and correct when necessary, 
as inputs. The output of this learning regime is formed by an improved understanding of 
specific issues, improved products, process improvements, improved problem solving skills, 
adapted technical norms, changed formal procedures and so on.  
This connects with Argyris and Schon’s single-loop learning (1978, 1996). Single loop 
learning is a form of ‘instrumental learning’ that is concerned with the detection and 




Learning object new knowledge base 
specific elements 
of existing knowledge base 
Learning process expansive searching repetitive activities 
Actors new combinations of actors 
existing combinations of 
actors 
Input 
- insights into limits of  
  existing knowledge base 
- new capabilities 
refined problem solving 
capabilities 
Output 
- new knowledge  
- new ideas & beliefs 
- demo’s, experimental products 
- improved understanding of  
   specific issues  
- product adaptations 
- process improvements 
- technical norms 
Table 3.1 :  Archetypes of learning regimes from a competence view
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As said, these are two archetypical forms of learning regimes and other, more intermediate 
types can be identified as well. We will deal with this more extensively in chapter 4.  
3.2.2    Differences between a learning regime and a technological regime 
Our concept of a learning regime is related to the concept of a ‘technological regime’ 
although there are some clear differences between them. Nelson and Winter (1977) introduced 
the notion of a technological regime. According to them, ‘the sense of potential, of 
constraints, and of not yet exploited opportunities, implicit in a regime focuses the attention of 
engineers on certain directions in which progress is possible, and provides strong guidance as 
to the tactics likely to be fruitful for probing in that direction. In other words, a regime not 
only defines boundaries, but also trajectories to those boundaries (1977:57). This is 
comparable to the notions of technological paradigms and technological trajectories as 
developed by Dosi in analogy with Kuhn’s concept of scientific paradigms (1962). He defines 
a technological paradigm as a ‘pattern of solution of selected technological problems, based 
on selected principles derived from natural sciences and on selected material technologies’ 
and a technological trajectory as the ‘pattern of normal problem solving activity on the ground 
of a technological paradigm’ (1982: 152). After being introduced by Nelson & Winter, and 
later Dosi, this concept of a technological regime has been used and further specified by 
others such as Georghiou e.a. (1986), who defined a technological regime as a ‘set of design 
parameters which embody the principles which will generate both the physical configuration 
of the product and the process and materials from which it is to be constructed. The basic 
design parameters are the heart of the technological regime, and they constitute a framework 
of knowledge which is shared by the firms in the industry’.  
Underlying the notions of technological regime and technological trajectory is the central idea 
that relevant elements of technological development such as design options, heuristics and 
technical modes are shared among the involved actors and guide their interactions, resulting 
in a specific pattern of technological development. This connects with our interest in what we 
labelled in chapter 1 as the ‘collective dimension’ of interfirm learning in networks.  
As can be understood from these definitions, the concept of a technological regime has an 
interest in the ‘contents’ of a technology and hence in the products, processes, engineering 
practices and technical parameters associated with the particular technology. Changes in this 
technology can take place along certain paths, but it is implied that these paths themselves 
remain unchanged. In addition, the idea of a ‘framework of knowledge that is shared by the 
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firms in the industry’ (Georghiou 1986) suggests that a technological regime is limited to an 
industry that he defines by its main products and processes, implying that users, suppliers and 
others are considered as outside the industry.  
We see two clear differences between our concept of a learning regime and a technological 
regime. First, our concept of a learning regime clearly acknowledges the distinction between 
exploration and exploitation. As argued in paragraph 3.2.1, there are profound differences 
between both contexts with clear implications for the elements making up a learning regime 
such as its learning object, learning process etc. The concept of a technological regime more 
reflects an exploitation context as it ‘defines boundaries and also trajectories to those 
boundaries’ (Nelson & Winter 1977:57), whereas in exploration the primary object of 
learning is to change those boundaries, deviate from the existing trajectories and search for 
new ones.  A second difference is that our concept of a learning regime acknowledges the 
‘dark side’ of  interfirm learning : by engaging in interactive learning processes, firms become 
more dependent on one another, yielding relational risk. The possibility of relational risk 
influences interfirm learning and may sometimes even prevent learning from emerging in the 
first place. So, whereas the concept of a technological regime clearly takes a competence 
perspective, our concept of a learning regime combines this with a governance perspective. 
Such a governance-view will now be further dealt with in paragraph 3.3. 
 3.3       Learning regimes : a governance perspective  
This paragraph takes a governance-perspective of a learning regime. In order to so, we will 
first discuss the concept of relational risk and the various elements by which it is built up 
(paragraph 3.3.1). As next step, we will relate these elements to our model of the institutional 
environment (see figure 1, chapter 2), in paragraph 3.3.2. Finally, in paragraph 3.3.3, we will 
integrate these elements into our concept of a learning regime.   
3.3.1  Elements of relational risk 
Relational risk has two dimensions : the size of loss to a firm due to accidents or opportunism 
by the other network partner(s) and the probability that such loss will occur (Nooteboom 
1999). The first dimension of relational risk depends on the individual firm  confronted with 
such risk. As the individual firm level is beyond the scope of our research, we will not further 
elaborate on this dimension. The probability of loss due to relational risk is determined by the 
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institutional conditions in which a network of interfirm relations is embedded. We will 
therefore concentrate on the probability of the occurrence of loss due to relational risk.  
Four elements of relational risk 
An important notion in the literature on interfirm learning and innovation is that when firms 
dispose of the same knowledge, there is no potential for learning. Only when firms come from 
different cognitive backgrounds, can new combinations of knowledge be created and the 
potential for learning emerges (Dosi 1988 e.a., Nooteboom 2000). Still then, learning among 
heterogenous actors can only take place when information and knowledge are transferred 
efficiently and when this knowledge and information can be retained (McKelvey 1997). This 
requires that firms grow sufficiently cognitively close in order to be able to learn and to 
prevent misunderstandings. To grow cognitively close, firms need to make specific 
investments, both in terms of mutual understanding and in trust. From these investments, 
dependency arises which may result in hold-up. Hold-up refers to a situation in which the 
investments a firm has made can only be recouped in the relation with its specific partner.   
When a common cognitive framework among firms has developed, it becomes easier to learn 
from the other partner and knowledge may thus spill over. From a competence perspective 
such knowledge spill-overs are desirable as they basically provide the reason why firms can 
learn from one another in a network. From a governance perspective however, spill-overs can 
be problematic as they may lead to acts of freeridership. Freeridership is a general notion that 
refers to the room for a firm to benefit from the partner’s efforts without making a full 
contribution (Nooteboom 1999). In our research we analyse freeridership in the context of 
learning and innovation. So we take a more narrow view on freeridership and interpret it as 
the room for firms to benefit through knowledge spill-overs that originate from other partners’ 
efforts.  
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Figure 3.1 schematically outlines our argument. 
   
Hold-up 
     Specific investments                                                                                                      
                                                               Cognitive closeness               Spill-overs                Freeridership                                  
          Originates from 2
nd
 level institutions                                      Originates from 3
rd
 level
                                                                                                             institutions
Figure 3.1 :  Governance-perspective of a learning regime  
In terms of our institutional level model (figure 2.1, chapter 2 ): all four elements of relational 
risk pertain to the level of institutionalised behaviour, the oval in our figure. Taken together 
these elements make up a governance perspective of a learning regime. They therefore need to 
be analysed together although originating from different institutions in the institutional 
environment. The figure also indicates from which level of the institutional environment these 
four elements of relational risk originate. This will be now further elaborated upon in 
paragraph 3.3.2.  
3.3.2  Relational risk conditioned by the institutional selection environment 
To discuss the various elements that constitute relational risk we differentiate between 
specific investments and hold-up on the one hand and spill-overs and freeridership on the 
other hand.
Specific investments and hold-up 
The need to make specific investments originates at the 2nd level of the institutional 
environment, especially from the nature of the knowledge base. More specifically, specific 
investments are a function of the level of diffusion of knowledge, the level of systemicness 
and the tacitness of knowledge. The level of specific investments will be higher when 
knowledge has not diffused, pertaining  to individuals or a single firm. This may require 
substantial investments in order to absorb this knowledge, irrespective of whether it is 
codified or tacit. When knowledge is systemic this requires substantial investments in 
understanding adjacent knowledge bases. In addition, a systemic knowledge base may imply 
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that appropriability takes place by means of complementary assets. Appropriability by means 
of complementary assets also requires specific investments (Teece 1986). Assets from both 
sides need to be adjusted, requiring again investments in mutual understanding and trust.  
The level of specific investments is also determined by the tacitness of knowledge. Tacit 
knowledge rests in people and only spills over in close interaction between them. In that case 
interaction requires investments in mutual understanding and also trust. These investments 
range from investments in learning about the knowledge base of the other firm, its 
organisational procedures, its people as well as the build up of trust (Nooteboom 2000). 
Especially when knowledge is tacit and specific in scope, such investments may become 
highly specific to a particular relation. Another form of specific investments is formed by 
‘opportunity costs’, i.e. by spending time, money and people for a particular relationship other 
opportunities may be missed. According to transaction cost literature, specific investments 
can take a variety of forms : physical, human, site-specific, dedicated assets, brand name 
capital and temporal (Williamson 1996). Given our focus on learning and innovation in this 
research, we will not further elaborate on these forms of specific investments although we will 
include them in the analysis when their role cannot  be ignored. So, in the remainder of this 
research we limit ourselves to those investments that are required to create cognitive 
closeness, i.e. specific cognitive investments. Table 1 summarizes this discussion by 
presenting the extreme cases to clarify our argument. Of course, more intermediate forms are 
more likely to be observed in practice.15 Figure 3.2 summarizes our argument. 
So, the need to make specific cognitive investments originates at the 2nd level of  the 
institutional environment. Such investments may generate a potential problem of hold-up. 
Following our institutional level model, institutions at the 3rd level (network structure, 
interfirm relations and coordinating mechanisms) can reinforce the need for such investments 
and as such increase the probability of a situation of hold-up.
15 In our discussion above we have focused on how the characteristics of the knowledge base determine the level 
of specific investments. The level of investments also depends on one’s absorptive capacity. If knowledge is 
close to one’s core competence, absorption will be easier than when it entails a completely new field. Absorptive 
capacity may also benefit from a large R&D-capacity. When the knowledge involved is highly codified, it may 
be raised by maintaining R&D in areas outside the focus of the firm. As found by Granstrand, Pavel and Pavitt 
(1997), this explains the empirical phenomenon that firms continue to engage in some R&D activity in areas that 
they have outsourced. When knowledge is more tacit, the hypothesis is that absorptive capacity is raised by 
cumulative experience in communicating and interacting with agents who think differently (Nooteboom and 
Gilsing 2003). The level of absorptive capacity though pertains to the firm level. As our focus is on the network 
level, this issue of absorptive capacity will be further left out of the analysis.  
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                        Systemicness       +                                                            Specific, cognitive investments           
                        Tacit                      +                        
Figure 3.2 :  Relation between properties of the knowledge base and specific  
   cognitive investments 
Firms that occupy a central position in a network of a-symmetric relations can demand from 
others (suppliers, customers or competitors) to invest in understanding their particular 
knowledge base, organisational procedures, people, information systems etc. This 
understanding  may yield exit barriers for the dependent actors, thereby creating a problem of 
hold-up.16 When these relations are (mainly) formal, the need to invest into such cognitive, 
specialised assets can be formalized into contracts. For the dependent firm, this may be 
difficult when relations are a-symmetric but may become easier when relations are more 
symmetric. In the latter case, the need for specific investments can be negotiated before being 
formalized into an agreement in order to prevent hold-up. However, (detailed) contracts that 
limit the risks of hold-up are not desirable from an innovation point of view. The outcomes of 
learning and innovation are by definition uncertain that makes it difficult to specify those 
outcomes upfront. In addition, a contract needs to be monitored which, again, to a large extent 
is determined by the nature of the knowledge base : when knowledge is tacit and subject to 
radical change, monitoring may be very difficult. In addition, there is a relational argument 
16 From the point of view of the central actor this may seem to be an advantageous situation but this does not 
always need to be the case. In the 1980’s Japanese keiretsu networks tended to be closed. It used to be common 
practice that suppliers had dedicated assets and knowledge of which the use exclusively accrued to the large 
central firm. Increasingly these large Japanese firms have become aware of the necessity of learning, also among 
their suppliers. For this reason,  Toyota has decided to allow these suppliers to use these assets in other markets 
in order to stimulate knowledge sharing and learning. In this case the central actor, for its own sake, opened up 
the network in order to stimulate spill-overs by exposing its dependent suppliers to different practices (Grabher 
1993).
Wide diffusion  -
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that says that detailed contracts aimed at the prevention of opportunism are a signal of distrust 
(Nooteboom 2000). This is especially the case when relations are (mainly) informal and 
coordinated by informal mechanisms such as social norms and reputation, putting a strong 
limit on the use of contracts. So, in the case of informal relations, and which are also 
symmetric, investments in mutual understanding and trust can only be recouped when 
relations are durable enough.  
Spill-overs  and Freeridership 
As argued, firms make specific investments in order to develop a common cognitive 
framework that facilitates mutual learning and as such accommodates for knowledge spill-
overs. Whether knowledge can spill over depends, first of all, on the nature of the knowledge 
itself (2nd level). When knowledge is tacit, the risk of spill-over is smaller than in the case of 
more codified knowledge. Tacit knowledge rests in people and only spills over in close 
interaction between them. On the other hand, when tacit knowledge does spill over, the 
possibility of freeridership rises as the use of tacit knowledge by the freeriding firm, is (more) 
difficult to monitor. Codified knowledge spills over rather easily by means of documents, blue 
prints, information systems etc. On the other hand, its use by the freeriding firm is more easy 
to monitor. Also the rate of change in the knowledge base determines whether others have the 
ability to absorb the knowledge (Cohen & Levinthal 1990, Nooteboom 2000). In the case of a 
high rate of change of knowledge, recipient firms need time to be able to absorb new 
knowledge but then it may have become obsolete already. So, a high rate of change lowers the 
possibility of knowledge spill-overs. In addition, appropriability conditions may condition 
knowledge spill-overs as well. The possibility of using patents puts limits on the use and 
imitation of knowledge by others. Or when appropiation takes place by means of 
complementary assets (Teece 1986) : when the absorbing firm does not control these, the 
knowledge it absorbs may be rather useless, even when there is cognitive proximity.  
Again we claim that  3rd level institutions can reinforce or limit the risk of knowledge spill-
overs and thus influence whether free-ridership may occur. These are the following elements: 
direction of the relation and density of the network structure.
- Direction of the relation 
In the case of horizontal relations, firms may often be direct competitors. When knowledge 
spill-overs are enhanced, from the type of knowledge and/or appropriability conditions, and 
no governance mechanisms are in place, freeridership may become a likely phenomenon. 
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Using a contract may be a way to prevent this, but its limits were already discussed. An 
alternative may be evasion by keeping knowledge secret and by avoiding close interaction and 
specific investments (Nooteboom 2000). Another option is integration which may be very 
effective in  controlling spill-over but may also prove to be (very) expensive; not only the 
direct costs of acquisition but also the actual integration into the mother-firm. In the case of 
vertical relations, the direct risk of knowledge spill-overs such as in horizontal relations, may 
be limited. However, the risk may here be more indirect : when a customer or supplier 
(depending on the position one occupies) also has a relation to a direct competitor of yours, 
knowledge can spill over to that competitor and may lead to free-ridership. Or, alternatively, 
when the supplier or customer decides to forward/backward integrate he becomes a direct 
competitor and the relation turns from a vertical into a horizontal one. 
- Density of network structure 
The potential for knowledge spill-overs and the chance of freeridership is further conditioned 
by the density of the network structure. In chapter 2 (paragraph 2.4), we defined density as the 
number of ties that is present as a proportion of the total possible number of ties (Knoke 
1999).
In the case of a non-dense network there are few relations among firms, which limits 
possibilities to cross the cognitive distance present in the network and hence to the 
development of a common understanding. This will constrain room for spill-overs as a 
common infrastructure facilitating such spill-overs, such as technical standards or a shared 
(technical) language, may be lacking. From a governance-perspective, such a network does 
not accommodate the build-up of social capital such as the functioning of social norms, social 
control, sanctions, trust and reputation mechanisms. This limits the possibilities for the control 
of opportunistic behaviour by others. So, if knowledge does spill over in a non-dense network 
structure, there is a high chance of freeridership.  
A dense network structure entails many relations present in the network and as such enables 
to cross cognitive distance that exists among the involved firms, accommodating for 
knowledge spill-overs. From a governance-perspective, such a network also facilitates the 
functioning of social norms, reputation mechanisms, trust and sanctions and so on, which 
enable to control opportunistic behaviour by others. So, when knowledge spill-overs occur in 
a dense network structure, there is a limited chance of acts of freeridership. Figure 3.3 
summarizes our argument. 
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                                                                                                      potential for knowledge  
                                                             (-) +                                  spill-overs 
                  (non-) dense                       (-) +                                   potential for social 
                                                              (+) - 
chance of freeridership
Figure 3.3 :  Relation between network density and the potential for spill-overs, social  
control and freeridership
Obviously, possibilities for monitoring knowledge spill-overs are largely determined by the 
nature of knowledge. When knowledge is codified, observability is generally easier than in 
the case of tacit knowledge. Codified knowledge may be easier to specify in a contract that 
can be used to prevent acts of freeridership. From the formal nature of such an arrangement 
follows that compliance is enforced by the legal system (Grandori & Soda 1995). When spill-
overs are not clearly observable, it depends on whether social norms, control and reputation 
play a role prominent enough to compensate for a lack of formal enforceability.  
3.4.   Relational risk in different learning regimes 
Based on our analysis of relational risk and the way in which it is conditioned by the 
institutional environment, we will now integrate it into our concept of a learning regime, as 
developed in paragraph 3.2.  
Our analysis of relational risk has made clear that four elements are relevant in interfirm 
learning : cognitive closeness, spill-overs, possibilities for freeridership and chance of hold-
up. When following our earlier archetypical differentiation between two learning regimes 
with a focus on exploration or exploitation, the added elements of relational risk have the 
                 network structure                                                      control
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following values, as outlined in table 3.2 :   
EXPLORATION EXPLOITATION 
COMPETENCE VIEW 
Learning object new knowledge base 
specific elements 
of existing knowledge base 
Learning process expansive searching repetitive activities 
Actors new combinations of actors 
existing combinations of actors 
Input 
- insights into limits existing  
  knowledge base 
- new capabilities 
refined problem solving 
capabilities 
Output 
- new knowledge base 
- new ideas & beliefs 
- demo’s, experimental products 
- strengthened knowledge base 
- product adaptations 
- process improvements 
- technical norms 
GOVERNANCE VIEW 
Cognitive distance  medium to large low to medium 
Potential for spill-overs  small to medium medium to high 
Potential for freeridership 
- low if limited spillovers; 
- higher if ample spillovers 
- cognition related : low-medium 
- non-cognition related : potentially high  
Chance of hold-up  
- high if high specific investments; 
- low if low specific investments 
- cognition related : low inside network; high  
                                 outside network 
- non-cognition related : potentially high 
Table 3.2 :  Archetypes of learning regimes from a competence and governance view 
Exploration
In an exploration-oriented learning regime the cognitive distance among firms will in general 
be large. This large cognitive distance limits the potential of spill-overs. This is further 
reinforced by the fact that knowledge is primarily tacit in this learning regime and can only 
spill-over in close interaction between people, by poaching of key-people or by a take-over. 
On the other hand, when knowledge does spill over, its tacit nature makes it difficult to 
monitor such spill-overs and also to observe its use by the absorbing firm. This opens up 
possibilities for freeridership. As argued in paragraph 3.3.2, firms need to make specific, 
cognitive investments that increases the chance of hold-up. When cognitive distance among 
firms lowers, due to their joint searching activities, knowledge becomes more generic to the 
network, increasing the potential for spill-overs but lowering the possibilities for 
freeridership. In general, knowledge becomes more codified that enhances spill-overs but also 
enables to monitor its use by the absorbing firm.  
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Exploitation
In an exploitation-oriented learning regime the knowledge base is codified and more widely 
diffused across the network that makes cognitive distance among firms low or fairly 
moderate, enabling a medium to high level of spill-overs. Among firms within the same 
network, chances of hold-up are small as the cognitive distance among firms is generally 
small(er) so that specific, cognitive investments will also be limited. In addition, the fact that 
knowledge is more widely diffused across the network also makes that specific investments 
can be recouped in relations with a larger number of partners. At the same time, from a 
viewpoint of outsiders, knowledge is specific to the network that makes cognitive distance 
with such outsiders large(r), creating a high(er) chance of hold-up in relations with them. 
However, due to a drive to larger scale and the presence of standards in exploitation there may 
be specific investments needed in production facilities, distribution channels, brand names 
and so on, with a long economic life. This may then create a potential for freeridership and/or 
hold-up, but now for non-cognition related reasons.  
Dynamic view of a learning regime
As argued, these two types represent archetypical forms of a learning regime and reflect a 
static view. Obviously this does not reflect reality. As it entails learning, a learning regime is 
by its nature dynamic, in two senses. Firstly, there are dynamic relations among the elements 
making up a learning regime. One or two of the elements can change while the learning 
regime remains by and large the same, or alternatively, more elements change leading to a 
change of the learning regime. For example in an exploration-oriented learning regime: a 
large cognitive distance limits the potential of spill-overs but may give rise to possibilities for 
freeridership and may increase the chance of hold-up. When cognitive distance lowers, due to 
explorative learning, the potential for spill-overs increases, opportunities for freeridership 
lower as do chances of hold-up. In this way, a learning regime can change in nature and turn 
into another type of learning regime. In terms of the archetypical forms described above, from 
exploration to exploitation and vice versa. Secondly, there is a dynamic relation between a 
learning regime and the institutional environment in which it is embedded: changes in the 
level of the institutional environment affect a learning regime whereas outcomes of a learning 
regime can also affect the institutional environment.  
Such dynamic aspects of learning regimes and the dynamic relationship with the institutional 
environment will be the topic of chapter 4.
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Chapter 4 Co-evolution of institutional environment and  
learning regimes 
Research Question 3 :
What are the outcomes of interfirm learning and how do they affect the  institutional 
environment? 
 4.1       Introduction
In chapter 2 we identified the various types of institutions that are relevant for interfirm 
learning, followed by an analysis in chapter 3 of how they condition this learning. In this 
chapter we will build on this by discussing the main outcomes generated by interfirm learning 
and how these outcomes again affect the institutional environment. So, the focus of this 
chapter is on the dynamic relation between the institutional environment and learning 
regimes. This differs from the dominant approach taken in the literature on learning and 
innovation in which the institutional environment is often considered as exogenous; assuming 
that institutions determine the learning and innovation patterns in an industry (Pavitt 1984, 
Dosi e.a. 1988, Nelson 1993, Whitley 1994, 1999, Malerba & Breschi 1997, Mowery & 
Nelson 1999). This reflects a rather deterministic stance with a clear focus on processes of 
selection. We consider that to be too limited when developing a dynamic understanding of 
learning and innovation in SIS’s as it ignores that outcomes of such learning and innovation 
can also affect the institutional environment. Hence a dynamic analysis implies that we not 
only analyse how selection processes take place but also how this relates to the generation of 
variety and how this variety affects selection again.   
 Given the importance we attach to variety, we take a special interest in the outcomes of 
interfirm learning. An innovation is an important outcome of a learning process but there are 
other relevant outcomes as well. Following our social constructivist view of knowledge (as 
including perception, understanding and value judgements), we argue that learning outcomes 
are formed by new knowledge, new ideas, changed beliefs, adapted or newly created 
institutions, changes in the design of the network structure and adaptations to coordinating 
mechanisms. So, we explicitly take also such non-technological outcomes into the analysis. 
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To study this dynamic interplay between the institutional environment and a learning regime, 
we will make use of a co-evolutionary approach. Co-evolutionary inquiry attempts to predict 
how variables in the system respond to changes in other system variables or in changes to the 
structure of the system itself. The goal of co-evolutionary inquiry is to understand how the 
structure of direct interactions and feedback within systems gives rise to their dynamic 
behaviour (Baum & Singh 1994).  When describing this process of co-evolution, we run the 
risk of describing all possibly relevant institutions that would make such a description 
overcomplete. We refer to what we argued earlier about conceptualising the notion of an 
institution as a process of institutionalisation (see chapter 2) in order to free ourselves from 
the need to identify all different types of institutions that may have relevance under all 
conditions. So, when analysing this co-evolutionary process, we will mention those 
institutions which are relevant at a certain point in this process and leave aside those which 
are not.
As a way to structure this further, we propose to use the concept of the ‘cycle of knowledge’ 
as developed by Nooteboom (2000), which describes a heuristic of discovery. It starts from 
the notion developed by March (1991) that evolutionary survival depends on the trade-off 
between exploration and exploitation. Exploitation is required for survival in the short term 
and involves the efficient utilisation of existing resources and competencies. Exploration is 
required for survival in the long term and involves breaking away from continuity, standards 
and existing routines. This cycle is supposed to apply to all levels: of people, organizations 
and innovation systems and intends to explain the difference between radical and incremental 
innovation; between second order and first order learning; between exploration and 
exploitation (Nooteboom 2000). See also figure 4.1 (next page). 
Following the logic of this cycle, we will analyse the co-evolutionary process in three steps:  
in exploration (paragraph 4.2), towards exploitation (paragraph 4.3) and back towards 
exploration (paragraph 4.4). In paragraph 4.5 we will summarise by means of 4 hypotheses.
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Figure 4.1 :  Cycle of Knowledge (Nooteboom 2000) 
4.2.  Exploration of Novel Combinations  
A radical innovation starts with breaking away from an established way of doing things. Such 
an event is often initiated by a technological discontinuity which often marks the beginning of 
a newly emerging knowledge base. This embryonic knowledge base is highly tacit and often 
located at a local firm level, bound up in specific assets and people (Nelson & Winter 1982). 
The search process is highly empirical as opposed to more rational and driven by 
technological opportunities rather than demand (Stankiewicz 2002)17. In this search process 
firms often need to rely on other firms in order to exchange knowledge and establish 
connections with complementary knowledge or assets. Another reason for collaboration is to 
spread and share risk.  
In making use of knowledge held by others, both existing ties and new ties are important. The 
advantages of existing, strong ties lie in their cognitive closeness and trust, which help to 
exchange and complement newly emerging, largely tacit knowledge; in so far as available in 
established fields of practice such as for example the use of existing distribution channels or 
suppliers of raw materials for new products. On the other hand, during the phase of exploring 
novel combinations, the new knowledge base requires novel linkages with ‘outsiders’. These 
weak ties may give access to other networks and as such form an important source of 
17 This context of exploration closely resembles the concept of a ‘discovery-driven’ technological regime, 
characterized by a strong focus on learning-by-doing in which serendipity plays a key-role (Stankiewicz 2002).  
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diversity (Granovetter 1985). This connects with innovation theory that opportunities for 
learning increase when firms come from different cognitive backgrounds (Dosi & Marengo 
2000). However, when cognitive distance is (too) large, chances of misunderstanding increase 
which lowers the potential for learning (Nooteboom 2000).  
In the relations with these weak ties cognitive distance is large, and trust still needs to be built 
up. For this, firms need to make specific investments in mutual understanding (not only of 
knowledge but also of new organisational procedures and people) and the building of trust. At 
this stage, the network structure will be dense, small and locally embedded, more or less 
operating in seclusion. In view of novelty and tacitness of knowledge, ties are generally 
characterized by mutual openness and frequent interaction on a variety of issues, ranging from 
technology, organisation and potentially also future market demand, the availability of 
competent suppliers and so on. Specific investments may be needed to build up mutual 
absorptive capacity and relation-specific trust. However these investments have a short 
economic value, and thereby require only limited duration of relations. In such networks also 
informal relations may play a substantial role. Skilled people such as engineers or scientists 
may have informal ties to one another, which facilitate also the spill-over of firm-specific, 
tacit knowledge (Dahl & Pederson 2003).  
Concerning forms and instruments of governance, we already noted in chapter 3 that formal 
contractual safeguards are problematic in innovation. As a result, the more radically new 
exploration/innovation is, the more one can only use more informal instruments such as 
relation-specific trust, and transfer of reputation. Due to the specific and tacit nature of 
knowledge in this phase, monitoring the input and contribution of the involved firms is only 
possible by means of close interaction among a limited number of people. Therefore, the size 
of these newly forming exploration networks is generally small. While risks of hold-up are 
limited due to limited specific investments, the generally high mutual openness in knowledge 
sharing on various issues yields a potential risk of spillover. However, this risk is limited by 
the high degree of tacitness of knowledge, in exploration, and the fact that knowledge may 
have changed before it can be used for competition.  
Whereas firms within these exploration networks may grow cognitively closer due to their 
explorative learning activities, cognitive distance between these networks may be large, 
creating a compartmentalised structure among the various exploration networks. This makes 
the generation of collective action difficult, which further reinforces this compartmentalised 
structure.
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Such exploration networks may operate in relative isolation from established networks 
because the existing institutional environment can be highly selective and may hamper this 
variety generation processes, for two reasons. One has to do with vested interests. Firms 
occupying a central position in these existing networks, and which interests are threatened, 
may try to undermine the legitimacy of the new technology (Aldrich & Fiol 1994). They may 
try to block new entrants so that novel combinations may not be further explored. A second 
reason has to do with the fact that an innovation has to prove itself first before the existing 
institutional environment will be prepared to make the investments needed for adopting it. 
Especially when knowledge is systemic, the effects of the new finding can be highly 
disruptive so that the costs for adaptation may become substantial. In other words, the benefits 
of novelty should outweigh the costs of change. 
To the extent that the exploration of novel combinations ‘violates’ institutions in the existing 
institutional environment, it needs to find a niche outside the reach of these established 
institutions, in ‘allopatric speciation’ (Eldredge and Gould 1972, Nooteboom 2000).18 The 
exploration of new knowledge may then only continue when the ‘heroic, Schumpeterian 
entrepreneur’ keeps on pursuing his vision and ignores this selection by the existing 
institutional environment.  
Within these developing exploration networks a new learning regime emerges, characterised 
by expansive searching with the new knowledge base as its primary object of learning. 
Increasingly it becomes clear who is participating, what are the new aims and purposes and 
which new combinations of resources are required. Coordination of these searching processes 
is generally light and takes place by means of direct communication and social coordination 
and control mechanisms that increasingly function as selection mechanisms of who gets 
access to the newly forming network (Rosenkopf & Tushman 1994). In addition to social 
norms, also some first tentative, shared concepts and technical norms may develop. These 
reduce cognitive distance, thereby improving mutual understanding among the directly 
involved firms and hence enabling further learning. In addition to social and technical norms, 
other outcomes are formed by all kinds of demo’s, experimental products as well as new 
(technical) standards, new procedures and new interorganisational routines. So, outcomes 
from this new learning regime mainly affect the new knowledge base, and other internal 
18 In general the new knowledge base will for a substantial part be based on scientific knowledge. In this respect, 
such a secluded niche may be formed by universities and governmental institutions that can act as important 
incubators of radical new technology (Stankiewicz 1990, Duysters 1995). 
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institutions, rather than outside structures and institutions.
In general it is difficult to appropriate, and knowledge changes rapidly. By the time a new 
product has been developed commercially, the knowledge it represents may have become 
obsolete already, making customers less willing to pay a premium or to make specific 
investments. It may then be more rational not to go for full appropriation but rather to stay 
connected with one’s exploration network and to ‘live and let live’ in order to keep up to date 
with the rapidly changing knowledge base. So, in this phase of exploration, competition is no 
real issue and demand is hardly present.  
Exploration: summing up
Exploration is characterized by volatility or ‘chaos’ of experiments in multiple directions, 
without clear criteria for selection. The newly emerging institutional environment is highly 
embryonic and consists of a (very) few selection forces at this moment in the cycle. Variety 
abounds in this phase as many explorative learning processes result in all kinds of ideas, 
prototypes and demos, few of which are ready-to-market products or processes. So, variety is 
especially formed by learning results and mainly consist of new knowledge that is highly tacit 
and very specific to a limited number of firms. In terms of our 3-level  model of the 
institutional environment (see figure 1, chapter 2) : there is a strong feedback to the newly 
emerging knowledge base (2nd level ) and selection by this knowledge increases over time. 
In terms of our 3-level model of the institutional environment, we can define exploration now 
as follows:   
 main selection comes from the newly emerging knowledge base,  
 limited selection by coordination mechanisms such as social norms and  
reputation
 variety abounds and mainly affects the new knowledge base 
Schematically : 





Based on the above analysis of the co-evolutionary process in exploration, we can formulate 
the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 2a :
In the phase of exploration of novel combinations variety abounds, there is little 
selection by the newly emerging institutional environment and feedback by outcomes 
of a learning regime mainly affects the development of a new knowledge base.  
Hypothesis 2b : 
Novelty in exploration originates in allopatric speciation, at the periphery of the 
existing network where selection from the center is less strong. 
4.3  Towards Exploitation : Consolidation and Generalisation 
Based on the testing and some first use of newly developed products and demo’s, insights into 
potential application areas grow. Increasingly, firms start to focus on trying to develop 
demand in order to match the newly emerging knowledge base to potentially new markets. As 
a consequence, the new knowledge gains in cognitive legitimacy (Aldrich & Fiol 1994). Still, 
the absence of a dominant design constrains the broad diffusion of knowledge. Over time 
different paths of development may emerge, leading to a potential break-up into different 
networks developing along different paths. Hence outside competition, in a race to establish a 
market standard, may begin to emerge (Mowery & Nelson 1999).  
In the emergence of novel networks, novel strategic targets, and novel supply chains, also a 
new institutional environment starts to emerge. This institutional environment gets more and 
more a selection character: the involvement of demand and the combination of social and 
technical norms increasingly direct the searching activities and in doing so, delineate the 
boundaries of the new knowledge base. As a consequence, exploration of novel combinations 
slows down and variety decreases as outcomes of the learning regime such as newly 
generated ideas, knowledge and products increasingly need to fit into the emerging selection 
environment. The rate of change decreases and knowledge becomes more widely diffused 
across a larger number of firms. This enlarges possibilities to recoup earlier made specific 
investments as more potential partners become available now. As cognitive distance decreases 
and the codification of knowledge increases, knowledge spill-overs become a more common 
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phenomenon within the growing network of involved firms.  
Consolidation takes place when a ‘dominant design’ is selected (Abernathy & Utterback 
1978). Dominant institutional selection forces are the knowledge base, demand and 
appropriability conditions (Malerba & Breschi 1997). When the new knowledge base has 
substantial public benefits, also government involvement can have a substantial selective 
effect (McKelvey 1997).   
The effect of a dominant design on interfirm learning is substantial. It involves the 
establishment of a new paradigm and entails a common understanding of selected problems 
and the general search direction for appropriate solutions (Dosi e.a. 1988). It is in this clarity 
provided by a dominant design and in the elimination of competing standards that stability is 
created. Firms find a guidance in identifying required resources and competencies on which 
they can base further learning activities (Stankiewicz 2002). As a result, the rate of change of 
the knowledge base slows down, uncertainty decreases and standardization becomes now a 
central issue. A learning regime becomes confined to the selected boundaries of the 
knowledge base and it mainly focuses on incremental improvements.19 In defining such 
improvements, demand plays an increasingly important role (Stankiewicz 2002).20
21Competition intensifies and generally provides incentives to focus on cost reductions. Firms 
that cannot compete on price or that have not adopted the dominant design drop out.22 So, the 
institutional environment has become highly selective and  provides numerous incentives to 
engage in interfirm learning processes aimed at strengthening and formalising the dominant 
design. With this, standards based on which new knowledge can be assessed are selected. The 
knowledge base becomes predominantly codified, diffuses more widely and turns into a 
collective asset (Malerba and Breschi 1997). 
19 Learning becomes, what is referred to in the literature on organisational learning, ‘single loop’. Single loop 
learning aims to optimise within existing structures and is primarily concerned with the identification and 
correction of errors (Argyris & Schon 1978, 1996). 
20 This context towards exploitation resembles the concept of a ‘design-driven’ technological regime, 
characterized by a well-structured search process that is more focussed on demand-driven, incremental 
improvements and efficiency (Stankiewicz 2002). 
21 With regard to the role of demand, Carlsson stresses that in upscaling an innovation to a mass-market, users 
should dispose of sufficient ‘receiver competence’, i.e. the ability to understand its added value to them and to 
use it (Carlsson 1997, Carlsson and Eliasson 2003).  
22 At the same time, the strong focus of most (large) firms on dealing with the mass market may create niches of 
more sophisticated demand that opens up potentially attractive opportunities for specialised (smaller) firms. In 
the literature this phenomenon is also referred to as a process of ‘niche-elaboration’ (Pianka 1978).  
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Due to increased competition on price, there is a need to utilise economies of scale, and this 
opportunity arises since due to decreased uncertainty on the part of customers the market has 
enlarged. As a result, there is increase of scale, a shake-out of producers, and resulting 
concentration. In addition, there is an increase in specialisation that makes that relations entail 
more specific knowledge on a narrower range of issues. This drive for efficiency requires the 
elimination of redundant relations, yielding a less dense network structure. Reduced 
uncertainty and codified, diffused knowledge on a narrower range of issues enable the 
specification of contracts and the monitoring of compliance. This favours the use of contracts, 
with less relation-specific trust, which enables more arms-length, less personalised relations. 
This, together with a less dense structure, enables a larger size of the network. In other words, 
attention shifts to new forms of organization to enable efficient production and distribution, 
for exploitation of the new paradigm, and to respond to increased price competition due to 
novel entrants joining the bandwagon. Hence a division of labour arises,  regulated by formal 
contracts with built-in incentives to follow the dominant design, which further reinforces this 
organizational form. All this contributes to the emergence of a dominant design of 
organization for production and of supply chain structures, to yield ‘dominant organizational 
logics’ (Bettis and Prahalad 1995), and ‘industry recipes’ (Spender 1989). Important 
characteristics of this dominant organizational form are that, in general, relations among firms 
become more hierarchy and authority-based. Also durability of relations increases as specific 
investments are made, other than specific cognitive investments, such as in specialised 
machinery, storage facilities, specialised employees and so on. Coordination mechanisms 
enhance integration such as planning & control systems, (formal) procedures, standard modes 
for problem-solving, information systems and so on. In other words, new organizational 
institutional arrangements arise, next to a new technological paradigm (Freeman and Perez 
1988).
As a result, variety decreases and mainly consists of adaptations to standardized products, 
(formalized) social norms, newly formed industry associations and collectively defined issues. 
So, the focus of a learning regime here is on the efficient exploitation of existing resources 
and competencies that results in incremental, order-creating (technical) change. Critical 
(technical) issues are defined collectively, legitimate procedures are established and common 
norms and values emerge from the learning regime. Actors that reinforce these issues become 
more prominent such as standards bodies, professional societies and industry associations 
(Rosenkopf & Tushman 1994).  
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After the emergence of dominant designs in technology and organization, and adapted 
institutions, networks no longer need to hide in seclusion and local embedding, since they are 
now legitimized. Networks get dis-embedded from local environments and will tend to extend 
their markets internationally, for both inputs and outputs. This expansion is facilitated by new 
transmission and retention routines and procedures for problem solving, standards bodies, 
professional societies and industry associations. This expansion to new contexts of application 
is called the stage of generalization.
Exploitation : summing up 
The institutional environment provides incentives to transmit and retain the dominant design 
in the learning regime. This manifests itself by strong selection forces such as demand, 
competition, formalized control systems, technical standards and so on, allowing for 
incremental improvements.  In terms of our 3-level model of the institutional environment 
(figure 1, chapter 2), we can define exploitation as follows :  
 a strong selection by 2nd level institutions such as competition and demand, 
 a strong selection by 3rd level institutions such as social norms and/or formal 
control,
 limited feedback of learning outcomes to the institutional environment 
Schematically : 
                                                                                                                             Strong      Medium   Weak 






Based on the above analysis of the co-evolutionary process from exploration towards 
exploitation, we can formulate the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 3a :
In consolidation selection by newly formed 2nd level institutions such as the 
knowledge base and demand has become strong, whereas selection by 3rd level 
institutions is emerging.  
Hypothesis 3b :
The increasing selection by 3rd level institutions manifests itself by an emerging 
dominant organisational form that enables a division of labour.
Hypothesis 4 :  
In the phase of exploitation there is a strong selection by the existing institutional 
environment with limited feedback by outcomes of a learning regime. 
4.4  Towards Exploration : Differentiation and Reciprocation 
The phase of exploitation is generally characterized by a strong drive to achieve further 
economic growth based on the existing knowledge base and learning regimes. Scale effects 
are enabled by the fact that essential transmission & retention mechanisms are highly 
institutionalised by means of technical norms, formalized procedures for problem solving, 
standards bodies, professional societies and industry associations. In this respect, a 
competitive position has been built up and further growth may be obtained by the application 
of the dominant design in different contexts. This leads to the phase of differentiation: the 
application of the dominant design into a context that, although related, is different from the 
context from which it originates.23 The application of the knowledge base in these different 
contexts often requires adaptation to demand and institutions of that context. Especially when 
knowledge is systemic, adaptations can become more complex when complementary (non-
technological) processes also need to be adjusted in order to make the dominant design fit into 
the new context. In that case, knowledge needs to be embedded in local tacit knowledge. 
However, such incremental adaptations, in differentiation, may turn out to be insufficient. 
23 This connects with the notion of ‘local search’ as mentioned by Nelson and Winter (1982). Local search 
reflects the idea that firms search in related areas with which they are familiar instead of totally unrelated areas. 
Underlying this is the idea of the relative inertia of firms, as advanced by population ecologists such as Hannan 
and Freeman (1984) that firms are better at doing more of the same than at adapting to change.  
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They do not further improve efficiency but rather create additional complexity, adding extra 
costs. This is an important event as now insights develop into the limits of the existing 
dominant design and its dominant mode of organization, providing a rationale for more 
radical change. Through these insights seeds for a new path of exploration are sown and as a 
result, uncertainty increases and instability is created.  
To explore the new opportunities then requires the break-up of the existing learning regime 
and the opening up of the existing, densely connected network structure towards outside 
ties.24 Such outsiders, coming from another context, may dispose of knowledge on ‘solutions’ 
to the identified limits of the knowledge base. It may turn out that in some respects these local 
practices perform better in the novel context, so that one tries to incorporate such elements in 
imported practices, or indeed adopts local practices while incorporating elements from the 
existing dominant design. This is the phase of reciprocation. 
Moving to reciprocation requires the dominant organizational form to be adapted before new 
knowledge can be adequately accessed and locally absorbed. So, a process starts that forms 
the mirror-image of the process that occurred earlier towards exploitation, after the 
establishment of a dominant design. There, the new dominant design led to the emergence of 
a dominant organisational form. Here, the entrance of outsiders to the existing network makes 
that the dominant organizational form is changed first, before the dominant design can be 
adapted. So, towards exploitation selection of the dominant knowledge base, at the 2nd level of 
the institutional environment, leads to selection of the dominant organizational form, at the 3rd
level. Towards exploration, variety in this dominant organizational form, at the 3rd level, 
creates variety in the existing knowledge base, at the 2nd level. Hence the phase of 
reciprocation marks the transition from selection to variety as the main driving evolutionary 
mechanism, at different levels of the institutional environment. At the 3rd level of the 
institutional environment, variety is formed by an opening up of the dominant organisational 
form towards outside sources of knowledge, resulting in a mix of strong and weak ties. At the 
2nd level, variety is formed by ideas about directions for new exploration, originating from 
insights into limitations of the existing knowledge base and dominant design. The most 
important learning outcome of this ‘reciprocal learning’ is the insight that for a full utilisation 
24 As argued, this analysis of the co-evolutionary process pertains to a sectoral level. In other words, it is not said 
that all firms present in a SIS will make such a shift as conjectured here, on the contrary. In general, incumbent 
firms are characterized by (strong) inertia that prevents them from changing, due to sunk costs in specialised 
equipments, personnel and so on. It is found even that under such conditions of change as considered here, 
incumbent firms may even increase investments in the existing knowledge base and dominant design rather than 
absorbing signals that point to the relevance of new, outside knowledge (Porter 1990, 1998).  
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of the adopted practices a more fundamental restructuring is required. This provides 
indications for the integration of elements from various practices into a novel combination.
Based on the above analysis of the co-evolutionary process from exploitation towards 
exploration, we can formulate the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 5a :
From differentiation to reciprocation the insights into the limits of the existing 
knowledge base strongly affect the 3rd level and 2nd level of the institutional 
environment.
Hypothesis 5b : 
From differentiation to reciprocation the dominant organisational form opens up 
towards outside sources of knowledge, resulting in a hybrid structure of strong and 
weak ties. 
This analysis of this process of institutionalisation provides us with insights in how the co-
evolution of network structures, interfirm learning processes and changes in the institutional 
environment takes place. We have described how the actors by means of their interaction in 
these interfirm learning processes, socially (re-) construct the institutional environment. In 
addition, we have described how the interfirm learning processes are facilitated and 
constrained by the institutional environment and how the outcomes of these learning 
processes, in various degrees, again affect the institutional environment.  
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4.5  Summary : 4 Hypotheses 
In  this chapter, we have described the co-evolutionary process between institutional 
environment and learning regimes based on the cycle of knowledge. Following figure 4.2, we 
can summarize our analysis of this co-evolutionary process by developing the following 
hypotheses : 
exploration 
                                                                                           novel combinations 
                      r              reciprocation                                 consolidation     
                                                              differentiation                                  generalization  
                                                                                                   
exploitation 
Strong        Medium       Weak 
Figure 4.2 :           Schematic relation between Cycle of Knowledge and Institutional Level Model
Hypothesis 2a :
In the phase of exploration of novel combinations variety abounds, there is little selection by 
the newly emerging institutional environment and feedback by outcomes of a learning regime 















Hypothesis 2b : 
Novelty in exploration originates in allopatric speciation, at the periphery of the existing 
network where selection from the center is less strong. 
Hypothesis 3a :
In consolidation selection by newly formed 2nd level institutions such as the knowledge base 
and demand has become strong, whereas selection by 3rd level institutions is emerging.  
Hypothesis 3b :
The increasing selection by 3rd level institutions manifests itself by an emerging dominant 
organisational form that enables a division of labour.
Hypothesis 4 :  
In the phase of exploitation there is a strong selection by the existing institutional 
environment with limited feedback by outcomes of a learning regime.  
Hypothesis 5a :
From differentiation to reciprocation the insights into the limits of the existing knowledge 
base strongly affect the 3rd level and 2nd level of the institutional environment. 
Hypothesis 5b : 
From differentiation to reciprocation the dominant organisational form opens up towards 
outside sources of knowledge, resulting in a hybrid structure of strong and weak ties. 
These hypotheses describe the co-evolutionary process between institutional environment and 
learning regimes in a general way. How this co-evolutionary process manifests itself in a 
particular SIS is dependent upon SIS-specific institutions. Therefore we have not mentioned 
all possibly relevant 2nd and 3rd level institutions as these will differ per type of SIS.  
82
83
Chapter 5  Implications of the co-evolutionary process  
Research Question 4 :
What are the implications of the co-evolutionary process for firms with regard to the 
configuration of networks, the properties of interfirm relations and coordination 
mechanisms? 
5.1        Introduction 
Following our nested view of the institutional environment as developed in chapter 2, changes 
in the 2nd level of the institutional environment have implications for 3rd level institutions 
formed by network structure, relational properties and coordination mechanisms. In addition, 
outcomes of a learning regime can also affect these 3rd level elements of the institutional 
environment. So, as analysed in chapter 4, changes in 3rd level institutions can occur through 
selection by the institutional environment or through variety generated by outcomes of a 
learning regime. This chapter therefore focuses on the implications of the co-evolutionary 
process for network structure, the properties of the relations making up this network and the 
way these relations are coordinated.  
This chapter is built up as follows. Paragraph 5.2 discusses various concepts and insights on 
social networks as advanced in the social network literature. Paragraph 5.3 deals with the 
need for trade-offs in a network when balancing a competence view and a governance view, 
and how these trade-offs vary with the environmental context. Based on this we discuss the 
implications of the co-evolutionary process for the optimality of the network structure, 
relational properties and coordination mechanisms. To do so, we differentiate between a 
setting of exploitation in paragraph 5.4 and exploration in paragraph 5.5. Admittedly, this 
distinction is sharp, which is on purpose in order to clarify our argument. Of course, in 
practice the long term continuity of firms depends on how they combine both these processes 
instead of focussing on either one of them (March 1991, Nooteboom 2000).  
5.2  Social networks  
The focus of this paragraph is on social networks. We start with a brief review on networks as 
developed in innovation theory (paragraph 5.2.1). Then we turn to the literature on social 
networks as we discuss the contributions of three influential scholars, namely the work of 
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Granovetter, Coleman and Burt (paragraph 5.2.2). Next we discuss the importance of the joint 
consideration of density and strength of ties in order to develop a more in-depth 
understanding of networks that has relevance from a learning and innovation perspective 
(paragraph 5.2.3).   
5.2.1 Notions on networks from innovation theory 
One of the key messages from innovation theory is that learning and innovation take place 
within networks of firms and non-firm actors (Lundvall 1988, 1992, Grabher 1993, McKelvey 
1996,  Carlsson 1995, Oerlemans1996). So, networks are considered as important by  
innovation scholars although a systematic analysis and understanding of networks is lacking. 
When differentiating between various types of networks, the general distinction is made 
between densely connected networks, loosely coupled networks and open networks. But a  
systematic comparison of the strengths and weakness of each of these forms in the context of 
the learning and innovation has not been made. So, insights into the question under which 
conditions networks should have more integrated or more disintegrated structures tend to be 
underdeveloped. In this respect, it comes as no surprise that suggested solutions to solve 
hindrances in learning and innovation processes are quite general and often refer to the 
abstract notion of ‘interaction’ or ‘system connectivity’ (Malerba and Breschi 1997, Lundvall 
and Borras 1997, Edquist 1997). Obviously, interaction plays a key role in interactive learning 
but we consider this too general a statement. As our analysis in chapter 4 has made clear, 
interaction and learning differ considerably in the various phases of the co-evolutionary 
process and also varies with different types of networks and with different combinations of 
coordinating mechanisms. The agreement on the importance of networks notwithstanding, 
these notions are underdeveloped in the literature on learning and innovation. For a deeper 
understanding of networks we need to turn to the social network literature. 
5.2.2    Social network theory 
Networks and relations among actors are the primary object of analysis in social network 
theory. In this paragraph we discuss the contributions of three influential scholars in 
particular, namely the work of intensive, frequent and possess informational resources which 
one already has. Strong ties produce and are governed by relational trust and norms of mutual 
gain and reciprocity, which grow through a history of interactions (Rowley e.a. 2000, Lesser 
2000). Granovetter associated these strong ties with a dense network structure. In view of the 
Granovetter, Burt and Coleman. Each of their considerations lead to different conclusions 
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with respect to the optimal network structure. As we will argue, the question is not who is 
right, but who is right under which conditions.  
Granovetter
The distinction between strong and weak ties was introduced by Granovetter (1973). Strong 
ties are formed by relations which are frequent and intense interaction between many actors, 
much of the information circulating in the system is redundant. Weak ties are formed by 
relations with persons one is loosely connected to. As they operate in different networks, 
weak ties offer the advantage of  providing access to different information. So, in theory, the 
more weak ties one has, the wider scope of accessible information. Still, neither type is 
preferred as both have different qualities and it depends on the conditions which of the two a 
firm may favour (Rowley e.a. 2000).  
Burt
Burt (1992) focuses on the efficiency of networks and stresses that there are costs associated 
with maintaining contacts. According to Burt an efficient network structure is characterised 
by non-redundant contacts and brokerage opportunities. It is not considered rational to 
increase the number of linkages within an existing network as, according to Burt, redundant 
contacts carry the same information. Therefore, firms should aim to have non-redundant 
contacts that are complementary and do not overlap, so called structural holes. Structural 
holes are ‘disconnections between players in the arena’ and provide opportunities for 
information access, timing, referrals and control. In this way, competitive advantage is 
explained as a ‘matter of access to holes’ (Burt 1992 : 2). A strategic actor can build 
efficiency into its network by acting as a bridging tie, i.e. an actor who connects structural 
holes. Such a structure minimizes redundancy, thereby creating brokerage opportunities and 
access to different kinds of information. In this respect Burt made a clearer conceptual 
separation between the strength and the density of ties than Granovetter. It is the dense 
structure, apart from the strength of ties, which yields redundancy, when the aim is access to 
new knowledge. In dense networks one needs to expend many resources on the maintenance 
of ties (even if they are weak), while there is a high chance that ties in this dense structure 
carry the same information and hence form ‘redundant contacts’. So, efficiency can be 
obtained from maximising the nonredundancy of contacts so that  time and energy are saved 
for developing new contacts to unconnected people (Burt 1992). In doing so, access can be 
86
created to valuable information held by unknown others.  
Coleman
Coleman (1988) relates the structure of a network to the level of social capital which can 
emerge between network actors.25 On the relationship between social structures and social 
capital Coleman (1988) comments as follows: ‘All social relations and social structures 
facilitate some forms of social capital; actors establish relations purposefully and continue 
them when they continue to provide benefits. Certain kinds of social structure, however, are 
especially important in facilitating some forms of social capital’ (p. 329). In this respect 
Coleman points at the benefits of dense networks for their potential with regard to the build-
up of social capital26. This social capital is not only built up of information but also facilitates 
the functioning of norms and sanctions which may form effective ways to coordinate a 
relationship. Social norms on how to behave ‘properly’ can be highly prescriptive and 
deviating from them may be unattractive due to reputation effects which are generally strong 
in dense networks (Coleman 1988, Grandori & Soda 1995). In this way social capital 
functions as a social control mechanism to pre-empt firms from opportunistic behaviour 
(Grandori and Soda 1995, Rowley e.a. 2000). Betrayal becomes more costly as it not only 
affects the relation with the trustor but, through reputation mechanisms, also the relations with 
other ties (Coleman 1988).
Who is right under which conditions?  
Unlike their universalistic tone, the considerations of Granovetter, Burt and Coleman lead to 
different conclusions with respect to the optimal network structure. Granovetter stresses the 
importance of weak ties in order to increase the potential scope of accessible information. 
Burt stresses the importance of efficiency and proposes a structure rich in structural holes, 
spanned by ‘middle actors’ who have ties to unconnected alters. Both the considerations of 
Granovetter and Burt clearly refer to the competence side of relations. Coleman (1988) 
proposes a dense structure that enables the build-up of reputation and social capital, in the 
form of trust and social norms. These considerations have relevance from a governance-
perspective of relations.
25 See for an overview of the literature on social capital Coleman 1988, Leenders & Gabbay 1999 and Lesser 
2000.
26 Coleman mentions ‘closure’ as a specific structure of dense networks in which all actors are directly connected 
to one another. 
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So, it seems that there is no such thing as a universally optimal network structure. Due to the 
strong focus on structural elements of networks such as centrality, density, structural 
equivalence, structural autonomy etc. (Knoke & Kuklinski 1982, Wasserman & Faust 1994), 
the identification of relevant conditions and how they influence the structure and functioning 
of networks has generally been ignored by social network theorists. This is increasingly being 
acknowledged, among others by Coleman who stated that ‘social relationships that constitute 
social capital for one kind of productive activity may be impediments for another (Coleman 
1994: 177). Also Burt (1998) suggests that his view is not necessarily contradictory to 
Coleman’s as networks and social capital are valuable for different populations and purposes. 
Recently some studies have tried to shed more light on this and have indicated that the 
optimality of the network structure is indeed dependent upon the environmental context 
(Rowley e.a. 2000, Ahuja 2000, Duysters and Hagedoorn 2003).  
In line with this, we argue that the context has profound implications for how a network is 
structured and how it functions in view of a division of labour among its members. Hence the 
optimality of the network structure is liable to be a function of the context. Before further 
elaborating on that, we analyse two characteristics of networks more in-depth as this enables 
us to develop a more profound understanding of networks that is relevant in the context of 
learning and innovation. This will be further examined in paragraph 5.2.3.  
5.2.3    Density and strength of ties  
In this sub-paragraph we focus on two characteristics of networks that are important when 
developing a more in-depth understanding of networks from a learning and innovation 
perspective: the density of ties and the strength of ties. In doing so, we deviate from the 
insights as advanced by social network theorists in two ways. Firstly we argue that, unlike the 
discussion in social network theory, the understanding of the optimality of the network 
structure benefits from a joint consideration of density and strength of ties. Secondly, we 
argue that we need to differentiate between different dimensions of strength of ties as 
networks can vary in different dimensions of tie strength, depending on the context. We will 
discuss both issues in turn now.
Joint consideration of density and strength 
The discussion on the importance of the strength of ties (Granovetter) versus the density of 
ties (Burt) is not so relevant from a learning and  innovation perspective. We argue that in 
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such a context the understanding of the network structure benefits from a joint consideration 
of the strength of ties and the density of ties. To further substantiate this we need to 
differentiate between cognitive variety and cognitive distance. Cognitive variety refers to how 
many different individual cognitive frameworks are present in a network, cognitive distance 
refers to the difference between any of them (Nooteboom 1999). The density of ties is 
relevant as it indicates the potential for cognitive variety present in a network. A large number 
of ties present in a network, as a percentage of the total possible number, provides the 
possibility to have access to many different types of knowledge held by others. Depending on 
the cognitive distance between these different frameworks, ties need to vary in strength in 
order to cross this distance. So, the strength of ties is relevant as it indicates the potential to 
absorb this knowledge.  
Strength of ties 
To further specify this relation between the strength of ties and the potential to absorb outside 
knowledge, we need to differentiate between different dimensions of strength. As recognised 
by Granovetter, the strength of ties entails a linear combination of amount of time, emotional 
intensity, intimacy (mutual confiding) and the reciprocal services which characterize the tie 
(Granovetter, 1973: 1361). So, next to the amount of time, the combination of emotional 
intensity, intimacy and reciprocal services provide a good indication of the strength of the 
relation, especially in personal networks. In this respect, these four dimensions have a general 
meaning when developing an understanding of the strength of ties. However, in a context of 
learning and innovation these dimensions of strength are too general and require a more 
detailed elaboration. So, these four dimensions need to be adapted, which we will do by 
combining a competence and a governance perspective. We propose the following four steps. 
First we propose to keep the amount of time and will refer to this as the duration of the 
relationship. This is relevant from both a governance and competence perspective. The 
duration of the relation is important to recoup specific investments made in the relationship 
that are needed to develop a common cognitive framework. Secondly we propose to adapt 
emotional intensity to intensity in terms of frequency of contacts. The level of frequency 
indicates the potential for the transfer of tacit knowledge and thus the chance of spill-overs. A 
high level of frequency enables an easy transfer of tacit knowledge and thus a high chance of 
spill-overs, whereas a low level of frequency decreases the potential of the transfer of tacit 
knowledge and may thus prevent spill-overs. Thirdly we propose to adapt intimacy or mutual 
confiding to openness, i.e. the willingness to share knowledge in view of mutual learning as 
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well as in view of relevant relational risks of spill-over and legitimation. Our fourth step deals 
with reciprocal services, that deals with the level of ‘give-and-take’ in shared activities. This 
is a more slippery notion and may lead to misinterpretation. In this respect, we observe that 
Granovetter’s first three dimensions basically refer to the properties of the ties, whereas this 
dimension of reciprocal services may also provide an indication of the relational content of 
ties. Such a more explicit indication of relational content may have relevance from an 
innovation point of view. As argued, in the case of systemic knowledge firms need to operate 
in a more or less orchestrated fashion that may require interaction on many elements. A stand-
alone knowledge base allows for more leeway, and interaction on fewer elements may be 
needed. Hence for the understanding of the strength of ties some indication of the relational 
content seems to be relevant. We therefore propose to adapt reciprocal services to the breadth 
of the relational content, by which we mean the extent to which the relation between firms 
deals with a wide or narrow scope of issues. This is also relevant from a governance 
perspective as a wider scope generally provides more potential for spill-overs than a more 
narrow scope.
Bringing in the context 
Following the discussion above, networks can differ in their combinations of density and 
strength of ties. Our central argument now is that the optimality of any combination is 
dependent on the context in which the network is embedded. In chapter 3 we have made the 
general distinction between a context of exploration and of exploitation. Our dynamic analysis 
in chapter 4 has made clear that from exploration to exploitation the main co-evolutionary 
processes are standardisation and routinisation, within a context of increasing stability. 
Organization theory then informs us that under such conditions, more integrated 
organizational structures are the preferred mode of organization (Lawrence and Lorsch 1967). 
As we will argue in paragraph 5.4, this enhances integration and tighter forms of coordination, 
largely coinciding with a non-dense structure of strong ties.  
From exploitation to exploration, the main co-evolutionary processes is characterized by 
experimentation and deviation from existing standards and routines within a context of 
(increasing) instability. According to Lawrence and Lorsch (1967), to deal with such 
conditions requires more loose organizational structures. As we will discuss in paragraph 5.5, 
this enhances disintegration and more loose and informal forms of coordination, largely 
coinciding with a dense network structure built up of ties with low strength.  
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We will further analyse this more in-depth by relating the combination of density and strength 
of ties to the context of exploitation (paragraph 5.4) and exploration (paragraph 5.5). Before 
doing so we first discuss in paragraph 5.3 the need for trade-offs in a network when 
reconciling a competence perspective and a governance perspective.  
5.3 Combining a competence and a governance perspective 
As discussed in chapter 3, our concept of a learning regime integrates a competence view with 
a governance view. In this paragraph we build on this analysis by analysing how the 
environmental context of a network conditions the various trade-offs between these two 
perspectives. The environment creates uncertainty with which firms need to cope in terms of 
hazards, restrictions and demands put on them and on their network. In this respect, we 
introduce the notion of a ‘network strategy’ which we define as ‘those decisions and actions 
that firms need to make in order to balance a competence and a governance perspective in 
view of environmental uncertainty’.  
To further elaborate on this, we differentiate between three types of environmental 
uncertainty: complexity, variability and dependency.   
Environmental uncertainty : complexity 
Generally speaking, uncertainty due to complexity arises from accomplishing a difficult task. 
It may, for example, stem from a systemic knowledge base. In general, such a knowledge base 
requires standards on the interfaces as well an (basic) understanding of adjacent technology 
areas, creating complexity. In that case other firms are needed and the basis for a network 
emerges. To reduce uncertainty due to complexity, in the case of systemic knowledge, the 
design of the network structure should be so that relations are durable and (partially) 
exclusive. Such a network structure of strong ties then offers two advantages to reduce 
complexity. It accommodates efficient and quick coordination, and it enhances knowledge 
spill-over (also tacit) that furthers mutual learning and understanding.  
Environmental uncertainty : Variability 
Uncertainty due to variability arises from changes in the institutional environment such as for 
example change in demand or the advent of a new technology. In general, changing 
conditions in the environment requires the entrance of outsiders to the network. These 
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outsiders give access to other networks with different cognitive perspectives and may form an 
important source of diversity (Granovetter 1973). And this diversity is needed when dealing 
with variability in conditions. So, when uncertainty due to variability increases, relations with 
weak ties enable to cope with change.  
Environmental uncertainty : Dependency 
Engaging in a network for the purpose of learning and innovation creates dependency, on 
strong ties and on weak ties. This dependency yields relational risk which again influences 
possibilities for learning. As argued, a dense network structure in the case of a systemic 
knowledge base reduces uncertainty due to complexity. But it also creates dependency on 
these strong ties. The network configuration as described above (durable, dense and exclusive 
relations) also offers two advantages to cope with dependency. First, it allows for recouping 
specific investments which are made to grow cognitively close and as such prevents hold-up. 
In addition, it allows for the build up of social capital which also puts limits on freeridership. 
However, there is one big drawback of such a network structure which is its inability to cope 
with uncertainty due to variability. The accumulated social capital of a network of strong ties 
may then turn into lock-in (Arthur 1989, Nooteboom 2000) or social liability (Uzzi 1997, 
Gargiulo and Benassi 1999, Leenders & Gabbay 1999). Weak ties are now needed but also 
create dependency on them.  
Network strategy 
In sum: a network strategy deals with combining a competence and a governance perspective 
in view of  environmental uncertainty. More specifically we argue that, within an evolutionary 
context, a network strategy needs to fulfil three functions based on the three types of 
environmental uncertainty. Table 5.1 provides a schematic overview :  




Table 5.1 :  Types of environmental uncertainty and related function of network 
strategy
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A network strategy should fulfil these three functions by crafting a mix of coordination 
mechanisms that matches the three types and varying levels of environmental uncertainty. 
Obviously, these three separate functions do not need to be congruent, on the contrary, they 
may conflict. Each function pursues different objectives and hence selects different 
coordination mechanisms. So, in developing a network strategy, there are trade-offs to be 
made. These trade-offs are contingent upon the institutional conditions in which a network is 
embedded. As said we make a general distinction between two types of contingencies, namely 
an exploitation-setting (paragraph 5.4) and an exploration-setting (paragraph 5.5).  
5.4 Exploitation  
In this paragraph we discuss the implications of an exploitation setting for the optimality of 
the network structure in terms of density and strength of ties (paragraph 5.4.1). Based on that 
we discuss an appropriate network strategy in such a network (paragraph 5.4.2). We finish by 
summarising and by formulating three hypotheses (paragraph 5.4.3) 
5.4.1 Non-dense structure of ties strong in durability  
As argued in chapter 4, a setting of exploitation is characterised by standardisation and 
routinisation, creating stability with some incremental change. Dominant designs have 
emerged, and technological and market uncertainty have decreased. Here, considerations of 
efficiency are crucial, since competition has shifted to competition on price, with new entrants 
in the emerging market. Due to increased competition on price, there is a need to utilise 
economies of scale, and this opportunity arises due to decreased uncertainty on the part of 
customers: the market has enlarged. As a result, there is an increase of scale, a shake-out of 
producers, and resulting concentration. A learning regime develops with a focus on refining 
existing innovations and improving existing competencies. As analysed in chapter 4, this 
requires a search-process that is well-structured around a limited search space. As a 
consequence, there is an increase in specialisation so that relations entail more specific 
knowledge on a narrower range of issues. These requirements for information and the search-
process are better obtained from strong ties (Granovetter 1973). More precisely, ties are 
generally strong in terms of durability as this enables the continuous search for and 
development of specific information and knowledge around selected topics. Furthermore, 
investments shift to large-scale production, distribution systems, and brand name, which are 
all long-term. The drive for efficiency requires the elimination of redundant relations. This 
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yields a less dense structure. The increased codification of knowledge furthers diffusion 
without the need for relation-specific investments of mutual understanding. This enables a 
less dense structure, since now one can identify what competencies are and will remain 
relevant, who has those competencies, and who is likely to survive in the industry. The 
increased competitive pressure narrows the potential for trust and creates a need for contracts. 
At the same time, reduced uncertainty and more codified, diffused knowledge on a narrow 
range of issues enable the specification of contracts and the monitoring of compliance. As a 
consequence, ties show generally lower strength in terms of frequency of contacts, mutual 
openness and breadth of relational content.
Potential benefits and risks of a non-dense structure of ties strong in durability
Following the discussion above, such a non-dense network of ties which are strong in terms of 
durability enable members to specialise in a specific task so that they only need to coordinate 
with their immediate, direct ties. The long-term and frequent interaction between these strong 
ties result in a limited cognitive distance among firms so that this exchange of context-
specific, tacit knowledge can indeed take place efficiently.27 Such a network structure enables 
a clear separation of tasks in a stable division of labour. This presupposes though a high level 
of centrality in this network by one or a few members. Only the presence of such a central 
firm can ensure that the activities in the various parts of the non-dense network are 
coordinated and integrated in a stable way. In this respect, a non-dense network of strong ties 
is highly efficient as knowledge can reside within specialised firms and coordination can take 
place by one or a few firms in the core of the network. Furthermore this make it possible to 
take a structured approach to innovation, generally resulting in incremental adaptations. From 
a governance-perspective, the advantage of durable ties lies in the possibility to recoup 
specific investments that are made in view of specialisation and the development of specific 
knowledge on a narrow range of issues.  
Obviously, there are also risks associated with this network structure. From a competence 
perspective there is a chance of overload from the side of the central firm. Its coordination 
role makes that all information generated in the various parts of the network move through it. 
Especially in the case of a high level of complexity, large bodies of information and 
27 This is confirmed by empirical research such as for example Uzzi’s study (1996) on the New York apparel 
industry. He found that firms that were connected through strong ties were able to quickly exchange ‘fine-
grained’ knowledge on products and market-developments. 
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knowledge may be generated that cannot  be handled by the central firm alone. Another risk is 
that such a network may not be capable enough to deal with (radical) change. Due to the high 
level of centrality of the core firm, knowledge and information cannot  move freely so that 
their rapid recombination may be inhibited. This requires more direct ties among the various 
members that would increase density and turn this network into a more densely connected  
network of strong ties. In addition, interaction of high frequency over a long(-er) period of 
time decreases the cognitive distance that lower the potential for innovation, creating a risk of 
lock-in (Arthur (1988) or inertia (Nooteboom 2000).28
Risks from a governance-perspective relate to both freeridership and hold-up, especially from 
the side of non-central members in the network. Due to its central position the core firm may 
occupy a powerful position. As a result, it may be tempted to freeride on the efforts of the 
dependent, non-central members. In addition, it may force these members to make specific 
cognitive investments as well as other forms of specific investments such as dedicated assets, 
human, physical, site-specific and so on (see also paragraph 3.3.2). This creates a potential 
problem of hold-up on the side of non-central members. Table 5.2 summarizes our argument. 
COMPETENCE  PERSPECTIVE GOVERNANCE  PERSPECTIVE
POTENTIAL 
BENEFITS 
- functional specialisation 
- efficiency 
possibility to recoup  
specific investments 
POTENTIAL RISKS 
- low potential for rapid 
  recombination of knowledge 
- lock-in   
- hold-up  
- freeridership 
Table 5.2 :  Potential benefits and risks of a non-dense network of ties strong in 
durability, in exploitation  
5.4.2 Network strategies in exploitation  
We now further analyse how to balance a competence perspective and a governance 
perspective when developing a network strategy in a setting of exploitation. Obviously, these 
trade-offs are also firm-specific and in this respect dependent on firm-specific characteristics 
such as such a firm’s position in the network structure, firm specific knowledge and 
28 Others have labelled this situation as ‘overembeddedness’ (Uzzi 1997, 1999) or ‘social liability’ (Gargiulo & 
Benassi 1999). 
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capabilities, its ambitions with regard to innovation, etc. As argued, the individual firm level 
is beyond the scope of our research and we therefore confine ourselves to the possible set of 
options for network strategies and the trade-offs among them from which firms can choose.  
In a setting of exploitation, as argued in chapter 4, uncertainty due to complexity is fairly low  
due to a more codified and widely diffused knowledge base. Compared to exploration, the 
rate of change is much lower resulting in low(er) uncertainty due to variability. In addition, 
initial weak ties have turned into ties that are strong in terms of duration. So, environmental 
uncertainty in exploitation is fairly low and dependency mainly rests in relations with strong 
ties. These general environmental characteristics lead to the following trade-offs among 
network strategies.  
The codification of knowledge and the presence of (technical) standards make it possible to 
monitor and value both inputs as outputs by other firms, lowering possibilities for 
freeridership. The coordination function favours a network strategy of contracts which outline 
specific mechanisms such as personal communication, decision & negotiation procedures, 
planning and control systems, information systems and so. Contracts may increasingly be 
complemented by relational contracts which mirror informal understandings and habits 
(Smith Ring and van de Ven 1994). Such contracts are also desirable from a safeguarding 
perspective as they lower possibilities for freeridership. A further advantage of relational 
contracts is that they allow for flexibility and low set-up costs29 (Nooteboom 1999). Such a 
network strategy of formal contracts and informal, relational contracts enhance the need for 
coordination, safeguarding as well as for adaptation. In this respect, the three functions are 
mutually reinforcing. Although an important assumption here is that interests converge.  
When interests diverge, uncertainty due to dependency rises and a different situation 
develops. Conflict of interests requires coordination by means of formal, obligational 
contracts (Grandori 1997). However, when contracts are too detailed they may signal distrust 
(Nooteboom 2000) which is undesirable from a safeguarding perspective. In addition, they 
limit flexibility and hence do not allow for adaptation. Also from a coordination perspective, 
detailed contracts can bring disadvantages. More tacit parts of the knowledge base are 
difficult to monitor and value, thus putting limits on the possibility for input and/or 
29 This flexibility is of a different order than flexibility within exploration. In exploitation flexibility refers to 
adaptations within the constraints of the existing knowledge base, accomplished by the existing network. 
Flexibility in exploration entails the creation of a new knowledge base which requires the creation of (totally) 
new networks. 
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performance control by means of contracts. In that situation, realignment of objectives by 
means of (partial) integration may be an option (Grandori 1997), enhancing both coordination 
and safeguarding. However, for adaptation this option may be less attractive as it creates a 
potential for hold-up as well as social liability.  
Relevance of Burt’s structural holes argument 
In such a network, Burt’s recommendations to create or improve efficiency are especially 
relevant. Given the small cognitive distance in this network there is a high chance that strong 
ties carry the same information and hence form ‘redundant contacts’. Given the costs 
associated with maintaining contacts, Burt suggests that firms can create efficiency in the 
network by disposing of such redundant contacts and selectively maintain relations with a 
limited set of firms. In this respect, Burt’s suggestions are adequate in an exploitation-setting, 
at least as a general strategy in structuring a network30. More specifically then, the question 
becomes who should be selected and who should be disposed of by reaching him through 
others. Burt proposes to ‘minimalise information-redundancy among contacts’ as the primary 
design and selection principle. This implies that those contacts that are well-informed and 
provide access to other, information-rich networks should be selected. Although 
understandable from a viewpoint of improving efficiency, Burt’s theory does not give any 
guidance from a competence-perspective nor from a governance-perspective: in how far is the 
central actor who spans a structural hole sufficiently competent, now and in the future, and in 
addition, can he be trusted? To assess this may again require relations with the actors who 
were initially disposed of and who are now reached through this central player. In general, 
insights into who and how to select for cooperation is a fairly unexplored issue in the 
literature.  
5.4.3     Summary and hypotheses  
Towards exploitation the main co-evolutionary processes are standardisation and routinisation 
with a focus on improving existing competencies and the search for context-specific 
knowledge. Under such conditions a network is selected of low density and of ties that are 
strong in terms of durability but show lower strength in terms of frequency of contacts, 
mutual openness and breadth of issues covered. This combination of density and tie strength 
means that firms can develop a deep understanding of selected topics in view of incremental 
30 See a longitudinal study by Ahuja on networks in the international chemicals industry for an empirical test and 
(partial) confirmation of these claims by Burt (Ahuja 2000).  
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innovations. A network strategy aimed at integration and coordination takes place by 
contracts and other formal control mechanisms, possibly complemented by ‘relational 
contracts’ that are reflected in the use of more informal mechanisms such as reputation, trust-
in-intention and social norms. A risk of such a network is a heavy inward-looking orientation 
that blocks renewal, resulting in lock-in. 
We can now rephrase these conclusions in terms of our evolutionary approach by means of 
the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 6a : 
       In exploitation the institutional environment will select non-dense networks of ties that 
are strong in durability but show low(er) strength in terms of frequency of contacts, 
mutual openness and breadth of issues covered.
Hypothesis 6b : 
In exploitation the institutional environment will select coordination mechanisms that 
enhance integration such as contracts and formal control mechanisms, possibly 
complemented by informal mechanisms such as reputation, trust-in-intention and social 
norms.
Hypothesis 7 : 
A potential risk of such a network is a heavy-inward looking orientation that results in 
lock-in.
5.5.   Exploration 
In this paragraph we discuss the implications of an exploration setting for the optimality of the 
network structure (paragraph 5.5.1). Based on that we discuss an appropriate network strategy 
in these types of networks (paragraph 5.5.4). We finish by summarising and by formulating 
three hypotheses (paragraph 5.5.5). 
5.5.1    Dense structures of ties with low strength  
As argued in chapter 4, a setting of exploration is characterised by a shift away from 
established routines and competencies so that existing knowledge and proven practices 
become less relevant. So, a learning regime develops characterized by a constant search for 
new information on many potential alternatives. Such an exploration setting poses an 
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important challenge for firms. On the one hand firms need to develop an in-depth 
understanding of the newly emerging field whereas on the other hand they need to keep a 
broad focus and maintain access to various possible options. Searching through its existing 
strong ties enables the firm to develop such a deep understanding but decreases chances for 
finding new information as cognitive distance in this network is limited. This implies the 
importance of different or new sources of knowledge outside this existing network through 
establishing linkages with weak ties (Granovetter 1973). This connects with arguments made 
by various innovation scholars who stress the fact that different sources of knowledge outside 
a firm are critical for the innovation process (Lundvall 1992, Carlsson 1997, Malerba 2002). 
In line with this argument we can make the conjecture that when environmental uncertainty 
due to variability increases, the need for weak ties becomes stronger. However, there is a 
maximum of weak ties that firms are able to handle, for two reasons. First, the time and 
resource obligations to strong ties puts a limit on the possibilities to create and maintain 
relations with weak ties (Rowley e.a. 2000). A second argument is that too many weak ties 
may increase the chance of misunderstanding when cognitive distance among the various ties 
is (too) large (Nooteboom 2000). Learning among heterogeneous actors can only happen 
when information and knowledge are transferred efficiently and when this knowledge and 
information can be retained (McKelvey 1997), which requires some overlap in cognition.  
So, an exploration setting requires weak ties although they should be seen in relation to the 
existing strong ties that firms have31. It is in the mix of strong and weak ties that firms can 
make new combinations of what is already known and what is new, yielding a dense structure. 
This connects with information theory, which argues that the chance for ‘information noise’ 
reduces while the demand for more exact information increases, when accessing multiple and 
redundant contacts (Shannon 1957). In this respect, the existing strong ties facilitate 
triangulation among their multiple weak ties and thus better assessing the value of the 
obtained information and knowledge (Rowley e.a. 2000). Following our contingency-
argument, the ‘desired mix’ of strong and weak ties depends on the environmental context.  
Potential benefits and risks of a dense network with low strength of ties
A network of high density indicates a high number of ties as a proportion of the total possible 
number of ties in a network. The existing ties needed for triangulation are mostly strong but 
31 This issue seems to be a bit overlooked in the literature in which the choice for strong and weak ties is often 
approached in terms of ‘either or’. An interesting attempt to jointly consider them is made by Rowley e.a. 2000. 
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especially the relations with new or weak ties are characterised by low strength, being  
generally non-durable with limited interaction on a few issues with limited openness. These 
weak ties give access to other networks and as such form an important source of diversity 
(Granovetter 1985). The combination of high density and low strength indicates that there are 
many connections among different firms but for a limited period of time, with low frequency 
and possibly with limited openness and/or entailing a few issues. From a competence-
perspective this brings the advantage of a rapid recombination of ties that enables an effective 
exploration of novel combinations. Especially in the case of a systemic knowledge base such 
a network offers the possibility of exploration through the rapid recombination of different 
technologies. From a governance-perspective it brings the advantage of a rapid transfer of 
reputation, especially with regard to competence rather than with regard to intentional 
trustworthiness.  
However, there are also risks associated with this network structure. From a competence 
perspective there are two potential risks. Recombining different types of knowledge through 
various weak ties may create a risk of misunderstanding when cognitive variety becomes too 
big. In addition, this process of recombination of knowledge may often require specific 
investments in order to make these different types of knowledge fit with one another. This is 
generally a more tacit process and requires some duration of the relation in order to recoup 
such a specific investment. When the strength of ties is too low in terms of durability then 
firms may show less inclination to engage in exploration that may negatively affect 
knowledge creation. As a consequence, from a governance perspective there is a risk of hold-
up. When specific investments are made in the relation with weak ties, the generally short 
duration of the relation may prevent this investment from being fully recouped. As such this 
knowledge may possibly be used in relation with others to compensate for a hold-up problem 
but the rapid transfer of reputation in the network also puts limits on the possibility of such 
acts of freeridership. In addition, the rapid recombination of ties creates a (large) potential for 
knowledge spill-overs although this will be conditioned by the level of codification of 
knowledge; the more codified, the higher this potential risk. Table 5.3 summarizes our 
argument (see next page). 
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COMPETENCE  PERSPECTIVE GOVERNANCE  PERSPECTIVE 
POTENTIAL 
BENEFITS 
rapid recombination of 
knowledge 
rapid transfer of reputation 
POTENTIAL RISKS 
- risk of misunderstanding 
- insufficient creation of 
new knowledge 
- hold-up 
- potential for spill-overs 
Table 5.3 :  Potential benefits and risks of a dense network with a low strength of ties, 
in exploration 
5.5.2     Network strategies in exploration  
We now further analyse how to balance a competence perspective and a governance 
perspective when developing a network strategy in a setting of exploration. Obviously, these 
trade-offs are also firm-specific and in this respect dependent on firm-specific characteristics  
such as such a firm’s position in the network structure, firm specific knowledge and 
capabilities, ambitions with regard to innovation, etc. As argued, the individual firm level is 
beyond the scope of our research and we therefore confine ourselves to the possible set of 
options for network strategies and the trade-offs among them from which firms can choose.   
As analysed in chapter 4, initially in exploration the newly emerging systemic knowledge 
base is highly tacit and cognitive distance among firms is large. The coordination function 
asks for direct mutual adjustment ‘in real time’ which requires coordination mechanisms such 
as direct personal communication, group problem solving and  group decision-making. 
Relations should be durable and (partly) exclusive, both for reasons of coordination (to lower 
cognitive distance) as for reasons of safeguarding (to prevent hold-up). In addition, both 
functions require that the network size is kept limited : due to the specific and tacit nature of 
knowledge, its exchange (coordination) as well as monitoring the input and contribution of 
the involved firms (safeguarding) is only possible by means of close interaction among a 
limited number of people. The adaptation function requires low set-up costs and flexibility 
due to a high rate of change in exploration. This may favour more short term relations but this 
may be undesirable from a coordination and safeguarding point of view. A solution could be 
to create additional relations with other weak ties to remain flexible: lateral relations by 
means of liaison roles and linking pin units, initially coordinated by transfer of reputation and 
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trust-in-competence. This enlarges network size which may increase the chance that interests 
diverge. As argued, relations with weak ties may give rise to acts of freeridership and to 
prevent this, safeguarding prefers coordination by reputation on past performance and trust-
in-intention, with the benefit of limited monitoring (Nooteboom 2000). But in the relation 
with weak ties this trust cannot  be built from scratch and needs to develop as the relation 
grows. Contracts only have a (very) limited use, especially in the early phase of exploration, 
as there is little known on the value of inputs and outputs. In addition, too many weak ties 
may generate social liability (freeridership and hold-up), as argued in paragraph 5.3.2, which 
is undesirable for both coordination and safeguarding. This latter function may consider 
evasion but this may be undesirable again from an adaptation perspective as weak ties are 
needed to cope with (rapid) change. An alternative network strategy may be formed by mutual 
self-interest (e.g. non-equity alliance), although, only when interests with a weak tie(s) 
converge. When interests diverge and when knowledge is close to one’s core competence, 
realignment of objectives by rearranging property rights may be more appropriate such as by 
means of joint-ventures and other equity-alliances (Grandori & Soda 1997). 
Relevance of Burt’s structural holes argument
Another question here is the relevance of Burt’s recommendations for creating efficiency in a 
network. As argued, a setting of exploration with volatile and (highly) uncertain conditions 
means that existing knowledge and competencies become increasingly less relevant. The 
search-process is concerned with exploring which new technologies are most useful to invest 
in as much as with finding out who is capable and trustworthy in this new field, making 
selection of the right partner a difficult task. This applies especially in a Schumpeter Mark I 
regime in which a new technology breaks with the existing dominant design and in which 
non-incumbent firms form the primary driving force. As argued in chapter 4, variety in 
exploration originates in ‘allopatric speciation’ (Eldredge and Gould 1972, Nooteboom 2000),  
at the periphery of the existing network where selection from the center is less strong. In such 
a setting, selecting those partners with vested interests in existing technologies and that, by 
spanning structural holes, occupy a central position in the network may then prove to be an 
unwise strategy. In this respect, as we have suggested, a more viable strategy is to build 
relations with different types of weak ties that bring in different cognitive perspectives as a 
basis for learning. In addition, we mentioned the importance of triangulation of different 
external sources of knowledge that is only possible trough multiple, redundant contacts.  So, 
in exploration redundancy should not be reduced but rather be considered as an inevitable 
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phenomenon. This was confirmed empirically in a recent study by Hagedoorn and Duysters 
(2003) on networks of firms in the international semiconductor industry. From this study the 
authors concluded that firms in unstable environments had indeed benefited from learning 
through multiple, trusted contacts.  
In conclusion: in a setting of exploration, access to new knowledge is more important than the 
most efficient route to that knowledge. In other words: it is important who you reach, not how
you reach, which contradicts Burt’s proposition that actors should optimise both these aspects 
of their network.
5.5.3  Summary and hypotheses  
Towards exploration the main co-evolutionary processes are characterized by 
experimentation, deviation from existing standards and the increasing obsolescence of 
existing routines. In such changing conditions more dense, redundant forms of networks are 
preferred of strong and weak ties that enable a rapid recombination of different types of 
knowledge ties as well as the triangulation needed for that. An appropriate network strategy is 
then formed by a combination of a rapid transfer of reputation, trust-in-competence and 
mutual self-interest.  
We can now rephrase these conclusions in terms of our evolutionary approach by means of 
the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 8a: 
In exploration the institutional environment will select a dense network structure of strong 
and weak ties as the dominant mode of organization. 
Hypothesis 8b:  
In exploration the instituitional environment will select coordination mechanisms that 
enhance variety-in-cognition such as a rapid transfer of reputation, trust-in-competence 
and mutual self-interest.
Hypothesis 9: 
A potential risk of such a network is the possibility of misunderstanding that results in 
chaos.
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Chapter 6  Methodology 
6.1  Introduction 
This chapter forms the pivot of our research in the sense that it discusses how we relate our 
theoretical concepts, as developed in the preceding chapters, to empirical testing. Therefore, 
the focus of this chapter is on the development of a sound methodology that enables us to 
arrive at scientifically accountable answers to our research questions. Therefore we start in 
paragraph 6.2 by discussing our hypotheses as developed in the preceding chapters. Next, in 
paragraph 6.3, we formulate our basic methodological starting points. We will discuss the 
implications of these starting points for our research design in paragraph 6.4. Based on our 
research design we finally discuss methods of data collection and the operationalisation of our 
key-variables in paragraph 6.5.  
6.2   Structuring our hypotheses  
In this paragraph we collect our hypotheses as formulated in earlier chapters in order to 
indicate their relation to our research questions. To do so, we refer to chapter 1 (paragraph 
1.3) where we concisely summarized what our research aims to do, namely: 
1. To identify systemic combinations of institutional environment and learning regimes. 
These systemic combinations are static and reflect a specific point at the Cycle of 
Knowledge.  
2. To identify the transition of those systemic combinations over time, as a movement 
along the Cycle of Knowledge 
3. To identify and explain the implications of those transitions in terms of network 
structure, relational properties and coordination mechanisms.
As can be noted from this concise summary of our research, the first two elements aim to 
describe the systemic combinations of learning regimes and institutional environment as well 
as how they change over time. Based on this we then aim to identify and explain the 
implications of those changes for the combination of network structure, relational properties 
and coordination mechanisms. At this point it is important to discuss our interpretation of 
‘explanation’ as there are some different interpretations in the literature. The more general 
interpretation is the deductivist model of explanation (Lawson 1997). According to this 
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deductivist model of explanation, the ‘explanandum’ (what must be explained) must be 
deduced from a set of initial and boundary conditions plus universal laws of the form 
‘whenever event x then event y’. Following this deductivist logic, explanation and prediction 
then become almost similar terms. Explanation entails the deduction of an event after its 
occurrence, prediction prior to its occurrence (Lawson 1997). In this way explanation entails 
formal relations but not causal relations. In our study we follow a different interpretation of 
explanation. Our approach to explanation can perhaps best be formulated in terms of 
understanding why a specific combination of network structure, relational properties and 
coordination mechanisms develops. This entails an explanation that differs from the 
deductivist model in the sense that it aims to explain causal relations instead of formal 
relations. Our description of the systemic combinations of the institutional environment and 
learning regimes (the 1st element as formulated above) and the changes within them (the 2nd
element as formulated above) should enable us to develop an understanding of the causal 
relations between the institutional environment and the embedded learning regime. The 
methodological implications of this combination of descriptive and explanatory research will 
be further discussed in paragraph 6.4.  
We will now discuss how our hypotheses cover these three issues. In doing so, we keep to the 
general distinction that we made between exploration and exploitation, and categorize our 
hypotheses accordingly.  
Exploitation-related hypotheses 
Our hypotheses that relate to exploitation are the following: 
- Hypothesis 3a :
In consolidation, selection by newly formed 2nd level institutions such as the 
knowledge base and demand has become strong, whereas selection by 3rd level 
institutions is emerging.  
- Hypothesis 3b :  
In consolidation, the increasing selection by 3rd level institutions manifests itself by an 
emerging dominant organisational form that enables a division of labour.
- Hypothesis 4 :  
In the phase of exploitation there is a strong selection by the existing institutional 
environment with limited feedback by outcomes of a learning regime. 
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- Hypothesis 6a : 
In exploitation the institutional environment will select non-dense networks of ties that 
are strong in durability but show low(er) strength in terms of frequency of contacts, 
mutual openness and breadth of issues covered.
- Hypothesis 6b : 
In exploitation the institutional environment will select coordination mechanisms that 
enhance integration such as contracts and formal control mechanisms, complemented 
by informal mechanisms such as reputation, trust-in-intention and social norms. 
- Hypothesis 7 :
A potential risk of such a network is a heavy-inward looking orientation that results in 
lock-in.
These exploitation-oriented hypotheses are related to the three main issues of our research in  
the following way: 
1. To identify systemic combinations between institutional environment and learning 
regimes. These systemic combinations are static and reflect a specific point at the 
Cycle of Knowledge. 
2. To identify the transition of those systemic combinations over time, as a movement 
along the Cycle of Knowledge 
Hypothesis 3a, 3b, 4
3. The implications of those transitions in terms of network structure, relational 
properties and coordination mechanisms.
 Hypotheses 6a, 6b, 7
So, with regard to exploitation, we can say that hypotheses 3a, 3b and 4, covering the second 
issue, deal with the general pattern of co-evolution between institutional environment and 
learning regimes. The hypotheses 6a, 6b and 7 covering the third issue, deal with how this 
general pattern settles in network structures, relational properties and coordination 
mechanisms. Furthermore, the possibly negative consequences of hypothesis 6a and 6b are 
covered by hypothesis 7. 
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Exploration-related hypotheses 
Our hypotheses that relate to exploration are the following:
- Hypothesis 1 : 
When change in 2nd level institutions becomes more radical, there is an increasing 
need for weak ties to deal with this variability in conditions.
- Hypothesis 2a :   
In the phase of exploration of novel combinations variety abounds, there is little 
selection by the newly emerging institutional environment and feedback mainly affects 
the development of a new knowledge base.  
- Hypothesis 2b : 
Novelty in exploration originates in allopatric speciation, at the periphery of the 
existing network where selection from the center is less strong. 
- Hypothesis 5a :  
From differentiation to reciprocation the insights into the limits of the existing 
knowledge base strongly affect the 3rd level and 2nd level of the institutional 
environment.
- Hypothesis 5b : 
From differentiation to reciprocation the dominant organisational form opens up  
towards outside sources of knowledge, resulting in a hybrid structure of strong and 
weak ties.
- Hypothesis 8a : 
In exploration the institutional environment will select a dense network structure of 
strong and weak ties as the dominant mode of organization. 
- Hypothesis 8b :  
In exploration the institutional environment will select coordination mechanisms that 
enhance variety-in-cognition such as a rapid transfer of reputation, trust-in-
competence and mutual self-interest.  
- Hypothesis 9 : 
A potential risk of such a network is the possibility of lack of selection that results in 
chaos.
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These exploration-oriented hypotheses are related to the three main issues of our research in 
the following way:  
1. To identify systemic combinations between institutional environment and learning 
regimes. These systemic combinations are static and reflect a specific point at the 
Cycle of Knowledge.  
Hypothesis 1
2. To identify the transition of those systemic combinations over time, as a movement 
along the Cycle of Knowledge 
Hypothesis 2a, 2b, 5a
3. The implications of those transitions in terms of network structure, relational 
properties and coordination mechanisms. 
Hypotheses 5b, 8a, 8b, 9 
So, with regard to exploration, we can say that hypotheses 2a, 2b and 5a covering the second 
issue, deal with the general pattern of co-evolution between institutional environment and 
learning regimes. The hypotheses 5b, 8a, 8b and 9 covering the third issue, deal with how this 
general pattern then settles in network structures, relational properties and coordination 
mechanisms. Furthermore, our hypotheses are related in the following way: combining 
hypothesis 1 and hypothesis 5b leads to hypothesis 8a and 8b, of which the possible negative 
consequences are covered by hypothesis 9. 
So, the three issues of our research are adequately captured by our hypotheses, both for 
exploitation and exploration. 
6.3    Methodological starting points 
In this paragraph we will develop some methodological starting points, according to the 
following two steps. First we will discuss the dynamic relation that exists between our 
concepts of an institutional environment and a learning regime. This understanding then has 
implications for how the time dimension will be incorporated into our analysis, which will be 
considered next.  
108
Dynamic interplay between institutional environment and institutionalised interfirm learning 
As argued in chapter 2, we follow the suggestions made by both Nelson and Sampat (1999) 
and Nooteboom (2000) to conceptualise the notion of an institutional environment as a 
process of institutionalising. In doing so, we free ourselves from the need to identify all 
different and specific types of institutions which may, to a greater or lesser extent, have 
relevance; not all institutions are relevant at the same time. So, we can actually mention those 
institutions which are relevant at a certain moment in time and leave aside those which are 
not. A second implication by conceptualising it as a process is that we can portray the 
institutional environment as a ‘hierarchy of institutions’ (Nooteboom 2000). Some institutions 
are embedded in ‘higher institutions’ but at the same time embedding ‘lower institutions’.  
Hence higher institutions select lower institutions which can then be considered as the units of 
selection. These lower institutions again act as the selection environment for even lower 
institutions and finally for institutionalised behaviour that we have conceived of as a learning 
regime. Figure 6.1 schematically portrays this relationship between the institutional 
environment and a learning regime.  
Figure 6.1 :  Schematic relation between institutional environment and  




Learning regime  
Outcomes
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In this figure the rectangular boxes represent the various levels of the institutional 
environment. As argued, institutions at a higher level in the institutional environment select 
lower institutions and ultimately select upon a learning regime, as expressed by the S-arrows. 
The oval in figure 6.1 represents our concept of a learning regime that generates a variety of 
outcomes, as portrayed by the toppled square box. These outcomes may again affect the 
institutional environment in varying degrees, as expressed by the F-arrows.32
When analysing this dynamic interplay between processes of selection and of variety 
generation, Archer’s methodological principle of ‘analytical dualism’, as discussed in chapter 
1, is useful. It informs us on the importance of keeping the process of selection and the 
process of variety generation analytically separate and hence to make explicit whether 
causation is more attributable to the institutional environment (structural conditioning in terms 
of Archer) or to outcomes of a learning regime (structural elaboration in terms of Archer). To 
analyse then the dynamic interplay between institutional environment and learning regimes 
requires the careful treatment of time. So, for the purpose of our research the time dimension 
needs to be incorporated explicity.33
Incorporation of time 
The effective incorporation of time in our analysis calls for a clear treatment of the past that 
requires to study sectoral systems of innovation in a longitudinal way.  We do not aim to 
precisely identify at which point in time a process has started or ended. In the context of our 
research it is not very realistic that we can precisely identify such points in time, especially 
when studying past events. So, such a precise identification of specific points in time will be 
neither practically possible nor relevant for the purpose of our study. The incorporation of 
32 Archer considers this feedback effect as consisting of ‘largely unintended consequences’ (1995 : 91). As we 
see a sectoral system of innovation as a collective emergent outcome of the interaction and co-evolution of the 
various actors which make up this system, we can agree up to point with the notion of ‘unintended 
consequences’.  However, we do not share Archer’s view that the consequences of social interaction are ‘only’ 
unintentional. In the context of interfirm learning within a sectoral system of innovation, we argue that a more 
precise examination of social interaction reveals that it can have intentional consequences for structure as well. 
Although the selection bias of most innovation studies has tended to ignore this until now, there is clear evidence 
that firms may successfully pursue ‘path-creation strategies’ and can exert considerable influence on the 
structure in which they are embedded (Mowery & Nelson 1999). So, we consider this feedback effect as built up 
of both unintentional and intentional consequences of a learning regime. 
33 This distinctive recognition of time is made explicit by Archer through her two propositions of structural 
conditioning pre-dating action and structural elaboration post-dating action. These two propositions are reflected 
implicitly by the evolutionary concept of path-dependency. This expresses the notion that the past is retained in 
rules, designs, habits and so on that guide present and future firm action (Arthur 1988). Although evolutionary 
theory describes processes of change and as such acknowledges the temporal dimension, in most studies on 
innovation the careful treatment of time is underdeveloped. 
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time is required insofar as it brings an understanding of the dynamic interplay between 
process of selection and variety generation. An exact time reconstruction would result in an 
overly detailed account. This would not fit with the purpose of our research as formulated in 
chapter 1. As we argued, our interest is to understand the dynamic processes that generate 
aggregate learning and innovation patterns, rather than the development of a detailed 
understanding of the structure of a SIS and the networks within it at a specific point in time. 
Based on these methodological starting points we now discuss the implications for our 
research design.  
6.4    Research Design
This paragraph deals with the development of a design for the empirical part of our research. 
In order to develop this design we first distinguish among four basic forms of research 
(paragraph 6.5.1), then discuss the choice of our research method (paragraph 6.5.2) and finish 
by the number of research units that we want to study (paragraph 6.5.3).  
6.4.1   Basic research form 
The choice of the basic research form is largely determined by the available level of theory 
development of which four basic forms can be distinguished (Drew 1980, Murdick & Cooper 
1982, Wijvekate 1991) :  
 1. Exploratory research 
2. Descriptive research 
3. Explanatory research 
4. Testing research 
The less a problem has been researched, the more likely the basic research form is 
exploratory. Its primary analytical question is ‘which variables are important to future 
research?’. When concepts, definitions, variables and research subjects have developed to 
some extent, the level of theory development is somewhat higher and the research may 
become more descriptive. Explanatory research can be conducted when a theory has become 
more substantial. This facilitates the selection of a number of independent variables which are 
expected to exert an explanatory effect on dependent variables. A set of explanatory studies 
may provide sufficient ground to conduct testing research where the primary analytical 
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question then is how the dependent variables are related to the independent variables. The 
main difference with explanatory research is that a number of precisely formulated 
hypotheses are tested, often by using statistical techniques.   
As it is our ambition to contribute to the development of a dynamic theory of interfirm 
learning, our research is especially of a theory-building nature. The question now is what is 
the level of development of our theory building. 
Studying the dynamic relationship between institutional environment and learning regimes 
entails two multi-level issues: 1. the differentiation between an institutional environment and 
a learning regime and, 2. a hierarchical or nested view of the institutional environment as built 
up of different institutional levels. Multilevel theory entails a synthesis of various disciplines 
and hence requires to cut across various disciplines (Klein e.a. 1999, Danserau e.a. 1999). 
Especially research in the context of innovation and technological change may benefit from 
such a multidisciplinary approach (McKelvey 1996). In this research we make use of the 
following ‘theoretical lenses’: 
- The theoretical basis of our research is formed by evolutionary economic theory as 
developed by Nelson&Winter (1982)  
- Concepts and variables as developed by the (National) Systems of Innovation 
literature (Lundvall 1992, Nelson 1993, Edquist 1997, Malerba 2002)  
- Theories on learning (Argyris and Schon 1978,1996, Nooteboom 2000) 
- Social network theory (Granovetter 1985, Coleman 1988, Burt 1992, Grandori 1999) 
- Theories on governance (Williamson 1985, Nooteboom 1999, 2000, Grandori 1997,  
 1999) 
Using these theoretical frameworks implies that we do not start from scratch. Various 
concepts, definitions, variables, research subjects as well as methods of data collection and - 
analysis are available from this variety of literature. So, our research cannot be considered as 
(fully) exploratory. On the other hand, using elements originating from different theoretical 
frameworks implies inconsistencies among them that does not make them readily available to 
our research. So, by crossing various theoretical boundaries, the level of theory development 
can certainly not be considered sufficient for rigorous testing either. 
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The aim of our research is to determine ‘how the institutional environment conditions 
interfirm learning, how this changes over time and how this varies per type of sectoral system 
of innovation’. This indicates a descriptive basic form. By describing the dynamic interplay 
between the institutional environment and interfirm learning behaviour, we also attempt to 
explain why a specific pattern in this dynamic interplay develops. We then move from 
descriptive to more explanatory research. This is also what we intend as we want to develop 
an understanding of why a specific combination of network structure, relational properties and 
coordination mechanism emerges. In other words, by the description of the dynamic 
relationship between institutional environment and learning regimes we also attempt to 
explain how this dynamic relation settles in a specific combination of network form, relational 
properties and coordination mechanisms. So, the basic form of our research is descriptive with 
some clear explanatory elements in it.  
6.4.2   Choice of research method 
In general, basic forms of research correspond to certain basic research methods, as outlined 
by table 6.1 based on van de Zwaan (1990 : 44). The table is to be interpreted as a guiding 
tool in the choice of the research method and is only one of many possible classifications. 
Obviously, every research design has its own strengths and weaknesses, which should be 
considered jointly when choosing and crafting a particular research method.  
From the table it follows that for a mainly descriptive research form with some explanatory 
elements a (longitudinal) case study is an appropriate research method. Such a research 
method based on case-studies is especially appropriate when the set of interactions among 
relevant variables is unclear (Eisenhardt 1989, Yin 1994). In this respect it is better to study a 
limited number of situations in-depth with a more generic model than using a (highly) specific 
model in which possibly relevant variables are absent (Swanborn 1987). This brings us to four 
quality aspects of research methods which are also relevant for a method based on case-
studies (Swanborn 1987, Yin 1994).
measure. So, operational measures have to be developed which assure that the variables cover 
the areas of interest correctly. This will be dealt with extensively in paragraph 6.5.
Firstly, construct validity relates to the question whether we measure what we intend to 
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Table 6.1:  Affinities of basic research forms with research designs in  
         the social sciences (van der Zwaan 1990: 44) 
Secondly, internal validity is concerned with the verification of relations and causality among 
variables. To increase the internal validity one can make use of triangulation of data collection 
methods which entails combining various methods and data sources in order to compensate 
weakness of one method by the strength of another. Triangulation is especially useful when a 
research is aimed at theory-building (Swanborn 1987) and in addition to provide stronger 
support for hypotheses and causality in case-studies (Eisenhardt 1989). 
Thirdly, external validity deals with the generalisability of the conclusions. Generalisability is 
not a particular strength of a research method based on case-studies. At best, it can generate 
well-founded propositions. We will come back to this issue of generalisability in chapter 9. 
Fourthly, reliability deals with a proper execution of the research and addresses two aspects. 
It relates to the question whether the same results would be obtained when the research is 
repeated. In addition, it relates to the question whether the same results would be obtained 
when the research is conducted by another researcher. How we deal with this issue of 
reliability, as well as with internal validity, will be dealt with in more detail in paragraph 6.5.1 
when discussing data collection methods and data analysis. An emphasis on reliability would 
              Basic Research Form 








Case study Research 
- momentaneous 
- longitudinal 
      +++ 
        + 
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Evaluation Research + +++ 
Simulation Research ++ ++ + + 
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require more effort per case-study which, given time constraints, may result in a smaller 
number of case-studies, negatively affecting generalisability. To increase generalisability one 
can choose to increase the number of cases and/or to make use of an embedded case-study 
containing multiple cases in it, if time and budget constraints allow. This then makes it 
possible to compare across cases which may lead to replication, enhancing generalisability. 
We will come back to this issue of generalisability in chapter 9 (paragraph 9.4). 
In acceptance of its limitations, our research method will be based on case-studies. Following 
the importance of the explicit incorporation of time, as discussed in paragraph 6.3, we choose 
longitudinal case studies opposed to momentaneous case-studies.  
6.4.3  Number and selection of case-studies 
The number of case-studies and the way to select them depends on what we want to achieve. 
Our research aim stresses differences among SIS’s. As argued in chapter 1 (paragraph 1.2), 
we claim that interfirm learning is specific to a SIS. Hence our research questions focus on 
SIS specific institutions, insofar relevant for learning and innovation, and abstract from 
national institutions. By keeping the national context constant we can focus on differences 
among sectoral systems of innovation that enables us to verify the relationships among the 
relevant variables, enhancing internal validity. Furthermore, the criterion of internal validity 
indicates to study SIS’s that are ‘knowledge-intensive’, so that assumed causal relations 
between the properties of the knowledge base and interfirm learning behaviour may be 
expected. So, we should select (at least two) different, knowledge intensive SIS’s that are 
within the same national institutional context. 
For the purpose of our study it is important to incorporate time into the analysis, as argued in 
paragraph 6.3. Using triangulation for data collection methods implies that we will collect 
data by among others industry experts (see also paragraph 6.5). But when relying on people’s 
reflections and memory it is critical to study recent events. So, for reasons of construct 
validity and reliability, it is important not to go back too far in history.   
Based on these considerations, we plead to study sectoral systems of innovation that show and 
have shown a (relatively) high level of dynamism with regard to interfirm learning and 
innovation within a limited period of time. In the context of the Netherlands two sectoral 
systems which clearly fit this profile are multimedia and biotechnology. Both these sectoral 
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systems are known for their high innovation rate and for learning and innovation taking place 
in networks (Ministry of Economic Affairs 1999, OECD 1999, 2001). Both sectoral systems 
are built up of numerous networks that engage in learing and innovation. In this respect, both 
contain multiple cases within them and may as such provide sufficient empirical ‘feedstock’ 
for the  purpose of our research. 
6.5  Data-collection and - analysis 
This paragraph deals primarily with construct validity and reliability : our methods of data 
collection, the variety of data sources as well as the way in which we analyse those data. 
When discussing methods of data-collection and -analysis an important issue is the level of 
aggregation at which we want to study interfirm learning in the context of a sectoral system of 
innovation. Essentially, the purpose of study dictates the appropriate level of aggregation that 
subsequently dictates which data to collect and how to analyse those data. Therefore we will 
jointly consider the appropriate level of aggregation and data-collection methods (paragraph 
6.5.1). Next we will discuss the operationalisation of our key-constructs (in the paragraphs 
6.5.2, 6.5.3 and 6.5.4). 
6.5.1    Level of aggregation and data collection methods 
In the context of a SIS, the firm-level cannot always be considered as the most appropriate 
unit of analysis (Malerba 2002). Depending on the purpose of analysis as well as the specific 
system under investigation, a higher or lower level may have more relevance. The purpose of 
our research is to study the dynamic interplay between the institutional environment and 
interfirm learning. If there is one central notion in our research it is that interfirm learning 
takes place in networks, suggesting networks should be the relevant level of aggregation.  
Regarding the specific sectoral systems under investigation, multimedia and biotechnology, 
the following considerations are relevant. As explained in paragraph 6.4, the argument for 
choosing these two sectoral systems of innovation relates primarily to the fact that both are 
characterised by substantial dynamism in terms of learning and innovation within a limited 
period of time. In fact, both sectoral systems involve the transformation of more traditionally 
defined sectors as by Mowery & Nelson (1999) into newly emerging sectoral systems of 
innovation. Such transformation processes clearly entail ‘novel combinations’ of previously 
distinct knowledge bases and is driven by newly forming links and dynamic 
complementarities among previously unconnected firms. In this respect, Malerba (2002) 
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argues that a high level of aggregation is important in order not to miss out on things. In 
addition, in such uncertain and changing environments networks can be considered as the key 
organisational form in which interfirm learning takes place (Grabher 1993, Lundvall 1993, 
Grandori 1999, Nooteboom 2000). And it is through this learning that outcomes are generated 
that give rise to changes and transformation of a SIS.  
Differentiating between sectoral level and network level
Based on these considerations, we argue that the network level can be considered as the most 
appropriate level of analysis for our research. In addition, we differentiate between the 
network-level and the sectoral level. We propose conceptualising the relationship beween a 
SIS and interfirm networks as schematically depicted in figure 6.2. 
EXOGENOUS 
National Level 
ENDOGENOUS             
Sectoral Level (N + 1) 




Figure 6.2 :  Different levels of aggregation 
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As can be understood from figure 6.2, the network level can be considered as the relevant 
level of aggregation, corresponding to n. The sectoral level is considered as providing the 
institutional environment in which the networks are embedded, corresponding to n+1. This 
differentiation between the network level and sectoral level connects with our discussion in 
paragraph 6.4.1 on the basic form of our research. As argued, the basic form is descriptive 
with some clear explanatory elements in it. Regarding the sectoral level we will take a 
descriptive approach that then enables us to explain on a network level why a specific 
combination of network structure, relational properties and coordination mechanisms is 
selected. So, following our methodological discussion in paragraph 6.3 and 6.4, we consider 
the network level and the sectoral level as endogenous. As a consequence, we consider both 
the national institutional environment and the individual firm level as exogenous.  
Boundaries of a SIS 
An other issue which we need to address here is how to determine the boundaries of a SIS. In 
this respect, it is relevant to mention two methods of identifying networks (Knoke and 
Kuklinski 1982). A realist approach is based on the subjective perception of the involved 
actors. The identification of a network is determined by ‘the limits that are consciously 
experienced by all or most of the actors that are members of the entity’(Knoke & Kuklinksi 
1982: 22). A nominalist approach is based on the viewpoint of the researcher. Identification of 
a network is based on the application of his analytical framework used. As we clearly focus 
on a SIS, a sectoral system of innovation opposed to a sectoral system of production or 
distribution, we see learning and innovation as the relevant starting point for determining the 
boundaries of a SIS. More specifically, we consider the boundaries of a SIS to be determined 
by those interfirm networks whose relational content is made up of knowledge exchange, 
learning and innovation and given this, which parties are considered as relevant according to 
the involved actors. So, we take a two-step approach to identifying networks and the 
subsequent boundaries of a SIS: we start with a nominalist approach by only considering 
those networks with relevance from an innovation perspective, within these networks we 
study the relations among those firms that are considered to form part of such a network by 
the involved actors, which entails a realist perspective.34
34 Due to our focus on interfirm networks, we follow here the methodology for the identification of networks as 
developed within social network theory. There are alternative approaches to identifying the boundaries of an 
(sectoral) innovation systems. In chapter 1 we argued that the conept of a SIS is closely related to that of a TS 
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Methods of data collection 
Given the breadth of information that we need, ranging from information on sectoral features, 
network characteristics and learning regimes, our primary source of information and data is 
formed by industry reports and studies. Given their (growing) importance to the Dutch 
economy, both industries have been extensively studied over the past 10 -15 years. These 
studies were carried out by individual (scientific) researchers, specialised research institutes 
and consultancy firms. Clients of these studies ranged from the Dutch Ministry of Economic 
Affairs, the Dutch Ministry of Transport and Telecommunication, various industry 
associations, the OECD and others. Most of these reports cover (some of) the issues that we 
are interested in and, taken together, these reports enable us to draw an accurate picture of the 
co-evolutionary processes that have characterized both SIS’s over the past 10 –15 years. 
Using a variety of industry reports also enables to triangulate among them. Furthermore, we 
approach recognized industry experts with our analysis of the multimedia and biotechnology 
SIS. Their role is to check whether the analyses made, are correct in terms of facts and 
completeness and may potentially come up with additional information. This combination of 
data collection methods enables us to triangulate between these two sources, which is 
important for internal validity and reliability.  
For the analysis of the multimedia SIS in the Netherlands we have studied over 30 industry 
reports and around 15 articles in professional journals and newspapers, all of which have been 
published in the period from the early 1990’s towards the early years of the new millennium. 
For biotechnology these numbers are 26 reports and 22 articles. Based on these reports and 
articles we have made an analysis of the evolution of both SIS’s in the relevant period. Next 
we have asked recognized industry experts on multimedia en biotechnology to make a critical 
check on our analyses. For multimedia we have approached drs. Sven Malta and drs. Pim den 
Hertog of Dialogic who have conducted numerous studies on the multimedia industry, both 
for various Dutch ministries and for the OECD (Paris).35 For biotechnology we have 
approached drs. Christien Enzing and drs. Sander Kern of TNO-STB who have also 
conducted numerous studies on biotechnology for the Dutch ministry of Economic Affairs, 
(see footnote 4). See Carlsson 2002 for an extensive and fine overview of the methodological issues when 
identifying the boundaries of a TS, with relevance also for a SIS. 
35 See for more details on both experts www.dialogic.nl
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the European Commission and the OECD (Paris).36 Both groups of experts have read our 
analyses and have provided comments, most of which we have incorporated into our study. In 
addition, our analyses have been presented on various international conferences.37 In addition, 
an earlier version of our analysis on biotechnology has been extensively commented upon by 
dr. Steve Casper of Cambridge University (UK), who has published widely on the 
biotechnology industry in among others Germany, the United Kingdom and the US.  
The absence of reliable quantitative data sets on the exact number of firms and the properties 
of the relations among them in both multimedia and biotechnology means that we have to rely 
on this combination of qualitative data sources. This approach is in line with some of the 
recent work on SIS’s that has been published by among others Maureen McKelvey, Luigi 
Orsenigo, Franco Malerba, Nicoletta Corrocher and others on behalf of CESPRI (Bocconi 
Univeristy, Milan).38 Still, this makes an attempt to develop such quantitative data sets a 
worthwhile effort for future research as this would enable a more rigorous analysis of the 
sectoral and network dynamics in these two SIS’s.   
6.5.2  Operationalisation of the 2
nd
 level of the institutional environment  
In this paragraph, as in paragraph 6.5.3 and 6.5.4, we operationalise the various relevant 
variables in a qualitative way. Unlike quantitative data which can be recorded on a naturally 
occurring numerical scale, qualitative data can only be classified into categories (McClave 
2000). Therefore we will make use of three categories of values which our variables may 
have, namely : low – medium - high. 
First,  we operationalise our variables of the 2nd level of the institutional environment. The 
variables of the 2nd level of the institutional environment consist of A. knowledge base, B. 
appropriability conditions, C. demand conditions and D. competitive conditions. Taken 
36 See for more details on both experts www.tno-stb.nl
37 The following conferences have been visited to present (parts of) our analyses on multimedia or 
biotechnology: DRUID-Winter Conference January 2000 (Copenhagen), MERIT ETIC-Conference October 
2000 (Maastricht), EGOS July 2001 (Lyon), DRUID-Winter Conference January 2002 (Skoerping), CHIMES-
Conference June 2002 (Rotterdam), Conference ‘Empirical Research on Routines’ November 2002 (Odensee), 
ERIM-Conference ‘Competence Development in MNC’s (1) January 2003 (Rotterdam), ‘Competence 
Development in MNC’s (2) May 2003 (Oslo) and EGOS July 2003 (Copenhagen).
38 This was under the Fourth Research and Technological Framework Programme, Targeted Socio-Economic 
Research (TSER) on European Sectoral Innovation Systems commissioned by the EU, March 2001.  
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together, these variables form variables which, as a set, describe the 2nd level of the 
institutional environment. 
A. Knowledge Base 
- level of tacitness (low, medium, high)  
 extent in which knowledge is experience-based 
- level of codification (low, medium, high) 
 extent in which knowledge is made explicit through documents, blueprints, 
standard operating procedures etc  
We do not consider tacitness and codification as mutually exclusive variables, rather, 
we consider knowledge as consisting of varying combinations of both tacit and 
codified elements. We consider this mix to differ per type of SIS , per network within 
a SIS as well as to change over time.  
- level of diffusion within a SIS (low,  medium, high) 
 a low level of diffusion indicates that knowledge pertains to a specific 
network of firms within a SIS 
 a high level of diffusion indicates that knowledge is widely shared among 
networks within a SIS  
-     level of systemicness (low, medium, high) 
 a low level of systemicness indicates that knowledge has a low degree of 
integration with different scientific and/or engineering disciplines 
 a high level of systemicness indicates that knowledge has a high degree of 
integration with different scientific and/or engineering disciplines. In this 
respect, the direction of the external sources is relevant:  
• horizontal (competitors) 
• vertical
o upstream (suppliers, academia) 
o downstream (users, users of users) 
-   rate of change (low, medium, high) 
 level of cumulativeness of knowledge, i.e. extent in which there is serial 
correlation between innovations or more specifically, between interfirm 
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learning activities; it represents the probability of innovating at time t+1 is 
conditional on innovations and interfirm learning activities at time t or 
periods before that.
B.  Appropriability conditions 
- level of appropriability (low, medium, high) 
 extent in which innovation can be protected from imitation 
- means of appropriability 
 secrecy 
 accumulated tacit knowledge (e.g. learning curve) 
 lead times 
 complementary assets 
 standards
 patents
C. Opportunity conditions 
- level of opportunity (low, medium, high) 
 extent in which there are clear and powerful incentives for undertaking 
innovative activities 
- variety (low, medium, high) 





D. Competitive conditions  
- level of competition (low, medium, high) 
 extent in which competitions is intense 
- origin of competition  
 horizontal (i.e. competitors) 
 vertical
 upstream (i.e suppliers) 
 downstream (i.e. customers) 
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o external (indication of ‘group-based competition’ cf. Gomes-Casseres 
1994)
 with other networks within same type of SIS in other locations 
 with other types of SIS’s  





Taken together, these variables describe, as a set, the 2nd level of the institutional 
environment.
6.5.3  Operationalisation of the 3
rd
 level of the institutional environment  
As argued in paragraph 6.6.1, we take a nominalist approach to the identification of networks 
within a sectoral system of innovation. We focus on those interfirm relations whose relational 
content is (primarily) made up of knowledge exchange and learning. As a next step, we now 
further elaborate on which elements of these networks are relevant for our research.
Following our structural approach to networks, our interest lies in the structure of the relations 
among actors as well as in the properties of these relations. Based on our discussion of 
networks in the preceding chapters, we now list the relevant structural features of networks as 
well as how we want to operationalise these features. This set of variables consists of  A. 
network structure, B. relational form and C. governance of relational risk.  
A.  Network structure = structure of the relations among actors  
-   size   : number of members (bilateral – trilateral – multilateral (4+)) 
-  centrality  : member(s) with relatively many ties: (low – medium – high) 
-   density  : number of ties related to total possible number of ties (low medium  high)
-   structural holes : lack of ties between ‘parts’ (low – medium – high)        
-   closure   : level of exclusiveness, i.e. closed to outsiders (low- medium – high)       
-   cognitive distance : difference in knowledge, experience and thought (low-medium-high)       
-   entry  : number of entrants (low-medium-high) 
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B.  Relational form = properties of the relations among actors  
- formality  : level of formalisation due to formal contracts (low – medium – high) 
- durability   : length of relationship in time (low – medium – high) 
- intensity  : frequency of contacts (low – medium – high) 
- mutual openness : extent in which knowledge and information moves freely between  
firms (low – medium- high) 
- breadth of relational : range of issues that is covered (low-medium-high) 
  content
Next to these structural features and relational properties of networks, we also consider the 
governance of these networks. More specifically: 
C.  Governance of relational risk  
RELATIONAL RISK 
-      strategic need  : lack of alternatives (low – medium – high) 
- structure of interests : direction of interests (converging – parallel - diverging) 
- specific investments : level of specific investments (low – medium- high)                                            
GOVERNANCE  




o mutual self-interest 
o reputation (trust in intention, trust in competence) 
o position in network structure 
- coordinating mechanisms 
o direct communication 
o social coordination & control mechanisms            
o integration & linking pin units 
o common staff 
o hierarchy & authority 
o planning & control 
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o incentive systems 
o selection systems 
o information systems              
Taken together, these variables describe, as a set, the 3nd level of the institutional 
environment.
6.5.4  Operationalisation of learning regime and its main learning outcomes 
In this paragraph we operationalise the variables that pertain to a learning regime and its main 
outcomes.
A.    ELEMENTS OF A LEARNING REGIME 
- object of learning  




- business model  
- learning  process 
- exploitation 
o indicators:
 incremental adaptations 
 learning to detect and correct errors from existing values and norms 




 learning to detect and correct errors in existing values and norms  
 searching (expanded search) 
- actors 
- type of actors in terms of their role in a learning regime 
- input 
      -  knowledge, resources and capabilities needed 
- output 
      -  see B. learning outcomes 
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- spill-overs   
= level and direction of knowledge spill-overs 
o outside-in   
 from other networks within sectoral innovation system (low- medium – 
high) 
 from outside sectoral innovation system (low- medium – high) 
o within network (low – medium – high) 
o inside-out
 towards other networks within sectoral innovation system (low- 
medium – high) 
 outside sectoral innovation system (low- medium – high) 
- freeridership  
= possibility for alter to benefit from ego’s efforts without making a full contribution  
(low – medium – high) 
- hold-up   
= possibility that alter takes advantage of ego’s dependency on alter (low – medium – 
high) 
B.   LEARNING OUTCOMES  
As argued in chapter 3, interfirm learning generates outcomes which are idiosyncratic for a 
specific learning regime. We consider the following outcomes as relevant:  
- New products/services  
- level of newness  
o new to network 
o new to sectoral innovation system  
o new to the world 
- elements of newness (either one or a combination of following elements) 
o lower price 
o improved quality 
o faster delivery  
o wide variety of customer choice  
o new function 
- New processes 
- level of newness  
o new to network 
o new to sectoral innovation system  
o new to the world 
- elements of newness (either one or a combination of following elements) 
o lower costs
o improved reliability  
o increased speed  
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o higher flexibility  
Following our social constructivist approach, we consider cognitive understanding, perception 
and value judgements as elements of knowledge. As such new knowledge can also form an 
outcome of a learning regime. In this respect, we differentiate among various types of 
knowledge as relevant outcomes: 
- New shared ideas and/or beliefs 
o level of newness 
 new to network 
 new to sectoral innovation system 
 new to the world 
o elements of newness 
 new cognitive insights 
 appropriability 
 demand
 competition  
With regard to this overview of learning outcomes, two observations are relevant. A first 
observation is that this overview is a rather expansive list of outcomes of a learning regime. 
Because we only consider new outcomes (at T3 in figure 6.3), it is (very) unlikely that all of 
these outcomes will occur at the same time. A second observation relates to spill-overs, 
freeridership and hold-up that we have included as relevant variables in our set of a learning 
regime. In our set of outcomes, we do not include outcome-variables that explicitly relate to 
these 3 elements of a learning regime. Our  argument is that we focus on learning outcomes, 
i.e. outcomes that form a direct indication of what has been learned by firms as members of a 
network. In this respect, we do not consider outcomes of freeridership or hold-up (e.g. 
mistrust among actors, financial loss, reputational loss etc.) as a direct indicator of what has 
been learned by firms. Still, we consider freeridership and hold-up as having a possible feed-
back effect on the institutional environment. We measure this feedback-effect by means of 
changes in the variables governance strategies and/or coordinating mechanisms. In addition, 
knowledge spill-overs have a feedback-effect to the institutional environment as well. We 
incorporate this feedback-effect of knowledge spill-overs into our analysis by means of 
changes in the cognitive distance among actors.  
Taken together, these variables describe, as a set, a learning regime and the main learning 
outcomes it generates. 
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Chapter 7   The Dutch Multimedia System of Innovation 
7.1 Introduction 
The aim of this case-study is to analyse how the co-evolution of institutional environment and 
learning regimes in the Dutch multimedia SIS has taken place39. In this analysis we will take 
the moment of the adoption of Internet, as the worldwide standard for on-line communication, 
as a starting point. Following our methodological considerations as outlined in chapter 6, we 
need to study sectoral systems of innovation that have shown a high level of dynamism within 
a limited period of time. Therefore, our analysis of the multimedia SIS will range from the 
early 1990’s until the early start of the new millennium, a period characterized by a high level 
of dynamism with regard to interfirm learning and innovation.  
This chapter is built up as follows. In paragraph 7.2 we analyse learning regime 1 that dealt 
with technological exploration. In paragraph 7.3 we analyse learning regime 2 with a focus on 
technological exploitation. Learning regime 3 engaged in business exploration and is 
discussed in paragraph 7.4. In paragraph 7.5 we analyse some of the differences between 
these three learning regimes more in-depth. Finally in paragraph 7.6 we confront our 
hypotheses with our empirical findings, based on which we draw some conclusions. But we 
start by giving a brief overview of the period before Internet was adopted. 
Business side 
Three Dutch industries formed the basic building blocks for the emerging multimedia SIS 
around the early 1990’s, namely the telecommunication industry, the information technology 
industry and the media industry. These various industries were ‘worlds apart’ in the off-line 
era. We will now first discuss some of the key characteristics of these three industries.40
The telecommunication industry in the Netherlands was dominated by various specialised 
suppliers such as Philips and some foreign firms such as Lucent, Ericsson, Siemens. A further 
key role was played by KPN, at the time a state-owned monopolist for distribution. In 
addition there existed a well-developed telephony-based services industry formed by call 
39 We thank Pim den Hertog and Sven Maltha of Dialogic for their valuable comments on an earlier version of 
this chapter. Of course, any error remains entirely our responsibility. See for more information on both experts 
www.dialogic.nl.
40 Based on den Hertog & Maltha, 1999, The Emerging Information and Communication Cluster in the 
Netherlands, Paris, OECD 
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centres and firms specialised in transaction-based applications such as Electronic Data 
Interchange (EDI) and tele-banking (directie EDI 1996).  
A key characteristic of the information technology industry was its high growth rate in terms 
of number of firms, turnover and employment, mainly created through a strong focus on 
selling capacity, i.e. man-hours. There were relatively few firms that specialised in in-house 
development of software and this activity mainly pertained to small niches in which these 
firms found a relative strength, such as ERP-applications and financial transactions.  
The media industry was characterised by a traditionally strong publishing and printing sector 
and a rapidly growing advertising industry (ATKearney 1997). In addition, various strong 
firms were emerging in the field of TV-production such as John de Mol and Joop vd Ende, 
which later merged in Endemol. Moreover, there was a relatively well-developed industry that 
specialised in providing technical facilities. At the demand side there was a growing cable 
penetration (BoozAllenHamilton 1997). 
Technology side  
Technological advancements in the fields  micro-electronics, miniaturisation, compression-
technology etc. led to increasing possibilities for digitisation of information. Digitisation 
made information easy to combine and to manipulate. The major implication was the change 
from analogue to digital representation, manipulation, storage and transportation of 
information (Bouwman and Propper 1994). In addition, digitisation spurred the convergence 
of three different technological fields that dealt with information processing, namely 
telecommunication technology, information technology and media technology (Dialogic 
1998). More specifically, this technological convergence could be described as a process of 
the convergence of transport utilities such as cable and telecommunication networks, 
interactive storage, manipulation and processing of information as well as devices to use or 
consume the information (Bouwman and Hulsink 2000). 
Before the advent of Internet, Philips and Sony played a pioneering role, already in the early 
1980’s, when they introduced CD-rom. CD-rom technology was the first application of these 
converging technologies as it built upon the integration of media technology and information 
technology. Still, CD-Rom’s did not require an integration with telecommunication 
technology as distribution of CD-Rom’s took  place through traditional channels such as 
bookshops, music stores, video stores, consumer-electronics outlets etc. So, the clear 
delineation of the various industries remained largely intact (directie EDI 1996). This 
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situation changed with the adoption of Internet as the dominant design for on-line 
communication. This required the integration with telecommunication technology in the 
technological convergence process resulting in a newly arising technological field labelled as 
‘on-line multimedia’ (Dialogic 1998). The essential difference with CD-roms was its on-line 
character enabling direct interaction between senders and users of information as well as its 
capacity to store, analyse and transport information anywhere, anytime, anyplace at negligible 
costs (Economist 2000). This technological convergence fuelled an industrial convergence 
process formed by the gradual merging of telecommunications, IT and media industries 
resulting in a newly emerging multimedia value chain (directie EDI 1996, Dialogic 1998, 
1999). In figure 7.1 (on next page) an overview is given of this newly emerging multimedia 
value chain and the positioning of the three learning regimes along it.  
7.2   Learning regime 1: Exploration of technology 
Before the advent of Internet, the existing knowledge base was compartmentalized in separate 
technologies that co-existed: information -, communication - , audiovisual – and data-
transmission technologies. These technologies were mostly stand-alone and most exploration 
was done by large, R&D-intensive firms.  These firms were specialized suppliers of hard- & 
software such as Lucent, Ericsson, Philips, and Sony, which explored within the scope of their 
own knowledge domain (directie EDI 1996, Bouwman en Jansen 1996, Bouman and 
Bouwman 2000). At the time there were various, competing standards for on-line 
communication but selection took place when Internet developed as the dominant design. The 
arrival of Internet yielded the insight that for its full utilization a more fundamental 
restructuring was required, in technological convergence. Digitalisation provided a technical 
incentive and opportunity for this integration of technologies. Thus, Internet, together with 
perspectives for digitalisation, provided powerful incentives to actively search for 
convergence of these technologies, in new applications (Condrinet 1998). This led to the entry 
of new firms that were small in size and formed by people with technological knowledge and 
a keen interest in exploring the  
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Figure 7.1:  Positioning of learning regimes along multimedia value chain
potential for this technological convergence process41. In doing so, these new entrants 
complemented the search activities of the large, R&D-intensive firms. This yielded learning 
regime 1: technological exploration. This learning regime developed between small 
specialized multimedia firms and specialized suppliers of hard-& software. The outcome of 
these exploration and search activities was a change of the knowledge base, resulting in an 
increasingly systemic integration of technologies such as information technology, 
communication technology, screen display technology and language technology (Smeulders 
41 There is no exact information on the number of new entrants in this period of the early 1990’s. Still we can 
make a rough estimate based on statistics of the Dutch Central Statistical Office (CBS) which would indicate a 
number of somewhere between 25 and 50 firms between 1993 and 1995. Regarding their size a more accurate 
number is available indicating that 90% of these firms employed less than 10 people (CBS Statline, Demografie 
























1999 (1)). Competition was hardly an issue yet and demand was highly embryonic and small 
(Schaffers e.a. 1996). In this respect, learning regime 1 emerged in allopatric speciation: 
largely outside the sight of the established players in the media, telecommunication and ICT 
industry. Many of these existing firms remained very aloof as they did not recognize the 
potential impact of Internet on their business in the early 1990’s nor much more later on42.
These new entrants were formed by spin-offs from these established firms as well as by new 
start-ups. In general, spin-offs were created by individuals, formerly employed by these 
existing firms, who were denied the possibility to explore these newly arising opportunities 
whereas start-ups were mostly created by a new breed of university graduates with no relevant 
antecedents in existing industries whatsoever (Schaffers 1994, Beam-it 1999). 
The relations making up the networks in learning regime 1 were mainly informal and 
(relatively) symmetric (Dialogic 1999). Although these relations became more intensive, the 
growing number of entrants led to an overall loosely coupled network structure. Increasingly, 
this network started to develop its own learning regime. Interfirm learning was ‘double loop’ 
and took place by much trial-and-error, with a great deal of tacit knowledge on which search 
directions to explore and how to explore them (Peelen e.a. 1998). This resulted in a dense 
network structure with low centrality (Peelen e.a. 1998, Jonkheer e.a. 1999). Ties were strong 
in terms of frequency of interaction that was open on various issues, but of fairly short 
duration.43 This combination of dimensions of tie strength created the possibility for an easy 
recombination of ties so that the systemic knowledge base could be explored rapidly. The 
main object of this explorative learning was the exploration of technological integration and 
later on also some first, new applications. Due to the increasingly systemic nature of 
knowledge, strong network externalities developed to effectuate technological integration: 
firms needed to cooperate in hard- and software, in joint development, where no single firm 
disposed of the necessary knowledge of all technologies (Schaffers e.a. 1996). Firms’ 
capabilities were mainly technology-oriented and centred around the ability to integrate key 
42 An example of this is formed by KPN, the national Dutch telco. At the time, their main focus was on making 
money out of their existing telecommunication network, i.e.  in selling distribution capacity. They were hardly 
interested in the Internet except for its potential to sell more of their existing capacity without any interest in the 
content going through their telecommunication networks (source: statement by Wim Dik, former chairmen KPN, 
during press-conference of presentation of 1994 annual report) 
43 Again, exact information is not available but a rough estimate based on discussions with multimedia firms in 
1998 would indicate an approximate level of duration that varies between 1 - 2 months and 6 - 8 months, with 12 
months or more being the exception. It was said that the relation had ended when “e-mails were not answered 
anymore”. With regard to frequency a rough estimate would indicate an approximate level between 2 – 3  
contacts a day and 1-2 contacts a week, often by email but also by face-to-face discussions.  
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technologies. Entrance was governed by professional norms stressing technical novelty and 
reputation, creating a network made up of established R&D-intensive firms and new entrants 
(Wegberg 1997, Peelen e.a. 1998). Furthermore, governance within the network was based on 
trust-in-competence and the assumption of intentional trustworthiness with limited 
opportunism and free riding, without extensive formal safeguards (Dialogic 1999, Bouwman 
and Hulsink 2000). This was further reinforced by firms’ mutual technological dependence 
and the importance of reputation for the sake of future options for collaboration in 
unpredictable, emerging networks.44 The notion of technological convergence was seen as the 
ultimate challenge for firms engaged in this learning regime and functioned as a sort of shared 
belief in which direction technological exploration should take place. This shared belief in the 
promises of technological convergence enabled  firms to coordinate their relation in their 
network by a ‘free-souls mentality’ (Dialogic 1999).45 46 The combination of these prevailing 
coordinating mechanisms and this free-souls mentality selected for dense networks made up 
of short relations in which knowledge diffusion took place quickly and by direct 
communication between actors sharing a great deal of tacit knowledge, yielding mutual 
absorptive capacity (Leisink e.a. 1998, 2000, Bouwman and Hulsink 2000). See also table 7.1 
on next two pages.  
The outcomes of this learning regime were some first applications such as simple e-mail 
applications,  websites and electronic games which propelled demand, causing some first 
users to become involved (directie EDI 1996). Early demand was mainly formed by 
professional users in information-intensive industries such as banking and finance and also by 
large firms with dispersed activities like multinationals (directie EDI 1996, Condrinet 1998). 
Initially, between these users and multimedia production firms there was a considerable 
cognitive distance. From this a-symmetry of knowledge stemmed an interesting selection  
44 For a treatise on instruments for governance of collaborative relations, see Nooteboom (1999). 
45 A clear empirical indication for this observed ‘free-souls mentality’ is for example found in the network of 
firms that cooperated in the technological exploration of multimedia image processing technology in the period 
around 1996-1998. When asked what they perceived as the most important benefit of cooperation when 
exploring this new technology, around 60 – 65 % of the involved firms mentioned access to and exchange of  
knowledge whereas only 5 – 10 % indicated that they worried about the risk of spill-overs (Oerlemans and 
Meeus 1999).  
46 Such a free-souls mentality can develop by the condition that one needs each other, and that there are no 
alternatives. Then one will simply have to make it work, in mutual give and take. Trust is further engendered by 
mutual respect among professionals struggling with shared problems. An informal safeguard against free-riding 
may be that in order to keep up with new knowledge development, all partners have to do their part, in give and 
take, to keep up with the development of their absorptive capacity, and shared tacit knowledge, to benefit from 
what partners develop. Due to the high rate of change of the knowledge base, an informal safeguard against 
hold-up on the basis of specific investments is that no one knows yet which investments will turn out to be 
generic and which specific, and it is not certain what knowledge could be used as a hostage. 
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TABLE 7.1





tacitness                                            high (search process)     
codification         medium (technological knowledge)                
level of diffusion    low     
level of systemicness high       
rate of change    high      
Appropriability conditions 
level     low-medium  
means  complementary assets  
Opportunity conditions 
level      high  
variety      high  
source      technology 
Competitive Conditions 
intensity     low  
dimensions    innovation  
3
rd
  LEVEL INSTITUTIONS
Network structure    
-   size     multilateral               
-   centrality     low  
-   density    medium - high 
-   structural holes   low  
       -   closure     medium-high 
       -   cognitive distance   medium  
       -   entry     high 
Relational form    
        - formality    low  
        - durability     low  
        - intensity    medium 
        - mutual openness    high      
        - breadth of issues covered   medium-high 




  LEVEL INSTITUTIONS
(continued) 
Governance of relational risk  
 - Relational Risk  
-      strategic need    high 
-      structure of interests  converging – parallel 
-      specific investments  medium                                                                
- Governance 
-     governance strategy  mutual self-interest,     
trust-in-intention, 
transfer-of-reputation 
-    coordinating mechanisms social coordination & control,  
professional norms, 
        ‘free-souls mentality’
ELEMENTS OF A LEARNING REGIME
- Object of learning    exploration of technological convergence  
- Learning process information-intensive, interactive learning   
- Actors established R&D-intensive firms and new entrants (start-ups, spin-
offs) 
- Input complementary assets in hard- & software (codified knowledge on 
various technologies, tacit knowledge on their integration and on 
directions for further exploration) 
- Output  Integration of distinct technologies and converging multimedia 
devices 
- Spill-overs   
- outside-in                        high (from outside Netherlands) 
- within network    high (tacit knowledge on search)                 
- inside-out    high (to learning regime 2)   
- Freeridership    low   
- Hold-up      low-medium within network; high by users 
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 mechanism, with specialised multimedia suppliers selecting lead customers rather than the 
other way around (Dialogic 1999). These first users needed to invest in specialized personnel 
with the ability to deal with specific multimedia technology and its applications, making it 
difficult for them to enforce exclusiveness (Dialogic 1999). So, at this point demand was a 
weak selection force, which entailed a general neglect of developing capabilities to deal with 
users and leading to relations with users at a large cognitive distance. The investments in 
specialized personnel made by users increasingly led to learning on their side, lowering 
cognitive distance to these specialized multimedia firms. Some turned in lead-users, and 
relations with specialized multimedia firms became more symmetric from the mid 1990’s 
onwards (Bouwman and Hulsink 2000). Then, exploration started to focus more on user-
oriented features such as different kinds of user-interfaces, speak-& language technology and 
image processing. Thus, learning regime 1 changed in nature as the object of learning shifted 
from a sole focus on technological convergence in the early 1990’s towards more user-
oriented technologies from the mid 1990’s onwards. This is in line with our analysis made in 
the preceding chapters that the institutional environment and learning regime form systemic 
combinations of features. A change in 2nd level institutions such as demand and opportunity 
conditions induced changes in 3rd level institutions (more symmetric relations and parity-
based governance) and in various elements of a learning regime: the object of learning (from 
technology towards user-needs), required inputs (knowledge on technology and ergonomics), 
a lowering of cognitive distance and a smaller chance of hold-up by users. 
7.3    Learning regime 2: technological exploitation 
As argued, learning regime 1 was embedded in  technical networks with a strong focus on 
technological exploration. Increasingly, different elements of the knowledge base became 
more codified, enabling its wider diffusion, for example by means of downloadable software 
from the Internet (Schaffers e.a. 1996). This led to the emergence of learning regime 2, 
pursued by networks with a focus on exploitation. The emergence of this learning regime 2 
was further stimulated by a broadening customer base, built up of a growing mass-market 
which exerted a relatively simple, more homogeneous demand.(directie EDI 1996, Dialogic 
1998, 1999)47 This market was served, from around 1995 onwards, by a rapidly developing, 
47 Exact data on the market size are not available although there are various indications. The Internet Almanac 
estimated the total number of users at 1,4 million in 1997 and predicted the number of users to have more than 
doubled to nearly 3 million users by the year 2000. Booz Allen & Hamilton (1997) estimated the total market for 
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new type of network. The vast majority of firms making up this new type of network were 
very small in size (often employing less than 10 people) and disposed of  average 
technological capabilities, all of them trying to take advantage of the growing market for on-
line applications Leisink e.a. 1998). Around 40% of them were new entrants, the majority 
(approximately 60%) had their major chunk of business in more traditional industries such as 
printing, advertising, audio-visual production, IT or pr/advertising (Jonkheer e.a. 1999, 
Dialogic 2000). In this respect, they had more familiarity with those aspects of multimedia 
that were closer to their traditional business (Dialogic 1999).  
Increasingly learning regime 2 further developed in this network. Compared with learning 
regime 1, learning in this learning regime 2 was more oriented to exploitation  with a dual 
learning object: the understanding of customer  needs as well as keeping up-to-date with the 
constantly changing technological knowledge as explored in learning regime 1.48 In general, 
customers were formed by professional users that were formed by firms in a wide variety of 
industries that increasingly adapted multimedia-devices and its related services such as e-
mail, websites, intranet-applications and so on.
In this learning regime a dominant network form arose reflecting a growing division of 
labour: communication with customers was done by a ‘main-contractor’ with a reliable 
reputation, surrounded by a stable set of firms with competences for solving various technical 
issues (Mijland 2001). The focus of this network was on a quick delivery of standard products 
such as e-mail and websites, enabled by an increasingly codified and diffused knowledge 
base, reducing cognitive distance between the involved firms (Mijland 2001). This dominant 
mode of organising consisted of a relatively non-dense network of ties as relations mainly 
existed between the core firm and the various supplying firms (Leisink e.a. 1998, 2000). 
These relations were durable, with frequent interaction49 to accommodate the integration and 
delivery process, and in this respect mainly entailed specific issues that were related to this 
on-line services through Internet in the Netherlands at somewhere between euro 410 and 450 million in 1997 
with an expected annual growth rate between 1997 and 2001 of around 65%.  
48 Clear empirical indications for this dual learning object were that, based on an extensive survey on multimedia 
firms by Peelen e.a. (2000), between 65 - 70 % of all multimedia firms especially invested in a better 
understanding of customers (through improvements in marketing, communication and customer focus) as well as 
in knowledge on (adjacent) technologies.   
49 Exact information is not available but a rough estimate based on discussions with multimedia firms in 1998
would indicate an approximate level of duration that varies between 2 years or more (often firms did not exist 
nor were engaged in multimedia longer than 2 years around 1998).  With regard to frequency a rough estimate 
would indicate an approximate level between daily or weekly contacts, either by email but also by face-to-face 
discussions. 
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integration and delivery process. These supplying firms only had direct ties among one 
another when needed in view of the integration process  (Leisink e.a. 1998, 2000).  
So, the systemicness of the knowledge base in combination with demand for quick delivery of 
relatively standard products selected a relatively non-dense and stable network with high 
centrality that integrated all required, complementary skills. For appropiation then, the 
network needed to be able to deliver a ‘turn-key solution’ that required from the involved 
firms that they could understand one another well and could count on one another. So, the 
vast majority of these networks was built up of durable, mostly exclusive and relatively 
symmetric relations (Leisink e.a. 1998, 2000).50 Governance was based on mutual dependence 
with contracts playing a limited role. Further coordination took place by reputation built on 
past performance and trust-in-intention, this latter explaining why most of the partners came 
from within a region. Reputation within this local network then acted as an important 
mechanism to prevent partners from free-riding and poaching.  
Over the 1990’s this network structure with largely exclusive and durable relations turned out 
to be self-reinforcing. When relations endured and experience accumulated, firms grew closer 
in terms of cognition and trust-in-intention and could therefore speed up their single-loop 
learning (Mijland 2001). This further enhanced possibilities to appropriate, which reinforced 
the existing network structure and further deepened the learning regime embedded in this 
network. See also table 7.2 .
50 Again exact data are not available but following a study by Leisink e.a (2000), around 85 - 90 % of the 
involved firms indicated that they were positioned in what they regarded as a stable network of on average 7 
partners and that they considered themselves as well as their partners as independent from one another, 
indicating symmetry in terms of power. This latter finding was irrespective of the fact whether firms were large 
or small, indicating that it was knowledge and skills that determined one’s position.  
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TABLE 7.2
Analysis Multimedia Innovation System  :  Learning regime 2 
2
nd
 LEVEL INSTITUTIONS    
Knowledge Base 
tacitness                                            high (how to organise the delivery process)     
codification         medium - high (technological knowledge)                
level of diffusion    high      
level of systemicness high       
rate of change    medium      
Appropriability conditions 
level     medium  
means  complementary assets, continuous improvements 
Opportunity conditions 
level      medium   
variety      medium      
source      demand / delivery process 
Competitive Conditions 
intensity     medium  
dimensions    price, flexibility  
3
rd
  LEVEL INSTITUTIONS
Network structure    
-   size     multilateral               
-   centrality     high  
-   density    low 
-   structural holes   medium-high 
       -   closure     low 
       -   cognitive distance   low-medium  
       -   entry     low 
Relational form    
       - formality    low-medium  
       - durability     medium-high 
       - intensity    medium-high 
       - mutual openness    medium 
       - breadth of covered issues     low-medium      




  LEVEL INSTITUTIONS
(continued) 
Governance of relational risk 
 - Relational Risk    
-      strategic need    medium 
-      structure of interests  converging – parallel 
-      specific investments  high                                                                     
- Governance 
-     governance strategy  mutual self-interest,     
trust-in-intention,  
limited use of contracts 
-    coordinating  mechanisms reputation on past performance,  
social coordination & control,
        
ELEMENTS OF A LEARNING REGIME
- Object of learning    user needs & outcomes of exploration in learning regime 1 
- Learning process learning-by-doing  
- Actors established firms from adjacent industries and new entrants  
- Input complementary capabilities in technology and organisation (codified 
knowledge on technologies, tacit knowledge on integration and 
organisation of the delivery process) 
- Output  Internet applications such as websites, portals and other web-enabled 
applications 
- Spill-overs   
- outside-in                        high (from learning regime 1) 
- within network    high (tacit knowledge on organisation of delivery process)                 
- inside-out    low  
- Freeridership    low   
- Hold-up      high
There was a clear connection between learning regime 1 and 2: the continuous influx of spill-
overs necessitated that firms in learning regime 2 maintained an open orientation to the 
exploration activities in learning regime 1 (Dialogic 1999). As said, this formed an important 
object of learning in learning regime 2 whereas the other learning object was the identification 
of customer needs. This second learning object then nurtured the capability to communicate 
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with users, where it is not feasible to make use of specialized technical language, a capability 
mainly absent in learning regime 1. So, this dual learning object of learning regime 2 made it 
possible to fine-tune the new multimedia practice as explored in learning regime 1 and to 
make full use of its potential. This then formed the basis to ‘invade’ the domain of established 
industries such as printing, advertising, audio-visual production, IT, media and 
telecommunication (Condrinet 1998). So, whereas learning regime 1 emerged in allopatric 
speciation and induced the development of learning regime 2, this second regime basically 
formed the ‘move back’ in the existing institutional selection environment, as can be noted 
from the large-scale presence in learning regime 2 of (large) firms from existing industries. 
These large firms were prepared to make substantial investments in the newly arising field 
and this growing availability of capital enabled the rapid emergence of learning regime 3.  
7.4     Learning regime 3:  business exploration 
The combination of learning regime 1 and learning regime 2 provided the basis for the 
emergence of learning regime 3 from around 1997, with a focus on exploration of business 
opportunities for on-line services (Dialogic 1999, Beam-it 1999). Whereas exploration 
through learning regime 1 created the potential for a new field of multimedia, learning regime 
3 made it possible to actually explore these business opportunities. It made multimedia-
technology more widely available by creating the necessary tools (software, user-interfaces, 
content, distribution) at increasingly lower costs, an important condition for unlocking a 
potential mass-market. In contrast to learning regime 2 that primarily focused on intermediary 
users, this mass-market on which learning regime 3 focused was mainly formed by consumers 
(BoozAllenHamilton 1997). These consumers became increasingly interested in Internet for 
different purposes, from using it as a source of information, communication, entertainment 
and purchases. So, the closing down of technological variety at the ‘supply’ side of the 
multimedia SIS, entering a phase of consolidation, enabled the opening up of variety through 
business exploration at the business/demand oriented side (formed by the value-steps of 
multimedia packaging, distribution and end-use).  
Learning regime 3 emerged from the  exploration of new business models that took place in a 
variety of ways. Some firms, especially Internet service providers as well as various 
publishers, opted for related diversification through in-house creation of new business models. 
Others made use of alliances, either equity or non-equity based, with firms already occupying 
a certain market position in the growing market for one-line services. For example the alliance 
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between VNU, a publisher, and Ilse, a Dutch search engine (Barschot 2000). But also the 
integration of successful start-ups by large firms such as the acquisition of Planet Internet, an 
internet service provider by KPN, the Dutch national telco (Bouwman and Hulsink 2000). 
Another type of network was that of a start-up backed by one or more venture capitalist(s) 
and/or informal investor(s) (Dialogic 1999).  
Towards the end of the 1990’s though, the learning regime embedded in the network made up 
of ‘start-ups and venture capitalists/informal investor’, started to dominate. Its systemic 
combination of characteristics appeared to be more effective in exploring on-line business 
opportunities: a-symmetric relations among start-ups and venture capitalists/investors, these 
latter having a strong coordinating role by acting as linking pins and taking seats on the board 
of these start-ups, which made coordination highly tacit and specific to the network 
(ATKearney 1997, Beam-it 1999). This resulted in a relatively non-dense network of ties that 
were strong in terms of frequency and openness but showed less strength in terms of 
durability and breadth of issues (Dialogic 1999). The main resources provided by these 
central actors were business knowledge, capital and market access, whereas the start-up often 
brought in the idea for a new business model. The learning object of this network was to learn 
about two issues: a quick understanding of user needs and the subsequent development of a 
viable business model. An important outcome of this first exploration of business 
opportunities was the growing insight that to make money out of Internet, one needs content 
which captures the attention of consumers or professional users. This was captured by the 
notion of ‘content is king’ giving full motivation to and direction for business exploration 
(directie EDI 1996, Schaffers e.a. 1996, BoozAllenHamilton 1997). In this search it quickly 
became clear  that, the importance of content notwithstanding, one does not necessarily 
needed to be content-owner but that it was more important to have access to a community of 
(professional) users who share a common need or interest (Condrinet 1998). Such a need or 
interest could range from on-line information on stocks, used cars, cooking recipes, Latin-
American novels, French wines to scientific publications and so on. In order to attract such a 
community, and more important to keep them interested, content should be attractive and 
needed to be tailored to the particular community. Therefore, ‘portals’ were created to target 
such an Internet-community, fuelled by the belief that the establishment of portals to create 
and maintain attention of the target audience became the key-success factor in the on-line 
multimedia industry (BoozAllenHamilton 1997, Condrinet 1998, Dialogic 199). This shared 
belief triggered substantial changes in the multimedia SIS that also affected publishers, being 
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thè specialists in creating and managing content in the off-line world51.  See also table 7.3 on 
next two pages.               
After ignoring Internet as a new medium for quite some time, around the mid 1990’s 
publishers started to enter, although mainly from a defensive posture52. They feared Internet 
as a threat to their existing business. Therefore, what they did was to use Internet as just 
another medium to distribute their existing content, but then electronically. So, they made on-
line advertisements for new books or magazines just like regular advertisements or 
commercials (directie EDI 1996, Condrinet 1998). In terms of the Cycle of Knowledge, for 
publishers this process marked the transition from exploitation towards differentiation, 
namely the exploitation of their existing knowledge base on publishing in a new context 
provided by Internet. However, their efforts did not appeal to users and mostly proved 
unsuccessful, making the limits of their existing knowledge base visible. The potential added-
value that Internet offers to electronic publishing is two-fold. One is the possibility for re-
packaging printed matter, with the possibility of adding sound and pictures in an interactive 
mode. A second possibility is digital archives which offer the possibility to maintain a stock 
of information around specific topics which appeal to a community of users (Economist 
2000). These potential benefits were mostly ignored by existing publishers but well 
understood by various start-ups in their exploration of such new business opportunities. 
Increasingly, publishers became aware of the need for a more fundamental change in their 
strategy to make better use of the potential offered by the new medium. These changes 
marked the transition towards the phase of reciprocation, where novel combinations with 
outside sources of knowledge were seen to be required. Such outside knowledge sources are 
formed by start-ups (such as the alliance of publisher VNU with search-engine Ilse) or by 
individuals with a reputation in the field.53
51 The expectation was that portal-owners will perform the role which publishers perform in the traditional, off-
line world as, in essence, their role is similar: to collect content, to bundle it in an attractive package (portals viz-
a-viz books, newspapers, magazines etc) and then distribute it to the respective target-markets.  
52 Much young talent within publishing companies became increasingly familiar with the possibilities of 
multimedia-technology and saw digital, interactive publishing as an interesting challenge, complementary to 
traditional publishing. However, many of their efforts to convince higher echelons of the need to explore the 
possibilities offered by multimedia technology have failed.  An inside source within VNU, a large Dutch 
publisher, revealed that these higher echelons often had no clue what this new on-line business was about. Why 
they decided to enter then was not so much from a growing belief in the possible opportunities but because they 
were increasingly being challenged by stock-analysts of Dutch and international banking firms who kept on 
‘interrogating’ them about their Internet-strategy. This external pressure and the fear of losing the favour of 
investors formed an important reason to start to explore these possibilities, although it often seemed more acts of 
window-dressing rather than based on true conviction.  
53 An example was WegenerArcade that appointed Maurice de Hondt as head of its New Media division.  
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TABLE 7.3
Analysis Multimedia Innovation System  :  Learning regime 3 
2
nd
 LEVEL INSTITUTIONS    
Knowledge Base 
tacitness                                            high (how to create a successful business model)  
codification         low  
level of diffusion    low  
level of systemicness low       
rate of change    medium      
Appropriability conditions 
level     low-medium  
means  complementary assets, brand name 
Opportunity conditions 
level      medium - high 
variety      high      
source      demand  
Competitive Conditions 
intensity     medium-high 
dimensions    price, flexibility, innovation  
3
rd
  LEVEL INSTITUTIONS
Network structure    
-   size     multilateral               
-   centrality     high  
-   density    low - medium  
-   structural holes   medium  
       -   closure     low - medium 
       -   cognitive distance   medium  
       -   entry     high  
Relational form    
       - formality    medium 
       - durability     low - medium 
       - intensity    medium - high 
       - mutual openness    medium - high 
       - breadth of covered issues     low - medium      




  LEVEL INSTITUTIONS
(continued) 
Governance of relational risk 
- Relational Risk    
-      strategic need    high  
-      structure of interests  converging  
-      specific investments  high                                                                     
- Governance 
-     governance strategy  mutual self-interest,     
trust-in-competence,  
contracts 
-    coordinating mechanisms direct communication, linking pins,  
capital ventures, liaison roles
ELEMENTS OF A LEARNING REGIME
- Object of learning    user needs & creation of viable business model 
- Learning process searching & learning by doing 
- Actors VC’s and start-ups, possibly complemented by large established 
firms with strong brandname 
- Input complementary resources and capabilities  
 (capital, possibly brandname in combination with idea and know-
how for new business model, marketing capabilities) 
- Output  wide variety of portals  
- Spill-overs   
- outside-in                        high (from outside the Netherlands) 
- within network   high (tacit knowledge on creation of business       
 model and supporting organisational processes)         
- inside-out    high (to others networks within Dutch SIS as well as outside     
              the Netherlands)  
- Freeridership    low   
- Hold-up      high  
The exploration of new business opportunities resulted in a wide variety of business models. 
The traditional business model in the off-line world is to generate revenues by advertising and 
subscription. The on-line business model offered mostly free access so that revenues can only 
be made from web-ads (BoozAllenHamilton 1997). Hence an on-line media business was 
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defined as a website serving as an intermediary between advertisers and possible target 
audiences whose attention needed to be captured through offering attractive content. Based on 
this, a variety of models emerged which entailed the offering of intermediary services in the 
field of either information (infomediaries), on-line marketplaces (e.g. www.LetsBuyIt.nl,
www.chemunity.nl) or e-tailers (e.g. www.macropolis.nl, www.wehkamp.nl). The assessment 
of these ideas for business models was done by venture capitalists and/or informal investors, 
although they were often not really critical (Dialogic 1999). By allowing for variety and 
providing abundant capital for exploration, they often accepted half-baked business plans 
(Steins Bisschop 2000). Later, this led to a tremendous shake-out of unsuccessful new start-
ups, for three reasons. A first reason relates to the easy possibilities for imitation of the 
various types of business models that lowered entry barriers, eroding initially attractive profit 
margins (Bughin e.a. 2001). A second reason is the unwillingness of website-visitors to click 
through these web-ads. This made these ‘banner-ads’ very ineffective, which lowered interest 
of advertisers, resulting in insufficient revenues (Bughin e.a. 2001). A third reason is that 
professional users and consumers suffered from a ‘liability of newness’, with uncertainty and 
lack of confidence concerning on-line commerce (BoozAllenHamilton 1997, Condrinet 1998, 
Dialogic 1999). This was not only related to the newness of the medium of Internet as such 
but also to the perception that on-line payment is unreliable. The resulting lack of selection by 
demand spurred new start-ups, convinced of their ability to develop a brandname for a new 
portal that would bring ultimate success. The near absence of selection forces in this 
exploration of business models rapidly led to a situation of ‘chaos’: variety abounded as can 
be noted from the explosion of portals, while insights into a viable and sustainable business 
model were still limited (redactie Financiële Telegraaf 2000 (1)). Ultimately, this led to a 
rapid decrease of confidence in the ‘promises’ of multimedia and made investors decide to 
withdraw. With capital funds drying up rapidly then, this finally resulted in a tremendous 
shake-out of multimedia firms in the early years of the new millennium (Steins Bisschop 
2000).
In terms of our Cycle of Knowledge, the ‘technology side’ of the multimedia SIS has 
consolidated and has subsequently sought applications in all kinds of directions 
(generalisation). In doing so, it provided a new context for various established industries 
(differentiation) and in this way induced a search process for business opportunities. In our 
analysis along the Cycle of Knowledge, we made the conjecture that firms in an exploitation 
setting actively pursue the transition towards differentiation, for example through exporting or 
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diversification to related markets. The case of publishers shows that application in a novel 
context can also be forced from outside, from the need not to ‘miss the boat’.   
7.5         Some reflections on learning regimes 1 and 3  
Following our analysis of the different learning regimes in the Dutch multimedia SIS, we can 
make some reflections on some commonalities and differences between the two exploration 
oriented learning regimes, namely 1 and 3.  
A first observation relates to the potential overlap between the object of learning and learning 
process in exploration. In learning regime 1 both were mutually entwined making it difficult 
to distinguish them from one another: the object of learning was the exploration of 
technological convergence that effectuated a search process characterized by efforts to 
integrate various technologies. This meant that the search process itself formed part of the 
object of search and vice versa, which prevented a more structured approach to the search 
process making it difficult to create a division of labour. On the other hand, in exploration by 
learning regime 3 there was a clear difference between the object of learning and the learning 
process: the object was to identify user needs and the development of a viable business model, 
which was then realised through a clear division of labour between VC’s and start-ups. The 
question now is why this difference in exploration, between learning regime 1 and learning 
regime 3, with regard to overlap in object of learning and learning process and hence in 
division of labour?  
The reason lies in profound differences in the knowledge bases underlying these learning 
regimes. The knowledge base in learning regime 1 has become increasingly systemic in the 
sense of strong mutual dependencies between different technologies. To develop a 
multimedia-application required the integration of different technologies for which change in 
one required adaptations in others. This created a complex search-process: when exploring the 
convergence of different technologies, one needed to consider all relevant technologies 
simultaneously, making it difficult to take a structured approach (Smeulders 1999 (1). This 
explains the tacitness of knowledge on technological integration and on directions for further 
exploration so that the search process itself formed part of the object of search and vice versa.  
In learning regime 3, the knowledge base had a stand-alone nature as a strong integration of 
different disciplines and competencies was not required. With the right resources available 
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such as capital, experience and eventually a brandname, the knowledge base was basically 
formed by competencies in the field of marketing (identifying a target group and 
communicating to them) and organisation such as how to link the front-office, i.e. the portal, 
with the back-office (Beam-it 1999, Dialogic 1999). Although there were interdependencies 
between parties in terms of complementary assets in learning regime 3, there were no direct 
interdependencies in terms of knowledge. This could be noted from the fact that start-ups 
largely explored alone and that they could adapt their strategy and market approach 
irrespective of the capabilities of their partners. This does not imply that they operated 
independently from their partners. Given their capital investments, VC’s had a clear say in 
such changes, making start-ups dependent in this respect. So, there was dependency in 
governance but not in knowledge. This made it possible to take a more structured approach to 
the search process and hence to create a division of labour between the involved parties.
7.6      Confronting hypotheses with empirical findings 
In this paragraph we discuss whether our hypotheses formulated earlier are supported by our 
empirical analysis of the multimedia system of innovation. To do so, we discuss learning 
regime 1 (paragraph 7.6.1), learning regime 2 (paragraph 7.6.3) and learning regime 3 
(paragraph 7.6.3). Based on that we draw some conclusions (paragraph 7.6.4). See table 4 for 
an overview of our hypotheses.  
7.6.1   Learning 1 
As analysed in paragraph 7.2, firms in learning regime 1 needed to cooperate in hard- and 
software, in joint development, as no single firm possessed the necessary knowledge on all 
technologies. So, this learning regime developed between small specialized multimedia firms 
and specialized suppliers of hard-& software. Given the fact that most specialised multimedia 
firms were start-ups or spin-offs, no prior relations with specialized suppliers of hard-& 
software existed, making them initially weak ties for one another. This provides support for 
hypothesis 1 that in a situation of radical change of 2nd level institutions, here originating 
from change in the knowledge base, weak ties are needed. The outcome of these exploration 
and search activities was a change of the knowledge base, resulting in an increasingly 
systemic integration of technologies such as information technology, communication 
technology, screen display technology and language technology. Competition was hardly an 
issue yet and demand was highly embryonic and small. In this respect, learning regime 1 
148
emerged largely outside the sight of the established players in the telecommunication, ICT 
and media industry. Many of these existing firms remained very aloof as they did not 
recognize the potential impact of Internet on their business in the early 1990’s nor much more 
later on. This provides support to hypothesis 2a and 2b that exploration takes place in 
allopatric speciation, outside the existing institutional selection environment, and that 
feedback by outcomes of a learning regime mainly affect the development of a new 
knowledge base.  
The arrival of Internet yielded the insight that for its full utilization a more fundamental 
restructuring was required, in technological convergence. Digitalisation provided a technical 
incentive and opportunity for this integration of technologies. Thus, Internet, together with 
perspectives for digitalisation provided powerful incentives to actively search for convergence 
of these technologies, in new applications. This provides support for hypothesis 5a: this new 
insight into the need for a more fundamental restructuring, marking the phase towards 
reciprocation, provided the basis for the exploration of a newly emerging knowledge base (2nd
level institution) and also meant that a new network was being formed between existing 
specialised suppliers and new entrants (3rd level institution). The growing number of entrants 
(see paragraph 7.2 for a rough estimate on numbers) led to an overall loosely coupled network 
structure. Relations making up this overall network were mainly informal and relatively 
symmetric to allow for direct communication and quick knowledge diffusion of mainly tacit 
knowledge, yielding mutual absorptive capacity.  
This supports hypotheses 5b and 8a that a new hybrid organisational form emerges (5b), 
characterized by a dense structure of strong and weak ties (8a). Entrance was governed by 
professional norms stressing technical novelty and reputation. Furthermore, governance of 
these fairly symmetric relations was based on trust-in-competence and the assumption of 
intentional trustworthiness with limited opportunism and free riding, without extensive formal 
safeguards, also labelled as coordination by a ‘free-souls mentality’. This supports hypothesis
8b that in exploration, relations are coordinated by transfer of reputation, trust-in-competence 
and mutual self-interest. Based on our analysis of learning 1 in multimedia, hypothesis 9 
could not be validated.
As analysed, the search-process was characterised by complexity and variability at the output-
side as well as at the input-side, making it difficult to take a structured approach to this search 
process. To deal with this uncertainty at both the input and output side of the search process 
required a dense network structure with low centrality and a high number of new entrants. 
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Ties were strong in terms of frequency of interaction that was open on various issues but of 
fairly short duration. This combination of dimensions of tie strength created the possibility for 
an easy recombination of ties so that the systemic knowledge base could be explored rapidly. 
So, the need for diversity in this exploration network was created through novel 
configurations of members. In this network, it was more rational not to go for full 
appropriation but rather to stay connected with the exploration activities going on and to ‘live 
and let live’ in order to keep up to date with the rapidly changing knowledge base. So, in this 
respect a ‘free-souls mentality’ could emerge. This combination of network structure and 
governance strategy accommodated the highly ‘interactive learning’ activities that 
characterized this learning regime. 
An important question now is why this complex and rapidly changing network did not fall 
prey to chaos. This is due to three ‘back-ground’ selection mechanisms. A first one was 
technology-related. As argued, Internet was selected as the world-wide dominant design for 
on-line communication and in this respect formed a crucial selection mechanism in the search 
process. Any new technology developed had to fit into this new Internet paradigm. A second 
selection mechanism was cognition-related. A central binding element was the shared belief 
of converging multimedia devices. Any exploration activity was basically aimed at creating 
such devices or enabling their use such as e.g. speak-&language technology, data-
transmission technologies. A third selection mechanism was governance-related. Governance 
was formed by the free-souls mentality that formed an important institution for selecting 
appropriate behaviour in this learning regime. Deviating from this was prevented by the rapid 
transfer of reputation. The combination of these three central, ‘background’ selection 
mechanisms meant that this network did not fall prey to chaos but was in fact quite effective 
in its exploration efforts.  
In sum, this combination of network structure, relational properties and coordination 
mechanisms was selected, both from a competence-perspective and from a governance-
perspective. It made it possible to cope with uncertainty at both the output-side and input-side 
as well as with regard to relational risk: staying constantly up-to-date with the rapidly 
changing knowledge base and with technologies that offered the most promising future 
prospects as well as with which firms were potentially attractive partners in terms of 
competence and intentional trustworthiness. So, this resulted in a dense network in which 
novelty originated from novel configurations of members. These novel configurations of 
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members reflected the constantly changing networks in which firms decided on whom to 
partner with as well as on the desired output of their local search process. In other words, 
selection in these local networks took place in relative autonomy, at a decentral level. Some 
‘background’ selection mechanisms prevented this network from falling apart in chaos.  
In conclusion 
Our hypotheses describing the co-evolution of institutional environment and learning regimes 
are supported as well as our hypotheses describing how this general pattern settles in network 
structures and governance strategies.  
7.6.2    Learning regime 2 
An increasingly codified and more widely diffused knowledge base in combination with a 
growing, homogeneous mass-market provided the selection environment for learning regime 
2. This learning regime was embedded in a rapidly emerging network of new entrants and 
existing firms. This confirms hypothesis 3a predicting that, towards exploitation, selection by 
newly forming 2nd level institutions becomes strong (knowledge base and demand) whereas 
selection by 3rd level institutions is emerging. This emerging selection of 3rd level institutions 
became manifest by means of a newly arising network form, built up of durable and mostly 
exclusive relations. This network structure reflected a growing division of labour between the 
involved firms: communication with customers was done by a ‘main-contractor’ with a 
reliable reputation, surrounded by a stable set of firms with competences for solving various 
technical issues. This confirms hypothesis 3b  that towards exploitation a ‘dominant design in 
organization’ emerges, a dominant logic of how to organise for the efficient exploitation of 
the knowledge base. This dominant mode of organising consisted of a relatively non-dense 
network of ties as relations mainly existed between the core firm and the various supplying 
firms. These relations were durable with frequent interaction to accommodate the integration 
and delivery process and in this respect mainly entailed specific issues that were related to this 
integration and delivery process. As analysed, these supplying firms only had direct ties 
among one another when needed in view of the integration process. Hence a network 
developed that enabled an emerging distribution of labour and the systemic, durable  
configurations needed for that, which gives a partial confirmation of hypothesis 6a. However, 
this hypothesis also predicted that relations showed limited strength in terms of frequency 
whereas we found a relatively high level of frequency ranging from daily to weekly contacts 
(see also paragraph 7.3). Governance was based on mutual dependence and coordination took 
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place by reputation built on past performance and trust-in-intention, this latter explaining why 
most of the partners came from within a region. Reputation within this local network then 
acted as an important mechanism to prevent partners from free-riding and poaching. 
However, these findings that the coordination of relations remained largely informal and 
relation-based, with contracts playing a limited role, are in contrast with hypothesis 6b.
The explanation for this partial confirmation of hypothesis 6a and rejection of hypothesis 6b 
is as follows: although various parts of the knowledge base became increasingly codified, 
they still remained specific to a particular firm with the relevant expertise. The various 
codified elements of the knowledge base enabled a division of labour but within a stable 
group of partners as the capability to integrate these various codified parts was still basically 
tacit, requiring daily or weekly contacts in order to create and maintain a close mutual 
understanding and trust-in-intention. So, learning regime 2 shows that also in a setting of 
exploitation governance can still be of a more informal type, if some essential parts of the 
knowledge base are tacit, such as knowledge on the integration and delivery process.  
Hypothesis 7 then predicts that such a dense network becomes vulnerable to lock-in. This 
could not be confirmed however, at least not throughout the 1990’s and the early years of the 
21st century. A probable explanation that lock-in did not occur was that firms continuously 
needed to absorb the new codified knowledge generated by learning regime 1. Due to the 
presence of competing networks in learning regime 2, in pursuit of the same customers, this 
state-of-the-art knowledge could not be ignored. This shows the clear connection between 
learning regime 1 and 2: the continuous influx of spill-overs into learning regime 2 
necessitated that firms in this learning regime maintained an open orientation to the 
exploration activities in learning regime 1. This also explains why hypothesis 4 is partially 
supported. Although there were various self-reinforcing mechanisms at work in this network 
fuelled by an increasing selection of the institutional environment, full exploitation could not 
occur due to the continuous knowledge spill-overs from learning regime 1 into 2.  
In conclusion 
Our hypotheses describing the co-evolution of institutional environment and learning regimes 
are (partially) supported (3a, 3b and 4). Hypothesis 7 could not be validated. Our hypotheses 
describing how this general pattern then settles in network structures and governance 
strategies were partially supported. Our empirical findings support the emergence of a 
dominant organisational form to enable a division of labour (hypothesis 3b), made up of a 
relatively non-dense network of ties that were relatively strong in durability and frequency 
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(hypothesis 6a). However, in contrast with hypothesis 6b, was the finding that relations 
remained coordinated by means of mainly informal coordination mechanisms. 
7.6.3      Learning regime 3 
As analysed, learning regime 3 developed between small, specialized start-up firms, VC’s and 
existing firms from established industries. The majority of these firms had no prior relations 
making them initially weak ties for one another, which is in line with hypothesis 1.
The learning object of this learning regime was two folded: a quick understanding of user 
needs and the subsequent development of a viable business model. This exploration of new 
business opportunities resulted in a wide variety of business models and an emerging 
knowledge base, entailing among others the importance of content, skills on how to capture 
‘on-line attention’ of customers, the role of portals and so on. This confirms hypothesis 2a.
Exploration in learning regime 3 was primarily done by start-ups, backed by VC’s. In 
addition, also established firms from a variety of existing industries engaged in exploration, 
but in the great majority of cases very aloof from their existing business. This supports 
hypothesis 2b that exploration takes place in allopatric speciation, although the engagement of 
also established firms informs us that, apparently, there are different types of allopatric 
speciation. One type is formed by exploration through new entrants that are complete 
outsiders with no history in the industry whatsoever. The second type is formed by existing 
firms that explore at the periphery of their organisation.   
In terms of our Cycle of knowledge, the ‘supply side’ of the multimedia SIS has consolidated, 
through learning regime 2, and has subsequently sought applications in all kinds of directions 
(generalisation). In doing so, it provided a new context for various established industries 
(differentiation) and in this way induced a search process for business opportunities, at the 
demand side of the multimedia SIS. In our analysis along the Cycle of knowledge, we 
assumed that firms in an exploitation setting actively pursue the transition towards 
differentiation, for example through exporting or diversification to related markets. The case 
of publishers shows that application in a novel context can also be forced from outside, from 
the need not to ‘miss the boat’. Still, the case of publishers confirms hypothesis 5a: to be able 
to make full use of the potential offered by a new context, offered by Internet, publishers 
needed to make a fundamental change in strategy, affecting existing 2nd level institutions as 
outside sources of knowledge were required. In addition, this change in strategy also affected 
3rd level institutions as such outside sources of knowledge were formed by start-ups or various 
individuals with a reputation in the field.
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As analysed, towards the end of the 1990’s though, the network made up of  start-ups and 
venture capitalists/informal investor, started to dominate. Relations between start-ups and 
venture capitalists/investors making up these networks were mostly informal and a-
symmetric. These VC’s/investors had a strong coordinating role by acting as linking pins and 
taking seats on the board of these start-ups. This supports hypotheses 5b and 8a that a new 
hybrid organisational form emerged (6b), characterized by a dense structure of strong and 
weak ties (8a). The central role of these investors, deeply embedded in these networks, made 
coordination highly tacit and specific to the network. Governance involved a mix of 
coordinating mechanisms consisting of informal mechanisms such as direct communication 
and trust-in-competence but also formal mechanisms such as capital ventures, liaison roles 
and acquisitions. This is in contrast with hypothesis 8b that predicts the use of informal 
governance mechanisms. An explanation for this is that VC’s needed to make substantial 
investments, not only in terms of  committing resources but also in terms of specific, 
cognitive investments. This combination of economic and cognitive investments created a 
clear rationale for more substantial governance that entailed a mix of informal and formal 
coordinating mechanisms, ranging from direct communication to capital ventures and liaison 
roles. The expansive search of this learning regime fuelled by a lack of selection forces, either 
by investors or customers, resulted in a wide variety of portals, while insights into viable and 
sustainable business models were still absent, resulting in chaos. This confirms hypothesis 9.
As argued, knowledge in this learning regime was stand-alone: knowledge and capabilities of 
the various involved firms needed no integration and a change in search-direction does not 
imply adaptations in knowledge and capabilities from other partners. This search-process 
required a combination of distinct and complementary resources ranging from ideas, capital, 
experience, social networks, reputation, brand names as well as competencies in the field of 
marketing (identifying and targeting a potential market) and organisation (how to link the 
front-office, i.e. the web-based portal, with the back-office). Given the person-bound nature of 
most of these resources and the fairly diffuse opportunities, this search process was fairly 
complex and predominantly tacit. Once these resources were available, uncertainty at the 
input-side was fairly limited. The diffuse nature of the opportunity conditions created 
uncertainty at the output-side of the search-process, both in terms of complexity and 
variability.  
To deal with this complexity, firms needed to make substantial investments, not only in terms 
of  committing resources but also in terms of specific, cognitive investments. This 
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combination of economic and cognitive investments created a clear rationale for more 
substantial governance. As analysed, this governance involved a mix of coordinating 
mechanisms ranging from direct communication and a combination of capital ventures and 
liaison roles. This role was often performed by the VC or informal investors and aimed at 
stimulating and enabling informal networking among start-ups in order to facilitate 
knowledge sharing. The tacitness of this search process explained why contracts had limited 
value and why the strength of relations was high in terms of frequency of interaction and 
mutual openness.54
To deal with variability, VC’s invested in various start-ups simultaneously, creating a network 
structure in which they occupied a central position. This combination of a central firm and 
peripheral start-ups engaging in exploration created a relatively stable configuration of novel 
combinations of  members that cooperated in a division of labour. This division of labour 
explains why relations showed limited strength in terms of breadth of issues. When 
opportunities did not prove to be viable, relations were generally terminated which explains  
why relations showed also limited strength in terms of durability. At the same time, the direct 
involvement in exploration by the central firm made the network vulnerable: it created an 
absence of selection inside the network that was not further compensated for by outside-
selection forces such as demand. 
In sum, the diffuse nature of mostly unrelated opportunities created uncertainty at the output-
side of the search process and required that the locus of diversity in this network was at the 
periphery of the network. However, in this network there was no central selection by the core 
firm. This core firm itself was actively engaged in exploration and did not select. This created 
a need for selection from outside such as for example formed by demand. However, as such a 
selection force was absent this learning regime became prone to chaos.  
In conclusion 
Our hypotheses describing the co-evolution of institutional environment and learning regimes 
are supported (2a, 2b, 5a). Our hypotheses describing how this general pattern then settles in 
54 This empirical finding on dominant governance strategies in business exploration in multimedia is in line with 
Grandori’s framework (1995). She predicts that under conditions of high cognitional complexity,  reciprocal 
interdependence (resources going one way) and diverging interests, a mix of capital ventures and lateral 
integration roles is selected. Although we need to add one comment, namely that interests among partners in this 
network do not necessarily diverge as, in general, both start-ups and investors wanted to make an ipo (‘initial 
public offering’) as quickly as possible. So, in this case we  argue it is more the level of investments made and 
the fact that most resources are person-bound that explains the substantial involvement of the investor in the 
search process (Clustermonitor 1999). 
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network structures and governance strategies were partially supported. Our empirical findings 
confirm that in exploration a new organisational form will emerge (5b), characterized by a 
loosely coupled structure of strong and weak ties (8a). However, in contrast with hypothesis 
8b, was the finding that relations were a-symmetric and based on a combination of informal 
as well as formal governance mechanisms. Hypothesis 9 was supported.  
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7.6.4 Conclusions 
The empirical findings on the three learning regimes in the multimedia SIS confirm our 
hypotheses that describe the general pattern of co-evolution between institutional environment 
and learning regimes. In other words, our analysis of the co-evolutionary process along the 
Cycle of Knowledge holds, both towards exploitation and towards exploration. In addition, 
we have gained some novel insights into this co-evolutionary process. Such a novel insight is 
the finding that the concept of allopatric speciation can be further substantiated by 
differentiating between two types. One is formed by new entrants that explore at the periphery 
of existing industries, such as in learning regime 1, and one by existing firms that explore at 
the periphery of their organisation, such as in learning regime 3. Another novel insight from 
the case study is that differentiation, in an attempt to apply existing competencies in different 
contexts, is not necessarily driven by voluntary expansion for growth. As the case of 
publishers has shown, it may also be forced as a defensive strategy of existing firms, to 
prevent loss of an existing market when confronted with a change in their institutional 
environment.
Clarification 
+ : support 
0  : partial support 
-  : no support 
Table 7.4 :  Overview of outcomes from confrontation of hypotheses and empirical 
findings for multimedia 
MULTIMEDIA Learning regime 1 
technological exploration
Learning regime 2 
technological exploitation
Learning regime 3 
business exploration
Hypothesis 1 + +
Hypothesis 2a + +




Hypothesis 5a + +
Hypothesis 5b + +
Hypothesis 6a +
Hypothesis 6b -
Hypothesis 7 (could not be validated) 
Hypothesis 8a + +
Hypothesis 8b + -
Hypothesis 9 (could not be validated) +
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Following table 7.4, the empirical findings give partial confirmation of our hypotheses that 
describe how the general pattern of co -evolution settles in network structures, relational 
properties and coordination mechanisms. We found support for our hypotheses stating that in 
exploration a new organisation form will emerge formed by a loosely coupled of strong and 
weak ties, and that in exploitation a dominant organisational form will be selected in view of a 
division of labour, formed by a dense network of strong ties. But our hypotheses that relate to 
the properties of these network relations and governance strategies employed were not 
supported. The explanation for this is that 2nd level institutions do not only differ between 
different SIS’s but also differ between different learning regimes within a SIS. These specific 
properties of 2nd level institutions make 3rd level institutions, as a lower level of institutions, 
also specific and therefore not necessarily in line with our general analysis and the hypotheses 
developed from that.
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Chapter 8  The Dutch Pharmaceutical Biotechnology System of 
Innovation
8.1   Introduction  
Biotechnology as such is not an industry per se but refers more to a set of technologies that 
profoundly affect existing industries such as agriculture, food-processing and human health. 
In the agricultural industry firms use modern biotechnology for the improvement of health, 
nutrition or breeding of agricultural livestock. In the case of plants firms use recombinant 
DNA techniques for the genetic modification of crops, plants or plants cells in order to 
enhance their quality or improve their characteristics. In the food industry companies focus on 
improving the quality of foods and develop new functional foods with added ingredients that 
supposedly have health-related effects. In the pharmaceutical industry firms develop 
diagnostic tools for identifying human or animal diseases such as different types of 
antibodies, genetic diagnostics that use polymerase chain reaction (PCT) technology or other 
biology techniques. Other companies produce therapeutics, i.e. biotechnology-derived 
products that are aimed at improving the treatment of human diseases. In addition there are 
specialised biotechnology firms that develop platform technologies with a potential for a wide 
variety of applications by making use of various scientific fields such as functional genomics, 
proteomics, combinatorial chemistry and high throughput screening facilities like DNA array 
technology. These technologies are essentially research tools and their developers do not aim 
to become producers but rather providers of tools and service to companies involved in drugs 
discovery and development. 
In this chapter we focus on the impact of the biotechnological revolution on the Dutch 
pharmaceutical industry.55 The biotechnological revolution in the pharmaceutical industry has 
been largely global in nature though (Henderson 1994). To understand therefore the impact of 
biotechnology in the Netherlands and the sectoral dynamics that have followed from that, we 
cannot ignore some of these essential developments that have largely taken place outside the 
Netherlands. Therefore we start this chapter with an analysis of the profound changes in the 
pharmaceutical industry caused by the biotechnology revolution. This will be the topic of 
55 We thank Christien Enzing and Sander Kern of TNO-STB for their valuable comments on an earlier version of 
this chapter. Of course, any error remains entirely our responsibility. See for more information on both experts 
www.tno-stb.nl
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paragraph 8.2. This then forms the basis for our analysis of the evolution of the 
pharmaceutical biotechnology system of innovation in the Netherlands over the period from 
around the mid 1980’s towards the beginning of the new century. This will be covered in the 
paragraphs 8.3, 8.4 and 8.5. Finally in paragraph 8.6 we confront our earlier formulated 
hypotheses with our empirical findings, based on which we draw some conclusions.  
8.2    Pharmaceutical biotechnology 
In this paragraph we analyse the profound changes caused by the biotechnology revolution 
that have affected the global pharmaceutical industry. To do so, we start with a brief overview 
of the pharmaceutical industry before the biotechnological revolution arrived (paragraph 
8.2.1). Then we analyse more in-depth the impact made by biotechnology on this industry, 
based on the Cycle of Knowledge (paragraph 8.2.2). Based on this we will then analyse and 
try to explain the emergence of new organisational forms (paragraph 8.2.3). 
8.2.1 The pharmaceutical industry  
For a considerable period of time, from around WWII to the early 1990’s, the pharmaceutical 
industry has been remarkably successful. For most of this period, double digit growth rates 
were the norm for most pharmaceutical companies and the industry as a whole ranked among 
the most profitable in the world. A number of structural factors supported this high level of 
innovation and profitable growth.  
After WWII, there were many diseases and physical ailments for which no drugs existed. 
These unmet needs created an enormous amount of R&D opportunities for pharmaceutical 
companies. In general, there was no in-depth understanding among firms/scientists of the 
more fundamental biological reasons underlying specific diseases (Pisano 2002). To exploit 
this sea of opportunities without detailed knowledge then, pharma companies developed an 
approach to R&D often labelled as ‘random-screening’ (McKelvey 1996). The essence of this 
approach is that natural and chemically derived compounds are randomly screened for their 
therapeutic potential. As little of this knowledge was codified, serendipity played a key role 
and often firms discovered a drug for another disease than they were searching for (Orsenigo 
e.a 2001). This search process of random screening was based on internal organizational 
processes and mainly tacit capabilities. Combined with the random character of the screening 
process, spill-overs between different firms were small (Henderson 1994, McKelvey and 
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Orsenigo 2001). In addition, patent protection was strong, making it difficult for an imitator to 
come up with an alternative compound which did not infringe on the patent. Also, consumers 
have proven to be largely price-inelastic, making demand for pharmaceutical products 
relatively insensitive to economic downturns. This was also due to the fact that it was often 
doctors who made the buying decision for which patients (i.e. users) were often compensated 
for by means of their medical insurance. Another factor here is the regulatory approval 
process which is time-consuming and costly, making it difficult for imitators to quickly come 
up with cheaper alternatives (Pisano 2002).
Taken together, these factors explain both the high and profitable growth of pharmaceutical 
firms and also why very few new firms entered the industry in this period.  
8.2.2   The advent of biotechnology 
The core knowledge base of the pharmaceutical industry until the early 1980’s was formed by 
organic chemistry. This knowledge base was specialised around an in-depth understanding of 
the chemical properties of molecules and how they interact with one another. In this respect, 
organic chemistry did not aim to explain the biological underpinnings of specific diseases. At 
best, organic chemists could develop a sense of a relation between a chemical compound and 
its potential therapeutic effect (Pisano 2002). These chemists therefore tended to focus on the 
synthesis of chemical compounds which had already been shown to have positive effects. 
These compounds were then screened for their therapeutic potential. So, the discovery of new 
drugs was a mainly tacit capability which was mainly dependent on the skills of the individual 
chemist making it therefore difficult to codify. Still, this search process of random screening 
worked very well for a large number of years and generated important classes of drugs, 
making this period after WWII the ‘golden age’ of the pharmaceutical industry (McKelvey & 
Orsenigo 2002, Pisano 2002). In terms of our Cycle of Knowledge, we can characterize this 
period as one with a strong focus on incremental innovations and the exploitation of the 
existing knowledge base of organic chemistry. 
From exploitation to differentiation 
In the early 1980’s some first signs emerged that things were changing. The massive public 
funding for health related research after WWII began to bear fruits. Substantial progress in 
scientific areas such as physiology, pharmacology, enzymology and cell biology created a 
growing understanding of the biochemical and molecular roots of diseases and of the 
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effectiveness of existing drugs in curing these diseases. These new medical insights in 
diseases offered researchers with opportunities for the development of new drugs. Although 
the core knowledge base remained firmly rooted in organic chemistry, this new biological 
knowledge enabled chemists to take a more rational approach to the design of new drugs. It 
enabled them to define the search space more accurately making it possible to take a more 
structured approach to the screening process. So, random screening turned in a more guided 
search process (McKelvey 1997). In essence, the advent of molecular biology enabled 
pharmaceutical firms to now fully exploit the possibilities which the existing knowledge base 
of organic chemistry provided. Still, the random character of the search process did not 
disappear as these technological advances were more complementary and did not displace 
existing competences of the screening process (Santos 2003). Later on, from the early 1990’s 
onwards, the increasing computational possibilities provided by ICT enabled to further 
improve the search process through high throughput screening. Whereas the original process 
of random screening was fairly labour intensive, this technology of high throughput screening 
was an automated, robotics-based process that enabled to test large numbers of chemical 
compounds, although still in a rather random manner .56
Firms did not adopt molecular biology as a goal in itself. As molecular biology is a different 
technology and complementary to existing organic chemistry, it enabled firms to further 
exploit the existing knowledge base of organic chemistry. So, the advent of molecular biology 
provided new inputs to the existing knowledge base of organic chemistry. In terms of the 
Cycle of Knowledge: a movement from exploitation to the phase of differentiation which, in 
this case, is formed by adjusting the R&D process to new inputs provided by molecular 
biology in order to further exploit the existing knowledge base.   
Unlike other industries where technical change involves advancement in product technology 
or process technology, biotechnology induced changes in the R&D process. It affected 
methods of R&D and deals with finding new ways to search, synthesize and select chemical 
compounds for therapeutic applications (Henderson and Cockburn 1996). R&D in 
pharmaceuticals is concerned with the discovery of new drugs and involves three, 
interdependent processes: search for therapeutic targets, synthesis of potentially therapeutic 
56 This random character is still present, even with new drugs that are introduced at today’s markets. Pfizer’s 
Viagra was initially developed as a treatment for hypertension, which proved to be limitedly successful. 
However, it has become an enormously successful drug for erectile dysfunctionings. 
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compounds and the screening of those compounds for desired therapeutic activity. The era of 
random screening was mainly concerned with synthesis and screening. With the development 
of rational drug design, enabled by molecular biology, a more structured approach to 
searching developed.  
From differentiation to reciprocation 
In the late 1980’s and early 1990’s a second wave in the molecular biological revolution 
emerged, genetic engineering, which opened up new areas for innovation and altered the drug 
discovery process in a more fundamental way. Genetic engineering forms an umbrella-name 
for a newly emerging set of complex and multidisciplinary technologies, formed by among 
others recombinant DNA (rDNA), monoclonal antibody technology, , and eventually 
combinatorial chemistry and high throughput screening. These new knowledge bases opened 
up a fundamental new way to define search spaces, identify promising targets and develop 
potential heuristics. With the advent of this second molecular biological revolution the total 
drug discovery process has started to change in a profound way.  
In terms of our Cycle of Knowledge, this second wave in the molecular biology revolution 
marked the transition to the phase of reciprocation. The continued exploitation of the existing 
knowledge base of organic chemistry made its limitations increasingly visible, first slowly but 
towards the end of the millennium increasingly more apparent. These limitations became 
manifest by the increasing number of existing patents by pharma companies which was 
expiring in combination with a lowering number of potential ‘blockbusters’ in the pipe-line.  
An example is formed by Eli Lilly’s patents for its very successful Prozac (against depressions) which 
expired from the beginning of 2001. The turn-over of 2.3billion US$ in 2001 has halved in a few 
months and could not be compensated for by increasing sales of other new medicines (FD, January 
2002).
According to Jan Leschly, former CEO of SmithKline Beecham, “Big pharma cannot afford to rest on 
its laurels. If today’s successful pharma companies do nothing then their sales will be halved within ten 
years from now” (E&Y 2001)  
Due to this accumulation of failures within a different context, provided by the 1st wave of 
molecular biology, the importance of this 2nd wave became increasingly apparent. The 
random nature of the search process did not disappear so that this change was more 
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evolutionary than revolutionary. A more guided search process became possible and as such 
improved the chance of success for finding effective drugs. The cognitive distance between 
these new knowledge bases and the existing knowledge base of organic chemistry was fairly 
large. So, the adoption of this 2nd wave of new or ‘foreign’ practices marked the transition 
from differentiation to reciprocation.
As argued by different authors (among others by Gambardella 1995) the successful adoption 
of these new technologies has varied substantially among firms. Especially firms that adopted 
the first molecular techniques in the early 1980’s and made the subsequent transition from 
random to guided drug discovery proved to be successful in managing this change process 
(Henderson e.a. 1999, Pisano 2002). Firms that had not made this initial transition were often 
very slow followers and proved unsuccessful in adopting the 2nd wave of new techniques 
(Henderson 1994, McKelvey and Orsenigo 2001). This is in congruence with our analysis 
along the Cycle of Knowledge, which predicts that it is very difficult to skip one phase and 
move on directly towards the next. The case of pharmaceutical biotechnology shows that 
firms which made the transition to the phase of differentiation and then moved to 
reciprocation had an advantage over firms which tried to move from exploitation directly to 
reciprocation by skipping differentiation. This especially applied to European firms which 
maintained close links to the knowledge base of organic chemistry making them slower in 
adopting molecular biology when compared with US firms. In Dutch firms organic chemists 
had occupied powerful positions for a long time and now tried to resist their lose of dominant 
positions to pharmacologists and biotechnologists, which became an inevitable process 
though from the end of the 1970’s and onwards. Still, the vested interests of existing organic 
chemists made that incumbent firms mostly did not jump onto the newly arising technological 
and commercial opportunities. 
8.2.3  New organisational forms 
In our theoretical analysis in the preceding chapters we have hypothesized that structural 
changes in the core knowledge base underlying a SIS will create new organisational forms.  
In general, the advent of molecular biology has created networks of collaboration between 
different types of firms and also with non-firm actors such universities and (public) research 
institutes. It is this appearance of new organisational forms, especially in new types of 
networks, upon which we will now elaborate.
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The profound changes in the core knowledge base underlying this SIS required from pharma-
firms to make fundamental adaptations in their learning and search routines. Therefore most 
of these firms did not consider it to be a viable option to make such adaptations in-house by 
re-educating their existing R&D-labour force of organic chemists (Degenaar and Janszen 
1996). To exploit the opportunities induced by molecular biology and genetics then required 
outsiders with expertise in this new technological field. These outsiders were formed by 
dedicated biotechnology firms (DBF’s), universities and (public) research institutes. 
Collaboration with DBF’s and universities allowed large pharmaceutical firms to access new 
technology and explore new directions, if they had disposed of sufficient absorptive capacity. 
From a sectoral viewpoint, these DBF’s performed a crucial function of transforming 
fundamental scientific knowledge into technological and commercially valuable knowledge. 
For these DBF’s the rationale to cooperate with large firms was access to finance as well as to 
complementary assets such as marketing, distribution and the capabilities to deal with 
regulatory approval procedures. Large firms were faced with an opposite problem. While they 
needed to explore and develop new knowledge, their monodisciplinary orientation remained 
largely in tact (Allansdottir e.a. 2002). Their key-capabilities and structure were mainly in the 
field of product testing and large scale production and marketing. Confronted with a sharp 
increase in opportunities and high rate of change of knowledge, these large firms needed to 
maintain access to a broad knowledge base in order to be able to quickly respond to new 
developments (Degenaar & Janszen 1996). Most of them created such access through 
partnerships with DBF’s and/or universities instead of exploring and understanding the new 
knowledge in-house. So, a network structure developed in which large pharma companies co-
existed in a relationship of strong complementarity with small DBF’s and/or academia 
resulting in a clear division of labour: small firms did exploration for which the large firms 
formed the fundamental source of demand and provided the integrative capabilities that were 
required to transform the newly explored knowledge into commercial products (Allansdottir 
e.a. 2002). This basically proved to be an effective way of solving the problem of exploration 
and exploitation by distributing these tasks in a network (Nooteboom 2000). Still two 
questions remain open.
A first question is why large pharma firms have made limited use of acquiring DBF’s to 
incorporate the new knowledge bases. Following our analysis as outlined above, an 
acquisition strategy would have created two distinct disadvantages. One is the difficulty, due 
to the diffuse opportunity conditions, to identify up-front which search process in a particular 
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technological field is the most likely to yield success, and then, which DBF would be most 
capable in realising this potential. A network of various DBF’s makes it possible to explore in 
different directions without the costs of acquisition and the risk of making the ‘wrong bet’. A 
second disadvantage lies in the difficulty of  incorporating such a DBF into the mother-firm 
due to differences in culture and management systems (control, reward, promotion systems 
and so on). Often this is a time-consuming and costly affair with a limited chance of success 
and the risk of key-people of the acquired firm leaving.  
A second question is why another alternative organisational form has not emerged, namely 
that of a DBF becoming a pharma firm itself. This would have created two substantial 
advantages, namely that of direct access to a potentially large, profitable market and the 
avoidance of being dependent on a large pharma firm, generating relational risk. Although 
there are a few successful examples such as e.g. Genentech, Amgen, Chiron, Genzyme and 
others, in general, this strategy has not been proven to be very viable, for three reasons. A first 
reason relates to cognition. Most DBF’s have a strong monodisciplinary orientation whereas 
the successful development of a new drug requires a much broader, more general knowledge 
base, both in technical and in organisational terms (McKelvey & Orsenigo 2001). A second 
reason has to do with appropriability conditions. Large pharma firms possess the required 
complementary assets and tacit capabilities to deal with complex and costly product approval 
procedures as well as with large scale marketing and distribution. Thirdly, DBF’s are in 
‘desperate need’ of cash. In this respect, venture capitalists play a key-role but, in general, 
they are more prepared to invest when there is support from a large pharma firm. Fourthly, 
when turning itself into a fully integrated pharmaceutical company, DBF’s would lose their 
advantage of their small size and flexibility for exploration. 
In  conclusion, networks have emerged as the dominant organisational form opposed to 
alternatives such as integrated forms or stand-alone forms. 
8.3  Pharmaceutical biotechnology in the Netherlands 
57
The emergence and growth of biotechnology is shaped to an important extent by the presence 
and structure of downstream industries that provide demand for biotechnology and its related 
57 See for the used reports, documents and articles the overview at the end of this chapter. 
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products. However, large and integrated pharmaceutical firms are absent in the Netherlands. 
This may explain the relatively moderate position of the Netherlands in the field of 
pharmaceutical biotechnology. According to recent figures, the Netherlands occupies a 12th
position in the overall ranking of nations, based on number of biotechnology companies 
(Ernst and Young  2002)58. Still, three medium-sized multinational firms are clearly involved 
in pharmaceutical biotechnology, namely AKZO Nobel (Organon, Organon Technika and 
Intervet), DSM-Gist Brocades (largest global manufacturer of penicillin), Yamenouchi and 
Solvay Pharmaceuticals. In addition, foreign pharmaceutical firms have clinical research 
being carried out in the Netherlands and have relations with Dutch DBF’s. Moreover, some of 
these DBF’s have relations with firms outside the Netherlands. This indicates that 
geographical proximity seems of less importance, an issue which we will further address.   
From the middle 1980’s towards the mid 1990’s technologies were primarily based on 
molecular biology or biology, forming a mainly stand-alone knowledge base. The main focus 
in this period was on scientific research so that knowledge mainly pertained to universities 
and research institutes (Ministerie EZ 1998). There was a low number of entrants of about 1 
per annum and most of the DBF’s had close relations with academia whereas some of them 
had relations with pharma firms, either Dutch (mostly Akzo and Solvay) or foreign ones. In 
general, there was a limited focus on possibilities for a rapid commercialisation of this 
knowledge (Janszen and Degenaars 1996).  
From the early 1990’s towards 1998-1999 the number of entrants by DBF’s per annum 
increased from 4 in 1994 to 10 in 1998, making 50 in total (Biopartner 2001, 2002). Around 
50% of these firms in the pharmaceutical industry in the Netherlands were active in the field 
of pharmaceutical biotechnology. This indicated that a pharmaceutical biotechnology SIS in 
the Netherlands was emerging in this period. All these young firms saw R&D as their core 
activity. They were either independently established (60%) or spin-offs from academia or 
existing firms (40%) with virtually no DBF’s created through diversification from existing 
pharmaceutical firms (Enzing 2000, Enzing and Kern 2002). These DBF’s had relations with 
academia as well as with large pharma firms, both inside and outside the Netherlands. Their 
main sources of income were formed by royalties from licences or by offering a variety of 
58 Another reason mentioned is that of the institutional set-up of national healthcare systems. When these favour 
low priced medicinal products, such as in the Netherlands, this would lead to relatively few biotechnology 
companies (Senker and Zwanenberg 2001).
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specialised services such as contract research, contract manufacturing and/or custom synthesis 
(Enzing and Kern 2002). Examples of such DBF’s are among others Pharming (transgenic 
animals), Crucell (platform technologies, gene therapy), Isotis (human tissue engineering).  
The majority of this ‘new breed’ of Dutch DBF’s was engaged, through contract research 
services, in general platform technologies with a potential for applications in the 
pharmaceutical industry such as e.g. genomics, combinatorial chemistry, high-throughput 
screening and bio-informatics (Degenaars and Janszen 1996, Ernst and Young 2001(2)). In 
these application areas, time-to-market was shorter and there was less risk involved as 
compared with therapeutics. These latter required lengthy and costly clinical trials and had a 
higher chance of failure. In our analyses of the Dutch pharmaceutical biotechnology industry 
we will further focus on firms active in these general platform technologies.   
General-purpose, platform technologies 
Research in these platform technologies could be considered as an important ‘engine of 
knowledge’ (Allansdotir e.a. 2002). There were many technological spill-overs by means of 
licences to different parts of biotechnology. Especially platform-technologies generate such 
spill-overs by providing platforms also in non-pharma applications such as plant breeding, 
food-processing (e.g. diagnostic kits), speciality chemicals, bioinformatics and biological 
catalysis. DBF’s that specialised in platform technologies aimed to provide tools and services 
to pharma firms that were involved in drug discovery and development. The advantage of this 
strategy was its potential for relative rapid commercialisation with (hopefully) fast cash-flows 
(Casper 1999).
So, over the course of the 1990’s a ‘knowledge exploration value chain’ was emerging in the 
field of general platform technologies, which is schematically depicted in figure 8.1: 
Science 1 DBF’s               2            Large Pharma firms 
Figure 8.1 :   Emerging knowledge exploration value chain and learning regimes in 
            the field of general platform technologies
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Within this value chain we can discern between 2 main types of learning regimes, namely: 
- Learning regime 1 : embedded within a network of DBF’s with academia.  
- Learning regime 2  : embedded within a network of one or more DBF’s with a large   
                                      pharma firm. 
As can be understood from figure 8.1, DBF’s performed a key role in commercialising 
scientific knowledge. They connected a ‘basic scientific environment’ with its emphasis on 
the importance of new knowledge with a ‘techno-economic environment’ which emphasized 
economic value (McKelvey 1997). In this respect DBF’s were faced with a dual selection 
environment that stressed economic performance on the one hand and scientific excellence on 
the other hand. This had implications for the nature of the knowledge base in terms of stand-
alone vs. systemic. The knowledge produced by academia was of a mainly stand-alone nature. 
To turn this knowledge into commercially valuable knowledge, DBF’s needed to integrate it 
with other bodies of knowledge such as adjacent biotechnological disciplines as well as with 
competences in the field of process technology and ICT. So, when moving from left to right 
in figure 8.1, the knowledge base became increasingly systemic (Degenaars & Janszen 1996, 
McKelvey & Orsenigo 2001).  
We now further analyse each learning regime more in depth: paragraph 8.4 discusses learning 
regime 1 whereas paragraph 8.5 discusses learning regime 2.  
8.4   Learning regime 1 : technological exploration 
Learning regime 1 in the basic-scientific selection environment was embedded in a network 
that was made up of relations between DBF’s and (public) research institutes. In this learning 
regime the main selection force stemmed from the nature of the knowledge base and its focus 
was on exploring new knowledge. We distinguish between two periods, one period from the 
late 1980 towards the late 1990’s (paragraph 8.4.1) and a second period from the late 1990’s 
onwards (paragraph 8.4.2). 
8.4.1   From the late 1980’s towards the late 1990’s  
From the 1980’s towards the middle of the 1990’s the knowledge base on general purpose, 
platform technologies had a mainly stand-alone nature due to its strong basis in molecular 
biology or biology. Demand was formed by European and world demand rather than local 
174
demand (Ernst and Young 2001 (2). Due to some high quality research at Dutch universities 
there were opportunities for Dutch DBF’s, although mainly pertaining to various niches 
(Janszen and Degenaars 1996). The fact that there were virtually no DBF’s created through 
diversification from existing pharmaceutical firms provided an indication of the cognitive 
distance from the existing knowledge base of organic chemistry. Also the unwillingness of the 
existing labour force of organic chemists to ‘give up’ their powerful positions to 
pharmacologists and biotechnologists made that incumbent firms did not jump onto these new 
opportunities. The majority of firms cooperated with (public) research institutes, indicating 
that knowledge was highly science-based (Ministerie EZ 1998). The learning outcome of this 
search process was formed by abstract and codified knowledge. The search process of 
scientific discovery itself was characterized by a lot of trial & error and was highly specific to 
individual persons and research communities (Enzing 2000). This process entailed many 
elements that were difficult to codify such as test set-up, accurate execution, interpretation of 
test results and so on. It was characterized by serial, incremental improvements, leading to the 
accumulation of tacit knowledge within stable research groups of academics and DBF’s 
(Enzing and Kern 2002). So, a science-based and fast-changing knowledge base developed 
with cumulative characteristics and high specificity to a network of DBF’s and academics 
(Enzing and Kern 2002). Relations between these people involved were dense and of fairly 
high durability (4-5 years or more) with frequent interaction in mutual openness on mainly 
search-related and technological issues. See also table 8.1 on the next two pages. 
In this network a clear spatial concentration could be observed, especially around universities 
such as those in Amsterdam, Groningen, Leiden, Utrecht, Nijmegen, Wageningen, Maastricht 
and Delft. The mainly tacit search process meant that personal contacts and frequent 
interaction were necessary to accommodate an effective transfer of this tacit knowledge 
(Geenhuizen and van de Knaap 1997). In addition, physical closeness facilitated easy access 
to a talent pool of skilled workers, facilitating knowledge spill-overs through the mobility of 
researchers. In addition, opportunities were generally diffuse, requiring regular checks and 
adaptations of the search process into the most promising search direction (Geenhuizen 1999). 
The importance of physical closeness was further indicated by the fact that most patents are 
assigned to inventors from within the Netherlands (Allansdottir e.a. 2002) in this period, 
making spill-overs into this learning regime relatively limited. So, these exploration networks 
were formed by dense networks of strong ties between universities and DBF’s that enabled 
them to develop an in-depth understanding and critical peer reviews (Enzing e.a. 2002).  
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TABLE 8.1
Analysis Pharmaceutical Biotechnology System of Innovation : Learning regime 1 
SECTORAL INSTITUTIONS  Period     Period                                      
      late 1980’s- late 1990’s   late 1990’s – onwards 
Knowledge Base  
tacitness                                            high (search process)  high (search process) 
codification         high (product knowledge)                high (product knowledge) 
level of diffusion    high    high 
level of systemicness   low     medium-high 
- related  
biotechnologies 
- initial linkages to ICT 
rate of change    high    medium-high 
Appropriability conditions 
level     high    high 
means  publications, patents  publications, patents 
Opportunity conditions 
level      high    medium – high (niches)  
variety      high     medium 
source      technology    technology 
Competitive Conditions 
intensity     low     low 
dimensions    innovation   innovation 
Type of innovation 
knowledge/product/process  new knowledge   new knowledge, initial products
NETWORK INSTITUTIONS
Network structure    1a       1a  1b
-   size     multilateral             multilateral bilateral 
-   centrality     medium         medium  high 
-   density    high       high  low 
-   structural holes   low         low  high 
       -   cognitive distance   low     low  medium 
       -   entry     medium    medium  high 
Relational form    
       - formality    low-medium    low-medium high 
       - durability     medium-high   medium-high low 
       - intensity    high    high  low  
       - breadth of issues    medium    medium  low 
(continued on next page) 
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NETWORK INSTITUTIONS  
(continued) 
Governance of relational risk 
  1a      1a       1b 
-      strategic need    high        high 
-      structure of interests  converging    converging          parallel        
-      specific investments  high                                                  high          low  
-     governance strategy  contracts,             contracts,          contracts  
mutual self-interest,            mutual           (licences) 
network position   self-interest, 
                                                         trust-in-intention   network-position,                                
    trust-in-intention 
-    coordinating    social coordination &         social coordination        
     mechanisms  & control, linking pins,   coordination&control,  
 information systems  linking pins, 
information systems 
ELEMENTS OF A LEARNING REGIME
- object of learning new scientific knowledge   new scientific knowledge  
- learning process expansive search & exploration expansive search & exploration 
- actors scientists and DBF’s   scientists and DBF’s  
- input  research skills &    research skills & scientific  
scientific knowledge  knowledge 
- output                                                         new scientific knowledge  new scientific knowledge  
- spill-overs   
- outside-in                 low               high    
- within network    high (tacit knowledge on search)           high  (low with weak ties)                  
- inside-out    high (codified knowledge)           high  
freeridership    low              low                 
hold-up      high              high (low with weak ties) 
LEARNING OUTCOMES
Main outcome                 new knowledge on  general           new knowledge on  general 
                                                        platform technologies             platform technologies  
 level of newness    new to world             new to the world 
 elements of newness   new scientific insights            new scientific insights  
- Relational Risk  
- Governance 
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8.4.2   From the late 1990’s and onwards  
Towards the end of the 1990’s platform technologies increasingly became more 
multidisciplinary in nature and entailed varying combinations of disciplines. Examples of 
such systemic platform technologies are DNA chips, rDNA arrays, proteomic analysis 
combining electrophoresis and NMR, genomic sequencing  (Janszen and Degenaars 1996, 
Enzing 2000). In addition, combinations with software and micro-electronics started to 
develop that accommodate for miniaturisation, automation and data-mining. This was also 
reflected in a growth of the number of patents with multiple assignees, especially over the 2nd
half of the 1990’s (Allansdottir e.a. 2001). In this respect opportunities increased, which was 
also reflected by the fact that the number of entrants further accelerated to 22 in 2000 
(Biopartner 2001), providing further substance to the Dutch pharmaceutical biotechnology 
SIS.  
Based on a recent survey held in spring of 200359,  there are approximately 110 DBF’s in the 
Netherlands that are specialised in pharmaceutical biotechnology. Of these 110 firms approx. 
38 % (42 firms) employ activities that entail both R&D and production whereas approx. 27 % 
(30 firms) also operate, next to their own R&D and production, as subcontractors to others by 
offering contract research services. Moreover, approx. 21% (23 firms) are fully dedicated to 
R&D with no other activities (Enzing e.a 2003). Overall, this makes that approx. 78% (86 
firms) that are active in the field of pharmaceutical biotechnology are active in R&D.  
Of these 86 Dutch DBF’s that are active in pharmaceutical biotechnological R&D between 70 
- 80% (60-69 firms) have indicated to work closely together with a university or a semi-public 
research institute. Approx. 36% of the mentioned universities and research institutes are based 
in the Netherlands, with universities in Wageningen, Groningen, Utrecht, Leiden and 
Nijmegen most frequently mentioned.60 The focus of this cooperation is on scientific research, 
developing new research techniques and/or on preclinical trials. Cooperation is mainly formed 
by means of joint projects to which the involved parties contribute through bringing in (a 
combination of) finance, specific knowledge or specialised researchers (Enzing e.a. 2003).  
Due to the mainly monodisciplinary orientation of their academic partners in this learning 
regime 1, DBF’s have also actively started to search and access complementary (scientific) 
59 Enzing, C.M., S. Kern and A. v.d. Giessen, 2003, R&D samenwerking door de Nederlanse biotechnologie 
industrie: uitkomsten van een survey, TNO-STB rapport, Delft, juni 2003 
60 The importance of physical closeness in this learning regime is certainly not a particular trait of the Dutch 
situation, but a common phenomenon in other countries as well. See for example an insightful study of the 
biotech-regions in Sweden and Ohio (Carlsson 2002) or for Southern-Germany and Cambridge (UK) (Casper 
1999).
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knowledge, wherever it was located. As a result these dense networks of strong ties between 
universities and DBF’s were opening up to complementary, outside sources of knowledge. 
Such outside sources were formed by universities, research institutes and other networks 
outside the Netherlands, either at various locations in Europe or in the US. Next to Dutch 
partners also universities and research institutes in the US (18%), the UK (6%) and Germany 
(4%) are mentioned61 (Enzing e.a. 2003). Because this knowledge at universities and research 
institutes was codified, it was easily accessible and transferable by means of publications or 
Internet (Ernst and Young 2000). Especially the use of Internet enabled DBF’s to share 
information with anyone around the globe and to access public databases with state-of-the-art 
(scientific) knowledge. These relations relied much less on geographical proximity and could 
take place over (very) long distances (van Geenhuizen and van de Knaap 1997). So, these 
more virtual linkages with weak ties created a non-dense network that was complementary to 
these dense research networks. The relations in the former were generally of low strength in 
terms of duration, frequency and entailed a limited set of specific technological issues (Enzing 
and Kern 2002). See also again table 8.1. 
Governance and coordination of these relations took place in various forms such as licenses, 
technology partnerships or by research contracts with scientific organisations. This also 
explained the large inflows of knowledge from US-based licences into the Netherlands 
(Degenaars and Janszen 1996, Enzing e.a. 2003). 
8.5  Learning regime 2 : technological exploitation and business exploration 
The ‘techno-economic face’ of the dual selection environment (see figure 8.1 again) was 
concerned with the exploration of new products, more than with new knowledge (Janszen and 
Degenaars 1996, Ernst and Young 1999). This meant that learning regime 2 was embedded in 
a network made up of relations between DBF’s and large pharma firms. The rationales 
underlying this network were as follows. Large pharma-firms needed to keep up to date with a 
rapidly changing knowledge base which was also diverse and systemic as it was built up of 
various disciplines. At the same time, opportunities pertained to niches and were also diffuse 
making it difficult to decide for pharma firms in which fields of knowledge to invest and 
which to ignore (Ernst and Young 2000, 2001 (2)). Therefore, large pharma-firms made use 
of alliances with various small DBF’s which enabled them to explore various opportunities at 
61 The remaining 36% is divided over France (3%), Belgium (3%), rest of Europe (5%), rest of world (2%) and 
unknown (23%). 
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the same time, without making substantial specific investments. The attractive but diffuse 
nature of opportunities and the fact that knowledge was highly specific to these DBF’s meant 
that the network structure was made up of mainly bilateral relations between large pharma-
firms and DBF’s. For these DBF’s a core performance-yardstick is ‘time-to-patent’ (Ernst and 
Young 1999). Again we distinguish between the two same periods, namely one period from 
the late 1980 towards the late 1990’s (paragraph 8.5.1) and a second period from the late 
1990’s onwards (paragraph 8.5.2). 
8.5.1   From the late 1980’s towards the late 1990’s 
In contrast with learning regime 1 in this period, selection in this 2nd learning regime stemmed 
more from the nature of the opportunity conditions, although the knowledge base still played 
its part. This combination of attractive, diffuse opportunity conditions and a rapidly changing 
knowledge base  required diversity in search spaces. As a result, a network structure emerged 
that combined a variety of decentralised approaches with the ability to coordinate this 
diversity in a fairly light way. So, in this learning regime the need for diversity stemmed  from 
a combination of opportunity conditions and knowledge base.  
This network structure also explains why in most cases DBF’s did not cooperate closely 
together when they were already cooperating with a large pharma-firm. To interact directly 
with one another would require specific cognitive investments from the involved DBF’s. 
Engaging in such investments was only rational when there were evident opportunities to do 
so. The stand-alone nature of knowledge in this period did not provide such a rationale as 
potential linkages between various technological areas were largely absent or difficult to 
define upfront (Janszen and Degenaars 1996). As a consequence, spill-overs between DBF’s 
were very limited (Ministerie EZ 1998, Senker 1998). See also table 8.2 on the next two 
pages. 
An important governance instrument in this network was formed by research contracts, 
possibly complemented by minority equity arrangements (Ernst and Young 1999, Enzing 
2000 (2) ). These contracts regulated contract research, contract manufacturing, custom 
synthesis, development, sequencing, testing, software design and so on. These contracts 
aimed to provide some duration to the relationship and to assure the DBF with sufficient 
resources (especially money) to do research. In general, these contracts wee being evaluated 
every 2 to 3 years (Ministerie EZ 1998). 
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TABLE 8.2
Analysis Pharmaceutical Biotechnology System of Innovation : Learning regime 2
SECTORAL INSTITUTIONS  Period      Period                                      
      late 1980’s- late 1990’s    late 1990’s – onwards 
Knowledge Base  
tacitness                                            high     high  
codification         high                   high 
level of diffusion    medium    medium-high 
level of systemicness medium    high 
- related  technologies  - related technologies 
- initial linkages to ICT  - clear linkages to ICT 
rate of change    medium-high   high 
Appropriability conditions 
level     medium    medium  
means  patents, compementary  patents, complementary 
               assets    assets           
Opportunity conditions 
level      medium (niches)    medium (standard platforms) 
 high (advanced platforms) 
variety      high     low-medium (standard platforms) 
 high (advanced platforms) 
source      technology, demand  technology, demand 
Competitive Conditions 
intensity     low     medium-high  
dimensions    innovation   costs, flexibility,  
         innovation 
Type of innovation 
knowledge/product/process  products    products    
NETWORK INSTITUTIONS
Network structure     
-   size     bilateral           multilateral 
-   centrality     high      medium 
-   density    low     medium 
-   structural holes   high     medium 
       -   cognitive distance   high     medium  
       -   entry     medium    medium      
Relational form    
       - formality    high    medium-high 
       - durability     medium    medium 
       - intensity    low    low-medium 
       - breadth of issues   low    low-medium 




Governance of relational risk  
- Relational Risk 
- strategic need    high    high 
-      structure of interests  diverging    diverging-parallel 
-      specific investments  high from DBF               high from DBf                       
low  from pharma firm                    low-medium
- Governance
-     governance strategy  contracts, network-position,  contracts, network-position 
trust-in-competence  trust-in-competence 
-    coordinating    licenses,  incentive systems,  licenses, incentive systems, 
             mechanisms   selection systems   selection systems 
ELEMENTS OF A LEARNING REGIME
- object of learning  new technological platforms new technological platforms  
     & derived products 
- learning process ‘division of labour’  ‘division of labour’ ; direct   
 interaction between DBF’s 
- actors pharma firms and DBF’s   pharma firms and DBF’s  
- input  research skills and knowledge  research skills and knowledge 
on potential applications  on potential applications 
- output                                                         new technological  new technological platforms 
platforms  
- spill-overs   
- outside-in                high (from academia)  high (from academia) 
- within network    low    low  
- inside-out  high (through variety of  high (through variety of 
applications)   applications)         
freeridership    medium-high (from side   medium (from side of large 
of large pharma firm)   pharma firm)             
hold-up      high (from side of DBF)   high (from side of DBF) 
LEARNING OUTCOMES
Main outcome    new knowledge on  general new general platform 
                                                        platform technologies   technology 
 level of newness    new to world   new to the world 
 elements of newness   new customer function  new customer function   
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The case of general platform technologies now raises some interesting questions such as: why 
were contracts such an important coordinating mechanism in a context with a strong focus on 
exploration? How were these contracts monitored given the high rate of change? And how did 
the cognitive distance between large pharma firms and DBF’s affect the need for specific, 
cognitive investments?  
In essence, the contract regulated a relatively arms-length relationship between two parties. A 
DBF devoted a lion’s share of its resources to explore a specific technological field and to 
which the large pharma firm contributed by financial resources. From the viewpoint of a large 
pharma firm, it was basically subcontracting research to a DBF and its interest mainly entailed 
the codified knowledge as an outcome of this search process, not so much this process itself. 
This was an important point: although the cognitive distance with its existing knowledge base 
of organic chemistry was fairly large, a pharma firm did not need to engage in specific, 
cognitive investments (such as mastering all of these tacit competences and search routines) 
nor in the build-up of trust. This also explained the possibility of cooperating without the need 
of being physically close. The absence of such social coordination mechanisms then made 
contracts a rational choice. However, its value was not so much in providing the possibility of 
recouping specific investments (as these were fairly limited) or in providing a detailed 
prescription of how things should be done. Its value was mainly in regulating between a large 
pharma firm contributing to the costs of doing research, manufacturing and so on, in return for 
the ‘first-right-of-refusal’. This entailed the rights to have first, exclusive access to the results 
upon which he could decide whether to use these or not. Note that this type of arrangement 
connected with the network structure that combined a variety of decentralised approaches 
with fairly light coordination. 
The fact that  knowledge as an outcome of the search process was highly codified explained 
why contracts could be used in the field of general platform technologies (and in 
biotechnology in general) as it made it possible to directly assess the amount of progress 
being made. Still, the high rate of change explained the importance of evaluation on a regular 
basis. Depending on the outcome of such an evaluation the contractual relation was durable 
up to the point that opportunities proved to be viable. If not, relations terminated and parties 
separated. This easy break-up was possible due to the fact that specific, cognitive investments 
were limited and trust-in-intention was not a key coordinating mechanism. If parties needed to 
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engage in such investments in order to grow closer in terms of cognition and trust-in-
intention, this would create an inclination to continue the relationship. 
8.5.2   From the late 1990’s and onwards 
At the end of the 1990’s, the appropriability conditions were starting to change for DBF’s in 
the field of general platform technologies. Increasingly knowledge on these technologies 
diffused on a wider scale, such as DNA-cloning or purification techniques (Ministerie EZ 
1998). Compared with therapeutic applications, margins became lower and competition 
increased (Ernst and Young 2000).. This enabled large pharma firms to command lower 
prices. To escape from this growing cost pressure DBF’s, both existing ones and new start-
ups, moved into new and more advanced fields of knowledge such as for example functional 
genomics that enabled to create more advanced platforms (Senker 1998). It also forced DBF’s 
to think about alternatives for large pharma firms. One alternative remained to pursue a stand-
alone strategy in the market for therapeutics with potentially high margins but with the 
disadvantage of enormous costs and risks. Therefore, a more viable alternative was emerging 
that consisted of a hybrid model using elements of both. The general idea was to first develop 
a strong position around a sophisticated technology platform that generated cash-flow through 
licensing fees. These initial revenue streams then opened up possibilities to collaborate with 
other DBF’s in order to develop products based on this technology platform and aimed at 
larger, more profitable markets (Senker and van Zwanenberg 2001, Enzing and Kern 2002). 
An example were genomics firms that, through contract research, develop genetic libraries 
based on which they (aspire to) develop potential therapeutics. Some of these products were 
much more niche-oriented and highly customised to specific diseases, a world-apart from the 
one-size-fits-all character of most blockbuster drugs of large pharma firms (Pisano 2002). 
Such niches generally did not appeal to large pharma firms but were potentially highly 
attractive to DBF’s that could benefit from a more favourable cost structure. So, opportunities 
seemed to be changing in favour of DBF’s. This was also indicated by the fact that some of 
them had been able to command deals with pharma firms at more favourable terms such as 
profit-sharing, co-promotion or full commercialisation. In addition, to explore this hybrid 
business model, DBF’s increasingly cooperated with other DBF’s instead of large pharma 
firms (PWC 1999, Enzing e.a. 2002). As a result, the proportion of collaborative relationships 
and alliances between DBF’s increased vis-à-vis alliances between DBF’s with large pharma 
firms and made the distinction between platform vs. product-based firms increasingly blurred. 
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This made the network structure in learning regime 2 more multilateral62 and increased its 
density (Enzing e.a. 2002). See also again table 8.2. 
Some reflections on the future
As analysed, until now large pharma firms have adopted the knowledge base on molecular 
biology in such a way that it enables them to maintain their existing position and business 
model. This business model can be described as a ‘one-size-fits-all model’ with a focus on the 
development of standard drugs that satisfy the average needs of a mass market. In line with  
this, pharma firms have set-up different kinds of standardized organisational routines, in 
production (economies of scale) as well as in marketing & sales (large sales forces, 
standardized distribution channels), all in order to sell high volumes of pills (Pisano 2002). In 
essence, the core of this model is to cure (symptoms of) diseases of patients, not to learn more 
about these patients (McKelvey & Orsenigo 2001). In this respect, the emerging development 
of genetic-based products that are more niche-oriented and highly customised to specific 
diseases and (small) groups of patients is a very interesting one. It opens up opportunities for 
more specialised DBF’s as currently being explored. It reflects a different kind of business 
model and requires other competences, not only technology-wise but also organisation-wise. 
Clearly this does not fit with the blockbuster-model of large pharma firms and it may turn out 
to be, and we can only speculate at this point, more competence-destroying for these 
incumbents than the technological revolution itself. It connects with our analysis along the 
Cycle of Knowledge in which we argued that, in order to be able to fully utilise the potential 
of the novel combinations, this requires a profound change in the total ‘script’ of the industry 
(Nooteboom 2000). From evolutionary theory we know that such ‘paradigm-shifts’ take time 
as new technologies do not immediately lead to economic growth, even after they have 
developed and diffused. As argued along the Cycle of Knowledge, this requires that the 
mismatch is overcome between on the one hand the vested interests and the institutional set-
up based on the old paradigm and, on the other hand, the unfolding script of the new 
paradigm. In other words, how the pharmaceutical biotechnology industry will move to 
consolidation and generalisation, in the Netherlands as well as elsewhere, remains an 
unanswered question at the moment. 
62 This is also reflected in patents which are increasingly assigned to multiple assignees (Allansdotir e.a. 2002). 
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8.6   Confronting hypotheses with empirical findings 
In this paragraph we discuss whether our formulated hypotheses are supported by our 
empirical analysis of the Dutch pharmaceutical biotechnology system of innovation. In line 
with the build-up of this chapter we first discuss the impact by the biotechnological revolution 
on the global pharmaceutical industry and based on that the emergence of learning regime 1 
(paragraph 8.6.1). Next we discuss learning regime 2 (paragraph 8.6.2). Finally, we draw 
some conclusions (paragraph 8.6.3).  See table 3 for an overview of our hypotheses. 
8.6.1   The biotechnological revolution 
As argued in paragraph 8.1, the biotechnological revolution has been largely global in nature 
(Henderson 1994). Therefore, to understand the impact of biotechnology in the Netherlands 
and the sectoral dynamics following from that, we have first started with an analysis of the 
profound changes in the pharmaceutical industry caused by the biotechnology revolution.  
Unlike other industries where technical change generally involved advancement in product 
technology or process technology, the first wave of molecular biology induced changes in the 
R&D process and affected existing methods of finding, synthesizing and selecting chemical 
compounds for therapeutic applications (Henderson and Cockburn 1996). Although in this 
first wave the core knowledge base remained firmly rooted in organic chemistry, this new 
knowledge base on biotechnology enabled chemists to take a more rational approach to the 
design of new drugs. So, the advent of molecular biology enabled pharmaceutical firms to 
further exploit the possibilities as provided by the existing knowledge base of organic 
chemistry. In terms of the Cycle of Knowledge, a movement from exploitation to the phase of 
differentiation that was formed by adjusting the existing R&D process to new inputs provided 
by molecular biology. This ongoing exploitation of the existing knowledge base of organic 
chemistry made its limitations increasingly visible. These limitations became especially 
manifest by the increasing number of existing patents by pharma companies that was expiring 
in combination with a lowering number of potential ‘blockbusters’ in the pipe-line. At the 
same time, a 2nd biotechnological revolution arrived, genetic engineering, which affected the 
drug discovery process in more profound ways. In terms of our Cycle of Knowledge, this 
second wave in the molecular biology revolution marked the transition from differentiation to 
the phase of reciprocation, as the cognitive distance with the knowledge base on organic 
chemistry was larger and provided the basis for a more in-depth understanding of the 
biological underpinnings of diseases. This opened up the possibility to define search spaces in 
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a more accurate manner. The random character of the search process still remained intact but 
could now be dealt with a more structured way. So, a new knowledge base developed and 
new organisational forms started to emerge, such as R&D-alliances between specialised 
research firms and large pharma firms, replacing the existing model of stand-alone, in-house 
R&D. This provides support for hypothesis 5a and 5b that from differentiation to 
reciprocation the insights into the limits of the existing knowledge base strongly affect 3rd
level institutions and 2nd level institutions of the institutional environment (hypothesis 5a), 
and that the dominant organisational form opens up to towards outside sources of knowledge, 
resulting in a hybrid structure of strong and weak ties (hypothesis 5b).  
In the Netherlands these profound, global changes have resulted in the emergence of a 
pharmaceutical biotechnology system from the mid 1980’s and onwards. As analysed in 
paragraph 8.4, this lead to learning regime 1 that was mainly the domain of public research 
institutes and a few DBF’s. In the first period that we analysed, between the mid 1980’s and 
the late 1990’s, the main focus of this learning regime was on scientific research. Although 
codified knowledge through publications by researchers in other countries were used as an 
input to this search process, explicit relations with such weak ties were mostly absent as can 
be noted from the fact that most patents were assigned to inventors from within the 
Netherlands. In addition, there was a very limited focus on possibilities for a rapid 
commercialisation of this knowledge that could be noted from the limited number of relations 
with pharma firms such as Akzo Nobel, Solvay or foreign firms. This provides support for 
hypothesis 2a and 2b that feedback by outcomes of an exploration-oriented learning regime 
mainly affects the development of a new knowledge base, and that this process takes place in 
allopatric speciation, in a niche outside the existing institutional selection environment. This 
niche did not only lie outside the selection environment formed by large pharma firms but was 
also, to some extent, away from other exploration networks in foreign countries as most 
patents were assigned to Dutch inventors only. 
So learning regime 1, as it developed throughout the first period from the mid 1980’s towards 
the mid-late 1990’s, focused specifically on the development of an in-depth understanding of  
stand-alone, science-based knowledge. The output consisted of codified knowledge in terms 
of publications and patents. This was a well-defined, stable output creating stability on the 
output-side of this learning regime. As analysed, the search process entailed many elements 
that were difficult to codify such as test set-up, accurate execution, interpretation of test 
results, reformulation of hypotheses and so on. Uncertainty did not stem so much from the 
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output-side but from complexity of the search process. This search process was embedded in 
dense relations of fairly high durability with frequent interaction in mutual openness on 
mainly search-related and technological issues. In order to deal with this complexity a dense 
network of strong ties emerged, coordinated by a combination of contracts, mutual self-
interest and social mechanisms such as peer control and review. These findings of the first 
period of learning regime 1 do not provide support for hypothesis 1 and hypothesis 8a that in 
exploration the institutional environment will select a dense network of strong and weak ties. 
The explanation for this is that in this first period the main focus was on scientific research 
only. As analysed, the exploration of such a science-based and stand-alone knowledge base 
created a highly tacit search process that entailed specific knowledge on a limited set of 
complex issues. The dense structure of strong ties functioned as a repository for this tacit 
knowledge and enabled critical peer reviews. This connects with findings in the literature that 
a dense network of strong ties generally facilitates an easy transfer and diffusion of such tacit 
and specific knowledge in view of developing an in-depth understanding of  complex issues 
(Rowley e.a. 2000, Coriat and Weinstein 2001).63
At the end of this first period and especially in the second period from the late 1990’s and 
onwards, the growing need for more systemic knowledge as articulated in learning regime 2 
implied a substantial change in the 2nd level of the institutional environment of learning 
regime 1. This meant that this dense network of strong ties of learning regime 1 opened up to 
complementary sources of knowledge, held by weak ties at other locations. This does provide 
support for hypothesis 1 and 8a of an increasing need for weak ties when change becomes 
more radical (hypothesis 1), resulting in a dense structure of strong and weak ties as the 
dominant mode of organization in exploration (hypothesis 8a). Access to these weak ties 
made it possible to create the required diversity at the input-side of this learning regime, i.e. 
diversity in sources of knowledge. As analysed, these weak ties were coordinated through 
licences that made it possible to access and use this distant, codified knowledge without the 
need for the substantial specific cognitive investments and the build-up of trust. This is in 
contrast with hypothesis 8b predicting that in such exploration-oriented networks 
coordination takes place through informal mechanisms such as transfer-of-reputation, trust-in-
competence and mutual self-interest. The explanation for this is that knowledge held by these 
63 This also connects with other findings in the literature such as Ouchi and Bolton (1988) and Grandori (1997) 
that in informational complex activities with a low observability of inputs and outputs and converging interests, 
firms will see cooperation as integrative without a need for extensive and formal safeguards. The identified 
combination of network s structure and governance strategy accommodated for the expansive and predominantly 
tacit search and exploration activities that characterized this learning regime.  
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weak ties at distant locations is highly codified through publications and patents. Its potential 
value can therefore readily be assessed given the generally high absorptive capacity present in 
the dense, local network. The high rate of change of knowledge meant that such distant 
sources of knowledge succeeded one another on a regular basis, which required constant 
monitoring for new potential sources. This relatively high turn-over of such weak ties was 
possible because the knowledge base was mainly stand-alone in nature. Substantial 
technological interdependencies were absent or weak, so that weak ties could be replaced 
without the risk of creating bottlenecks in adjacent technological areas. Based on our analysis 
of learning regime 1 throughout the two periods studied, hypothesis 9 could not be validated. 
In sum, a dense network of strong (local) ties to deal with complexity, additional relations 
with more distant weak ties to deal with variability. The dense, local relations made up the 
core of a network that provided stability needed to develop an in-depth understanding. This 
core was then surrounded by a periphery of relations with outside actors with varying levels 
of entry/exit and durability that were needed in view of the required diversity in inputs 
(diversity in sources of knowledge). The value of this knowledge that originated from these 
outside sources was then assessed by the core members in the center of the network. So, the 
locus of diversity of knowledge was in the periphery of the network whereas selection took 
place in the core of the network. This combination of ties and regular change in membership 
by weak ties created a stable and loosely coupled configuration in which novelty originated 
from novel combinations of members.
In conclusion 
Our hypotheses describing the co-evolution of institutional environment and learning regimes 
are supported (2a, 2b, 5a and 5b). Our hypotheses describing how this general pattern then 
settled in network structures and governance strategies were partially supported. Our 
empirical findings support the use of weak ties to deal with radical change (hypothesis 1), 
creating a dense network of strong and weak ties as the dominant mode of organization in 
exploration (hypothesis 8a). However, in contrast with hypothesis 8b, was the finding that 
relations with weak ties were coordinated by means of licences instead of informal 
mechanisms. Hypothesis 9 could not be validated. 
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8.6.2    Learning regime 2
As analysed in paragraph 8.5, learning regime 2 developed between large pharma firms and 
DBF’s. This network emerged due to a strong complementarity between large pharma 
companies and small specialised DBF’s, resulting in a clear division of labour: small firms 
conducted exploration for which the large firms formed the fundamental source of demand 
and provided the integrative capabilities that were required to transform the newly explored 
knowledge into commercial products. As we argued, this basically proved to be an effective 
way of solving the problem of combining exploration and exploitation by distributing these 
tasks in a network (Nooteboom 2000). In other words, from the viewpoint of a DBF this 
learning regime primarily dealt with exploitation, whereas from the viewpoint of the large 
pharma firm it primarily dealt with exploration. It is important to keep this duality in mind 
when interpreting our empirical findings on this learning regime.  
For the large pharma firm the combination of attractive but diffuse opportunities and a rapidly 
changing knowledge base created uncertainty at the output-side of the search process. This 
uncertainty can be decomposed in complexity and variability. To deal with complexity, a 
pharmaceutical firm contracted a DBF that explored in his distinct area of expertise in a 
relatively autonomous way, coordinated through a contract. In essence, the contract regulated 
a relatively arms-length relationship between both parties: a DBF devoted a lion’s share of its 
resources to explore a specific technological field and to which the large pharma firm mainly 
contributed  financial resources. To deal with variability in opportunities the central pharma 
firm followed two strategies. A first approach in the bilateral relation with a DBF was to 
evaluate these contracts on a regular basis. Depending on the outcome of such an evaluation 
the contractual relation was durable up to the point that opportunities proved to be viable. If 
not, relations were terminated and the parties separated. A second approach to handle 
variability was that large pharma firms contracted a number of DBF’s to deal with the diffuse 
opportunities. This resulted in a non-dense network in which the large pharma firm occupied a 
central position from where it maintained mainly bilateral relations with DBF’s, some of 
which were disposed of after some time and replaced by others.  
This network structure enabled a large pharma firm to combine a diversity of decentralised 
approaches with the ability to coordinate this diversity in a fairly light way. These findings 
provide support for hypothesis 1 that when change in 2nd level institutions becomes more 
radical, there is an increasing need for weak ties to deal with this change. The radicalness of 
this change basically refers to the large cognitive distance between the existing knowledge 
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base on organic chemistry and the new knowledge base on molecular biology and genetic 
engineering. DBF’s formed these weak ties by specialising in research around this new 
knowledge base. The only way to have these DBF’s come up with potentially valuable 
knowledge then was to let them explore ‘far away’ from the large in-house laboratories of 
mainly organic chemists. In this respect, these findings also provide support for hypothesis 2b 
that for a large pharma firm, novelty from these decentralised search approaches originated in 
allopatric speciation, outside the existing selection environment formed by traditional R&D-
departments.
So, the bilateral relations between the central pharma firm and DBF’s created a non-dense 
network structure made up of relations that were of limited strength and mainly coordinated 
through contracts (see also table 2). When taking the exploration-perspective of a large 
pharma firm, this is in contrast with hypothesis 8a and 8b, predicting that in exploration a 
dense network of strong and weak ties will be selected as the dominant mode of organization. 
When taking the exploitation-perspective of a DBF though, these findings provide support for 
hypothesis 4b that in consolidation the increasing selection by 3rd level institutions becomes 
manifest by an emerging dominant network form that enables a division of labour. In 
addition, these findings provide partial support for hypothesis 6a that predicts that in 
exploitation non-dense networks are selected, made up of relations that are strong in duration 
and frequency of contacts and show less strength in terms of mutual openness and breadth of 
issues covered; this is the case in this network except for frequency of contacts that is lower 
than predicted. In addition, support is also found for hypothesis 6b that in exploitation formal 
coordination mechanisms are selected such as contracts and formal control mechanisms, 
eventually complemented by more informal instruments.  
In sum, a network composed of a central firm that was surrounded by various weak ties to 
deal with complexity and variability in the exploration of opportunities. This combination of 
ties created a non-dense and stable configuration of novel combinations of members that 
cooperated in a division of labour. The diffuse nature of these mostly unrelated opportunities 
required that the locus of diversity in terms of exploring opportunities was at the periphery of 
the network whereas selection took place in the core of the network by the central firm; new 
knowledge was explored by DBF’s, the value of which being assessed by the core firm in the 
centre of the network.
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In conclusion 
A key-characteristic of learning regime 2 was the duality of exploration and exploitation. 
Following our empirical analysis in paragraph 8.5 and the confrontation with our hypotheses 
above, to understand the specificities of this learning regime requires the joint consideration 
of an exploration-perspective and an exploitation-perspective.  
8.6.3   Conclusions 
The analysis of the impact of the biotechnological revolution on the global pharmaceutical 
industry confirm our hypotheses that describe the general pattern of co-evolution between 
institutional environment and learning regimes, when moving from exploitation to 
exploration. In this respect, our analysis along the ‘left part’ of the Cycle of Knowledge, 
towards exploration, holds. As argued, it is too early in the development of this industry to be 
able to assess in how far the ‘right part’, towards exploitation, also applies in pharmaceutical 
biotechnology in the Netherlands or elsewhere. In addition, we found evidence that novelty 
originates in allopatric speciation, in a niche outside the existing selection environment. In 
learning regime 1 this niche did not only lie outside the selection environment formed by 
large pharma firms but was also, to some extent, away from other exploration networks in 
other countries. In learning regime 2 this niche was created by DBF’s exploring without any 
substantial involvement from large, in-house laboratories of pharma firms. So, in this respect 
the general pattern of co-evolution between institutional environment and learning regimes 
could be identified.
Following table 8.3, our empirical findings give partial confirmation of our hypotheses that 
describe how this general pattern of co-evolution settled in network structures and 
coordination mechanisms. We found clear evidence that weak ties as providers of new 
knowledge are needed when change becomes more radical. The opening up of the dense 
network of strong ties in learning regime 1 towards distant sources of codified knowledge was 
needed as a response to the increasing need for systemic solutions as articulated by learning 
regime 2. This resulted in a dense network of strong (local) ties to deal with complexity and 




Learning regime 1 Learning regime 2 
Hypothesis 1 0 / + + 
Hypothesis 2a + + 









Hypothesis 8a 0 / + - 
Hypothesis 8b - - 
Hypothesis 9 (could not be validated) (could not be validated)
Clarification 
+ : support 
0  : partial support 
-  : no support
Table 8.3  :  Overview of outcomes from confrontation of hypotheses and empirical  
                        findings for pharmaceutical biotechnology  
This combination of ties and regular change in membership by weak ties created a stable 
configuration in which novelty originated from novel combinations of members.
The need to deal with radical change for large pharma firms originated from the large 
cognitive distance with the new knowledge base on biotechnology in learning regime 2. This 
resulted in a network composed of a central actor that was surrounded by various weak ties, 
some of which were incidentally disposed of and replaced. This combination of ties created a 
non-dense and stable configuration in which novelty also originated from novel combinations 
of members.
Our findings did not provide support for our hypotheses predicting that in exploration a dense 
network of strong and weak ties was selected and that was predominantly coordinated through 
informal mechanisms. In learning regime 1 the relations with weak ties at distant locations 
were mainly coordinated through licenses. In learning regime 2 we found a non-dense 
network of low strength relations with DBF’s, mainly coordinated through contracts. The 
reason for both these contrasting findings lies in the highly codified nature of knowledge, as 
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an outcome of the search process. Codified knowledge, even at distant locations, can indeed 
be accessed fairly easily and, when of potential value, be absorbed by means of a license 
agreement or a contract. In other words, the codified nature of knowledge means that the 
‘knowledge absorbing party’ does not need to be directly involved in the search process but 
merely needs to engage in a once-off transaction. In this respect, a license or a contract makes 
it possible to delegate away the tacit complexities of the exploration and search process. This 
deviates from our analysis and discussion in chapter 4, in which we analysed the co-
evolutionary process. We argued that in exploration knowledge is primarily tacit with ample 
uncertainty and informal coordination mechanisms. In exploitation we argued that knowledge 
is more codified within a context of stability and more formal coordination mechanisms. In 
this case of exploration however, knowledge as an outcome of a search process is highly 
codified, meaning that contracts can be used. As analysed, these contracts were needed to 
provide sufficient duration to the relation with a DBF’s. Our counter-argument made in 
chapter 3 that contracts are undesirable in exploration, as they would signal distrust when 
specifying all possible unforeseen contingencies, does not apply in this respect. The division 
of labour between pharma firms and DBF’s and the transaction nature of their relation meant 
that there was no or only a limited need for specific investments and the build of trust. So, it 
made sense to coordinate the transactions of codified knowledge in learning regime 1 and 
learning regime 2 through contracts.  
In other words, both learning regimes provide a case that deviates from our theoretical 
analysis made in earlier chapters. On the one hand, there are characteristics of exploration as 
there is ample uncertainty on search directions and methods, on the other hand, knowledge is 
highly codified, which is a key characteristic of exploitation. Clearly, our theory has provided 
us with archetypes and had not foreseen the possibility of hybrid forms between these 
archetypes. The case of pharmaceutical biotechnology shows the possibility of such a hybrid  
structure between exploration and exploitation, a structure that can only be understood by the 
joint consideration of both perspectives.
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9.    Conclusions 
9.1   Introduction
In this chapter we will formulate the main conclusions of our research. To do so, we will first 
discuss the extent to which our theoretical analysis as made in the chapters 2 to 5 holds after 
having tested it empirically in chapters 7 and 8. In other words, what can we say about the 
tenability of our theoretical framework and hypotheses and are there also some novel 
insights? This will be the subject of paragraph 9.2. Next we will discuss in paragraph 9.3 the 
differences that we have observed empirically in network structures and their main forms of 
coordination between multimedia and pharmaceutical biotechnology. In paragraph 9.4, we 
pick up the issue of external validity as discussed in chapter 6 on our methodology and reflect 
on our research by discussing the generalisability of its main outcomes. Finally, in paragraph 
9.5, we discuss the main results and the limits of our research. 
9.2   Tenability of our theory and some novel insights 
In chapter 2 we introduced a nested view of the institutional environment, consisting of 1st-
level, 2nd-level and 3rd-level institutions and a level of institutionalised behaviour, referred to 
as a learning regime. We have considered 1st-level institutions as exogenous and have further 
focused on the dynamic relation between 2nd-level and 3rd-level institutions on the one hand 
and a learning regime on the other hand. To understand this dynamic relation we analysed in 
chapter 4, based on the Cycle of Knowledge, how these 2nd-level and 3rd-level institutions co-
evolve with the embedded learning regime: how changes in the institutional environment 
affect a learning regime and how outcomes of a learning regime can also affect the 
institutional environment. In chapter 5 we discussed the implications of this co-evolutionary 
process for firms with regard to the configuration of networks, the properties of interfirm 
relations and coordination mechanisms. 
As discussed in chapters 7 and 8, our case-studies have indicated that the general pattern of 
co-evolution, both when technology-oriented and when business-oriented, is adequately 
captured by the ‘dialectic’ of the Cycle of Knowledge. In consolidation, selection by 2nd level 
institutions such as the knowledge base and demand is strong. Towards generalisation, 
selection by 3rd level institutions increases and manifests itself by an emerging dominant 
organisational form that enables a division of labour, whereas in the phase of exploitation 
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there is a strong selection by the existing institutional environment with limited feedback by 
outcomes of a learning regime. From differentiation to reciprocation, insights into the limits 
of the existing knowledge base strongly affect the 3rd level and 2nd level of the institutional 
environment. The dominant organisational form opens up towards outside sources of 
knowledge, which results into a hybrid structure of strong and weak ties. 
From the confrontation between our hypotheses and our empirical findings in chapter 7 and 8, 
we can conclude that our case-studies support this general pattern of co-evolution. However, 
our empirical findings do not fully support our hypotheses on how this co-evolutionary 
process settles in network structures, relational properties and coordination mechanisms. This 
is an important conclusion. Our research aim was to determine how the institutional 
environment of a SIS conditions interfirm learning, how outcomes of interfirm learning may 
affect the institutional environment, and in how far this varies per type of SIS. As we argued, 
we are interested in which elements of this co-evolutionary process are more SIS-generic and 
which elements are more SIS-specific. We can now conclude that a general pattern of co-
evolution between 2nd level institutions and learning regimes can be identified. Our empirical 
findings have indicated that this co-evolutionary process is present in different SIS’s and in 
different parts of a SIS. How this pattern settles in 3rd-level institutions is specific to the 
institutional set-up within a SIS or within different parts of a SIS. Hence at the sectoral level a 
general pattern of co-evolution can be identified, how this settles at the network level is 
specific to the institutional set-up within a SIS. Following this conclusion, it is important to 
understand in more detail these specificities of 3rd level institutions and the implications for 
the level of fit of the network structure, relational properties and coordination mechanisms 
with the 2nd level of the institutional environment. This will be analysed more in-depth in 
paragraph 9.3.  
Our empirical findings on multimedia and pharmaceutical biotechnology have also generated 
some novel insights. One such novel insight is formed by the case of publishers in 
multimedia. As analysed in chapter 7, the ‘technology side’ of the multimedia SIS has 
consolidated and has subsequently sought applications in all kinds of directions 
(generalisation). In this respect, a new context was provided for various established industries 
(differentiation) and in this way induced a search process for business opportunities. In our 
analysis along the Cycle of Knowledge, we conjectured that firms in an exploitation setting 
actively and deliberately pursue the transition towards differentiation, for example through 
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exporting or diversification to related markets. The case of publishers has informed us that 
application in a novel context can also be forced from outside, from a defensive need not to 
‘miss the boat’.
Another novel insight relates to our notion of allopatric speciation. As discussed in chapter 7 
and 8, exploration in both multimedia and pharmaceutical biotechnology took place in 
allopatric speciation, in a niche outside the existing selection environment. But we found 
some clear differences in how this niche was secluded from the existing selection 
environment. In multimedia we found one type that was formed by exploration through new 
entrants that were complete outsiders with no relevant antecedents in the industry whatsoever. 
The other type was formed by existing firms that explored at the periphery of their 
organisation. Although we can classify this second type as a weaker form of the first type, 
both were secluded cognitively but not geographically. In both cases, firms maintained (some 
level of) contact and access to knowledge developed outside the Netherlands. In 
pharmaceutical biotechnology we found that this niche was not only secluded cognitively, by 
operating outside the selection environment formed by large pharma firms but also, initially, 
geographically. When learning regime 1 emerged at the end of the 1980’s and early 1990’s, it 
was strongly locally embedded, away from other exploration networks in foreign countries, as 
can be noted from the fact that in this period most patents were assigned to Dutch inventors 
only.  
Another novel insight is the possibility of hybrid structures between exploration and 
exploitation. Clearly, in our theoretical analysis we have generated two archetypes, one for 
exploration and one for exploitation. However, our theory has not foreseen in the possibility 
of a hybrid structure between these two archetypes. Learning regime 2 in pharmaceutical 
biotechnology informs us on the possibility of such a hybrid structure as it shows a non-dense 
structure with contracts as its main coordination mechanisms as an effective manner for 
exploration, instead of a dense structure coordinated by mainly informal mechanisms as we 
expected. This finding again points to the fact that sectoral specificities profoundly affect 
network structures, relational properties and coordination mechanisms. As said, this will be 
now dealt with in more detail in paragraph 9.3 
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9.3               Comparing networks in multimedia and pharmaceutical biotechnology
As concluded in paragraph 9.2, how the general pattern of co-evolution between 2nd level 
institutions and learning regimes settles in 3rd-level institutions is specific to the institutional 
set-up within a SIS. This is an important conclusion and it connects with our argument 
advanced in chapter 5 that optimality of the network structure is liable to be a function of the 
context in which it is embedded. To differentiate between contexts we made the distinction 
between exploration and exploitation. Based on our empirical analysis of multimedia and 
biotechnology we can now conclude that this distinction is too general. Our empirical findings 
on networks in both SIS’s show that there is a strong sectoral effect that determines which 
specific combination of network structure, relational properties and coordination mechanisms 
is selected. Even within the same SIS, there can exist substantial differences between 
networks as could be observed from the various learning regimes being embedded in different 
institutional environments within the same SIS. Therefore, in this paragraph we will analyse 
how optimality of the network structure varies with different contexts. To do so, we first 
introduce a general typology of networks and then relate this to the distinction between 
organising for exploration and organising for exploitation (paragraph 9.3.1). Based on that we 
apply this typology and our notions on organising to the various networks in multimedia and 
biotechnology (paragraph 9.3.2). Finally we draw some conclusions (paragraph 9.3.3).  
9.3.1   A typology of networks 
In chapter 5 (paragraph 5.2) we argued that to develop a more in-depth understanding of 
networks from a learning and innovation perspective, the joint consideration of density of ties 
and strength of ties is required. Density of ties is relevant as it indicates the potential for 
cognitive variety, the strength of ties is relevant as it indicates the potential to cross the 
cognitive distance that is present in this variety. Based on this joint consideration of density 
and strength of ties we propose differentiating between four archetypes of networks, namely:
LOW DENSITY HIGH DENSITY 
LOW STRENGTH 1 2 
HIGH STRENGTH 3 4 
Table 9.1 :   Four different types of networks based on density and strength of ties 
Our key-argument is that the optimality of any of these four archetypes of networks is 
dependent on the context in which the network is embedded. To further explore this we first 
turn to some widely accepted ideas on organisation. 
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In their seminal work ‘Organisation and Environment’, Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) argued 
that the two key-issues with regard to organisation are specialisation and integration: 
specialisation refers to differentiation in activities and who performs those activities, 
integration refers to how those activities are coordinated. These two key-issues have relevance 
when structuring a division of labour, both within organisations and between organisations, 
but only in a setting of exploitation. In exploitation the wide-spread presence of standards, 
norms, rules and so on mean that activities can be clearly identified, well-structured, divided 
into sub-parts for specialisation and subsequently be coordinated in view of integration. This 
distinction between specialisation and integration can be clearly identified in learning regime 
2 in multimedia with its focus on technological exploitation. Communication with the 
customer was done by a central firm which integrated the various technical issues that were 
being taken care of by specialised suppliers. These supplying firms only had direct ties when 
needed in view of the integration process. As analysed, this ‘dominant design’ in organisation 
consisted of a relatively non-dense network of ties that were durable with frequent interaction 
on specific issues in limited mutual openness. Hence this network largely coincides with 
archetype 3. In addition, this is also in line with hypothesis 7a that in exploitation non-dense 
networks are selected made up of ties that are strong in durability and frequency of contacts 
but show lower strength in terms of mutual openness and breadth of issues covered.  
However, this distinction between differentiation and integration  does not apply in a setting 
of exploration that is characterized by a shift-away from existing rules and norms and the 
break-up of old and creation of new routines and activities. One of the central arguments in 
our research is that such a setting requires variety-in-cognition. This makes the central task in 
exploration to manage this variety-in-cognition. Managing such variety then consists of two 
key-aspects, namely how to create variety-in-cognition and next how to coordinate this
variety in such a way that new insights are developed without falling prone to chaos. In other 
words, in exploration the key-question is not where to locate specialisation and where 
integration but where to locate diversity in the network, where to create selection and how to 
achieve a balance between them.  
9.3.2   Exploration networks in pharmaceutical biotechnology and multimedia 
Based on the discussion above in paragraph 9.2.1, we now further reflect on the exploration 
networks in multimedia and biotechnology by analysing where in these networks diversity 
and selection were located and how they were balanced.  
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Pharmaceutical biotechnology : searching & exploring 
In pharmaceutical biotechnology, the focus in learning regime 1 was on technological 
exploration with the main selection force stemming from the knowledge base. In this network 
variety-in-cognition was created at the input side of the search process through a non-dense 
periphery of low strength relations with outside actors with varying levels of entry/exit. This 
largely coincides with archetype 1. As analysed, the core was made up of a dense structure 
built up of relations of high strength that enabled to assess the value of this outside knowledge 
and as such functioned as a selection environment. This coincides with archetype 4. So, 
overall we observe a network structure that was made up of a combination of two types, 
namely: type 4 to deal with complexity and type 1 to deal with variability. It is this duality of  
the network structure that created a stable configuration in which selection and diversity 
operated in a balanced way and in which novelty originated from novel combinations of 
members.  
Learning regime 2 was characterized by a dual focus on exploration and exploitation. Variety-
in-cognition in the network in this learning regime was created through a non-dense network 
of relations with DBF’s that were rather strong in terms of durability but showed low strength 
in terms of frequency of contacts, mutual openness and breadth of issues covered.64 This 
largely coincides with archetype 1. As analysed, the core was made up of a central firm that 
through its exploitation focus could value the outcomes of these various search processes and 
as such functioned as a selection environment65. This combination of network structure and 
relational properties created a stable configuration that enabled selection and diversity to 
operate in a balanced way and in which novelty originated from novel combinations of 
members.  
64 One could now argue that there is specialisation in this network (in terms of Lawrence and Lorsch) as DBF’s 
are specialising through these decentralised exploration efforts. We argue though that this is not the case. As 
analysed, there is no need for these firms to have substantial interaction as they explore different and often 
unrelated opportunities. So, from a cognitive point of view there is no systematic coherence among these 
exploration activities and therefore no specialisation in terms of Lawrence and Lorsch’s argument; these authors 
focus on specialisation of related and interdependent activities because only then there is a need for integration. 
A second counter-argument is that the central firm does not integrate these decentralised activities but only 
selects them in view of exploitation. Were these decentralised exploration efforts cognitively interdependent, 
chances for overload at the core firm would increase as he would need to integrate them. That would require 
more substantial coordination from his side. However, as he ‘only’ selects,  this coordination is fairly light as can 
be noted from the fact that direct, operational involvement from his side is limited.  
65 Although a firm is clearly not a network, we could interpret a firm in terms of our typology as an example of a 
very dense network of relations of very high strength, which resembles in a way the dense network of strong 
relations of learning regime 1 in biotechnology  
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Multimedia : interactive learning 
The focus in learning regime 1 in multimedia was on technological exploration.  
As analysed, the complex search-process required a dense network structure with low 
centrality and a high number of new entrants. Ties were strong in terms of frequency of 
interaction that was fairly open on various issues but of fairly short duration. This 
combination of dimensions of tie strength les to the creation of variety-in-cognition through 
an easy recombination of ties. So, in this network novelty originated from novel 
configurations of members. This network showed characteristics of tie strength of archetype 2 
(short duration, fairly open) as well as of archetype 4 (frequent interaction, relative high 
breadth of issues). The presence of three ‘back-ground’ selection mechanisms complemented 
this network structure and prevented it from falling apart into chaos.  
In learning regime 3 the focus was on business exploration. As analysed, VC’s invested in 
various start-ups simultaneously, creating a network structure in which they occupied a 
central position. This combination of a central firm and peripheral start-ups engaging in 
exploration created a relatively non-dense network of ties that were strong in terms of 
frequency and openness but showed less strength in terms of durability and breadth of issues. 
So, a configuration in which novelty originated from novel combinations members.  This 
network largely coincided with archetype 1 and in this respect resembled the network in 
learning regime 2 in pharmaceutical biotechnology, in which a centrally positioned pharma 
firm selected among various decentralised exploration efforts by DBF’s. Unlike this network 
in biotechnology however, was the direct involvement in exploration by the centrally 
positioned VC. This made this network vulnerable as it created an absence of selection inside 
the network. With an additional lack of other ‘background’ selection forces or outside 
selection-forces such as e.g. demand this finally resulted into chaos. Figure 9.1 summarizes 
our discussion. 
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LOW DENSITY                                                                  HIGH DENSITY
LOW STRENGTH
HIGH STRENGTH
Biotechnology                         
Network periphery  
learning regime 1 
(weak in all 4 dimensions)
Biotechnology
Learning regime 2                                                         
(strong in duration)                                                                              
Multimedia                                                                      Multimedia
Figure 9.1 :  Positioning of networks in multimedia and biotechnology in network 
                      typology 
9.3.3               In conclusion  
In this paragraph we analysed how the optimality of the network structure varies with 
different contexts. Based on our empirical analyses of learning regimes in pharmaceutical 
biotechnology and multimedia we can draw the following conclusions. A network in 
exploitation generally favours archetype 3, a non-dense structure made up of strong ties. This 
enables a division of labour for which the key-question is where to locate specialisation and 
where integration. In an exploration network the key-question is where to locate diversity and 
where selection and how to achieve a balance between them. To further specify this we can 
differentiate between a context of exploring a systemic knowledge base and exploring a stand-
alone knowledge base. A systemic knowledge base selects for a dense, redundant network of 
relations that are strong in terms of frequency and openness but show low strength in terms of 
duration. This short duration of relations makes it possible to create diversity through novel 
configurations of members (hence an intermediate form between archetype 2 and 4). Selection 
 (strong in frequency and openness)                                                   (strong in frequency
                                                                                                              and openness)
Multimedia Biotechnology            
Learning regime 2                                                           Network core   
(strong in frequency, duration learning regime 1
  and openness)                                                                                    (strong in frequency,
                                                                                                              duration and openness)
Learning regime 3                                                          Learning regime 1        
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in these continuously changing configurations takes place based on some ‘background’ 
selection mechanisms. A stand-alone knowledge base selects for a network structure with 
diversity at its periphery, through a non-dense structure of low strength relations (archetype 
1), and selection in its center, through a dense structure made up of strong relations or a 
central firm (archetype 4). When selection mechanisms are absent, such a network becomes 
prone to chaos. 
9.4                  Generalisibility of conclusions 
One of the key methodological questions in any research is that of external validity, namely 
the extent to which the outcomes can be generalised to other contexts such as, in our research, 
to other industries or to other countries. This issue of external validity is the more important 
given our choice for longitudinal case-studies as our research method of which 
generalisability is not a particular strength. In this respect, we should differentiate between 
statistical generalisation and analytical generalisation. Statistical generalisation can be defined 
as the degree to which the research findings can be considered valid for all the research units 
in the general population, if only a part of this population is empirically researched. In the 
case of analytical generalisation a previously developed theory is used as a template with 
which to compare the empirical results of the conducted case studies with the aim to 
generalise these results to this broader theory (Yin 1994). Given our methodology as outlined 
in chapter 6, in this study we deal with analytical generalisation. The question now is in how 
far we can generalise from our case-studies. To address this we follow the distinction made by 
Groenewegen and Vromen (1996) between the relevance of conditions and relevance of 
issues. As argued by Groenewegen and Vromen, any theory gives a partial account, as ‘no 
single theory is thought to be able to give a complete account of some set of phenomena of its 
own’ (1996: 371). So, theories have value under certain conditions with regard to specific 
issues, which makes it important to be aware of those conditions and issues.
Relevance of conditions
In the context of our research, an important condition is the importance of knowledge. With 
the importance attached to knowledge comes the importance of learning and innovation. We 
have argued to ‘treat’ the knowledge base as a central, independent variable that explains the 
emergence of specific network structures, governance strategies and patterns in learning 
regimes, forming important dependent variables. This distinction between dependent and 
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independent variables applies when studying the structural conditioning phase of the co-
evolutionary process. When studying the structural elaboration phase of the co-evolutionary 
process, this distinction is reversed: outcomes of a learning regime become independent 
variables that affect the knowledge base making it a dependent variable. This change in 
distinction between independent and dependent variables is the methodological consequence 
that follows from our ontology as advanced in chapter 1 in which we argued that we adopt an 
endogenous view on both knowledge and learning. The criterion of internal validity has then 
led us to select two industries that are indeed highly ‘knowledge-intensive’, so that assumed 
causal relations between knowledge and learning behaviour were to be expected. So, when 
considering the relevance of the outcomes of our research, an important condition is the key-
role played by knowledge such as in multimedia and pharmaceutical biotechnology. Our 
conclusions may not hold when studying non-knowledge based relations in these industries 
such as for example ‘standard transaction’ relations with no knowledge exchange whatsoever. 
Nor may our conclusions hold in industries in which knowledge plays a less prominent role.  
In such contexts other approaches may have more relevance such as for example a power-
based approach or TCE.
Another condition is that of the national context. The national context is formed by the 1st
level in our model of the institutional environment. In our methodological discussion in 
chapter 6, we have argued why it is important to keep the national context constant. Our 
research aim stresses differences among SIS’s and our research questions focus on SIS 
specific institutions, insofar relevant for interfirm learning, and abstract from national 
institutions. By keeping the national context constant we can focus on differences among 
sectoral systems of innovation, which enables us to verify the relationships among the 
relevant variables, enhancing internal validity. Therefore, we have made the choice to select 
different sectoral systems of innovation within the same national, institutional context. So, our 
conclusions are applicable to the Netherlands and, strictly speaking, we cannot claim 
relevance to other countries. However, key sectoral institutions have a structure and life of 
their own (Mowery and Nelson 1999), making that the importance of knowledge, given its 
central role for these industries, may exceed the role of some national institutions. This may 
be more so because both industries have been characterized, and still are until the present day, 
by substantial knowledge inflows from outside the national territory, a phenomenon shared by 
these two industries in other countries as well. So, although we cannot make any claims based 
on our research, we expect at least some resemblance with regard to the co-evolutionary 
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processes in the multimedia and pharmaceutical biotechnology in other countries. 
Relevance of issues
An important issue is the relevance of our level of analysis. The central model in our research 
is formed by the Cycle of Knowledge. Nooteboom (2000) claims that this heuristic tool 
applies to different levels of analysis, ranging from people, firms, industries and economies. 
Based on our research we cannot confirm nor reject this claim as the focus of our study has 
been on learning and innovation process in the context of a SIS, which is largely comparable 
with the industry-level. Given this restriction, we have concluded in paragraph 9.1 that on an 
industry-level the general pattern as set out in chapter 4 was largely confirmed: the  4 sub-
phases that connect exploration with exploitation and vice versa could be identified, mostly 
also in the sequential manner as conjectured. However, our case-studies have not confirmed 
our hypotheses with regard to network structures and governance strategies. So, our case-
studies have indicated that the ‘general pattern’ of learning, both when technology-oriented 
and business-oriented, is adequately captured by our ‘dialectic’ of exploration & exploitation. 
How this pattern then settles in network structures, governance strategies and learning 
regimes routines is specific to the institutional set-up within a SIS.  
Another issue that relates to the external validity of our conclusions is the relevance of the 
Cycle of Knowledge in describing patterns of change, either technological or non-
technological. In our case-studies we have studied patterns of (technological) change that, 
although characterised by substantial dynamism and in some cases abrupt change, all had a 
substantial level of cumulativeness in them. Let us further clarify this.  
The multimedia innovation system is characterized by a duality in types of firms: new 
entrants with no relevant antecedents in this industry whatsoever as well as firms that have 
been around for a long(-er) period of time such as specialised suppliers of hard-&software, 
audio-visual firms, printing firms, publishers and telco’s. This duality in types of firms 
reflects the dual face of multimedia: on the one hand the newness of multimedia technology 
and the new economic activities generated by it, on the other hand the convergence process of 
previously distinct industries that were increasingly affected by these new technological and 
economic developments. In pharmaceutical biotechnology we also see this duality in types of 
firms: small DBF’s that explore in cooperation with large pharma firms that maintain a strong 
exploitation focus. The fact that appropriability takes place by complementary assets makes 
that this duality is maintained, at least for the time being. So, in both SIS’s we see radical 
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technological change and new entrants going together with the persistence of existing firms. 
The latter were needed as the continuity of innovative activities strongly depended on (some 
of) their capabilities and resources, indicating that for innovation in multimedia and 
pharmaceutical biotechnology there certainly is clearly also cumulativeness of knowledge and 
capabilities, next to substantial change. This connects with the social constructivist ontology 
underlying the Cycle of Knowledge. Perception, interpretation and evaluation are contingent 
upon the institutional environment and people are influenced in their thinking by prevailing 
cognitive institutions and other institutions that enable and constrain their actions. So, 
different people see the world differently to the extent that they have developed in different 
social and physical surroundings and have not interacted with each other. In other words, 
environment and past experience determine ’absorptive capacity’ (Nooteboom & Gilsing 2003). 
This explains why the Cycle of Knowledge is indeed capable of describing the processes of 
cumulative (technological) change in these two SIS’s.  
9.5  Results and limitations of our research 
An important assumption in our research is that we see industry evolution as a dynamic 
disequilibrium and evolutionary process of constant adaptation and renewal of network 
structures, coordination mechanisms and learning regimes. To be able to explain why a 
specific combination of these three elements has emerged, we need to understand the co-
evolutionary process that has generated it. Rather than providing a detailed account of the 
structure of the system at a certain moment in time, we have concentrated on trying to develop 
an understanding of how the system has evolved over time as a result of endogenous change 
within the system itself. So, we have focused on the dynamics within a SIS. The potential 
danger of such a dynamic analysis is that it may quickly lead to a high level of complexity 
and the risk of getting lost. To prevent us from falling into this trap we have set a number of 
limits to our research.  
Limits
One limit is in time. We have not focused on the entire history of both SIS’s but have limited 
our analysis to the past 10 - 15 years. Both the multimedia and pharmaceutical biotechnology 
SIS’s have been characterized by a high rate of change in this period with abundant dynamic 
processes that we have analysed in terms of the co-evolution of institutional environment and 
learning regimes. 
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A second limit is in level of analysis. Our focus has been on the changing nature of networks 
and the changing properties of the relations making up these networks. In doing so, we have 
ignored acts of individual firms. This choice reflects the notion that relations form the core of 
a SIS and form an integral element of these learning and innovation processes within a SIS 
(Malerba 2002).
A third limit is set by our choice of keeping the national level, the 1st level in our model of the 
institutional environment, constant. In our methodological discussion in chapter 6, we have 
argued the importance of keeping the national context constant. By keeping the national 
context constant we can focus on differences among sectoral systems of innovation which 
enables us to verify the relationships among the relevant variables, enhancing internal 
validity. Therefore, we decided to select different sectoral systems of innovation within the 
same national, institutional context.  
A fourth limit is set by our focus on knowledge-based relations. Obviously, firms may have 
different relations with different firms. The engagement in frequent economic transactions 
does not need to imply that these transactions are knowledge intensive. Transactions can 
entail mainly the exchange of standard products or services without any knowledge exchange 
whatsoever. Given our research aim, we have ignored such relations and we only studied 
those relations in which various sorts of knowledge are exchanged, in varying intensity.  
A fifth limit is that we have not systematically compared the performance of different 
combinations of network structure, relational properties and coordination mechanisms66. This 
followed from our research aim and questions, based on which we developed our research 
design. Our choice then for longitudinal case-studies and for data-collection based on archival 
records made it possible to analyse those combinations of network structures, relational 
properties and coordination mechanisms of which ex-post could be determined that this 
combination proved to be successful. As a consequence, we have not been able to compare 
these forms with alternative forms of organisation and their specific performance 
characteristics.  
Results 
Our research aim was to study the co-evolution between institutional environment and 
learning regimes. Based on the Cycle of Knowledge we have been able to systematically 
66 Obviously, there are different ways to see performance such as learning performance, economic performance 
or whether it relates to firm performance or network performance. 
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describe and analyse this co-evolutionary process in multimedia and pharmaceutical 
biotechnology. This analysis has brought us three important results.  
One is that we have been able to explain why a specific combination of network structure, 
relational properties and coordination mechanisms was selected. In other words, our research 
has led us to understand and explain the ‘inside-causations’ of this co-evolutionary process, 
and how it settled in these 3rd level institutions.  
A second result, which builds on the first, is that we have been able to develop some more 
insights into how optimality of the combination of network structure, relational properties and 
coordination mechanisms varies with the context. As we have shown, context-specificities 
profoundly affect the optimality of networks, which is a far cry from the universalistic tone of 
social network theory. In this respect, our study informs us on two issues with regard to the 
use of social network theory. A first issue is that social network theory has proven to be useful 
in systematically describing the structure and functioning of networks. The insights offered by 
social network theory on the distinction between on the one hand properties of the network 
structure such as density and on the other hand properties of relational ties making up this 
structure such as strength of ties, have proven to be useful in understanding social networks 
and differentiating between them. A second issue is that social network theory has not been 
useful in its normative implications with their strong universalistic tone. As argued, our study 
has clearly indicated that optimality of the combination of network structure, relational 
properties and coordination mechanism is subject to 2nd level institutions of a SIS. Hence the 
universalistic tone of social network theorists is not appropriate when studying networks from 
light on how a network-perspective, as taken in our research, can complement a firm-
perspective. The increasing importance of networks, especially in knowledge-intensive 
industries, makes that both perspectives become increasingly interwoven. Our findings 
indicate that a network-perspective brings in a new view with implications when taking a 
firm-perspective. This especially applies to exploration networks as we predominantly found 
in multimedia and pharmaceutical biotechnology. In this respect, we concluded that in 
networks the key-question with regard to organising for exploration is not ‘how to combine 
specialisation and integration’ but ‘how to combine diversity and selection’. This has 
implications for firms when developing a strategy on how to structure their network, where to 
position in such a network and which role to play. As said, such considerations were beyond 
the scope of our research but certainly justify further exploration in future research.  
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